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Summary 
Agricultural productivity has been low in Ghana due to low soil fertility aggravated by soil 
degradation among other factors. Soil fertility can be increased by investing in soil conservation 
measures. Tenure arrangements have gained attention as a way to understand investment in 
soil conservation measures. Secure tenure rights are claimed to increase investment, 
however, empirical findings concerning the effects of tenure arrangements on investment are 
ambiguous. Focusing on tenure arrangements alone might not be sufficient; decision-making 
occurs in the context of its social setting and social networks are therefore a promising source 
of explanation of investment behavior. Investment decisions might also be influenced by 
participation in off-farm activities that constitute an important source of income and influence 
labor allocation. Unravelling the determinants of investment in soil conservation measures 
helps understanding how to increase agricultural productivity in a sustainable manner.  
This study analyzes the impact of land tenure arrangements on farmers’ investment decisions 
in soil conservation measures at plot-level, while also determining the influence of social 
networks and income diversification of farms using cross-sectional data from 400 farmers in 
the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana collected in 2010. Four diverse tenure arrangements are 
employed: ownership with restricted rights, ownership with unrestricted rights, fixed-rentership, 
and sharecropping. Three soil conservation measures and one productivity-enhancing 
measure, fertilizer, have been chosen for the analysis. Tenure arrangements’ influence on the 
decision of farmers to invest in these measures is estimated by employing a multivariate probit 
model, while endogeneity of land tenure arrangements, social capital and off-farm activities 
are controlled for by 2SCML. The effect of investment on productivity is, unlike tenure 
arrangements by means of a productivity analysis, examined by propensity score matching 
which accounts for possible selectivity bias.  
A dynamic framework examines the relationship between diverse tenure arrangements, social 
networks and farmer’s investment in productivity enhancing and soil conservation measures. 
Diverse tenure arrangements lead to different time horizons, and costs of investment differ 
depending on the type of tenure. 
The empirical results show the influence of tenure arrangements, social capital and off-farm 
activities on farmers’ investment decisions. Farmers who rent land are less likely to invest in 
manure, a soil improving investment with positive long-term effects. Farmers on sharecropping 
contracts and under fixed-rentership are more likely to invest in fertilizer, a short-term 
investment option which decreases soil quality over time. The number of years the plot is under 
use by the cultivator is positively associated with all investment options, supporting the notion 
of tenure security as an important factor in investment in soil conservation measures.  
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Investment is driven by social networks. Being part of information networks as well as networks 
related to other types of assistance is positively related to most investment options. In addition, 
participation in a farm-based organization increases the likelihood of investment. A descriptive 
analysis underlines the positive relationship between several types of social networks and 
investment in soil conservation measures. Investment in soil conservation measures with long-
term effects are positively associated with diverse types of social capital covering monetary, 
practical and knowledge assistance. Underlining the previous analyses, farmers face varying 
constraints on investment depending on the various tenure arrangements they are confined by 
and the social networks they have access to. 
Results of the productivity analysis uncover no evidence that both tenure arrangements and 
social capital are significant determinants of productivity. However, results using PSM for the 
impact of investment on productivity reveal that investment in ditches, fertilizer and multiple 
cropping significantly increases revenue per acre on plot.  
Results of farmers’ decisions to participate in self-employment and wage employment show 
diverse drivers, yet similar entry barriers exist for both types of off-farm activities for households 
that have very few assets.  
Zusammenfassung 
Landwirtschaftliche Produktion in Ghana hat wie in anderen afrikanischen Ländern ihr 
Potential noch nicht ausgeschöpft. Wachstum muss nachhaltig sein, d.h. nachhaltige 
Bewirtschaftung muss neben produktivitätssteigernden Inputs angewendet werden. 
Grundbesitzrechte haben in Bezug auf Investition in nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung an 
Bedeutung gewonnen. Jedoch sind die empirischen Ergebnisse des Einflusses von 
Grundbesitzrechten auf das Investitionsverhalten des Landwirts nicht eindeutig. 
Entscheidungen treten in einem sozialen Umfeld auf und soziale Netzwerke können 
vielversprechend sein um das Investitionsverhalten zu erklären. Allerdings wurde der Einfluss 
dieser bisher wenig im Zusammenhang mit Grundbesitzrechten untersucht. Nicht-
landwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung wird ebenfalls berücksichtigt, da sie eine wichtige 
Einkommensquelle darstellt und die Arbeitsallokation beeinflusst. 
Die Studie analysiert vorwiegend den Einfluss von Grundbesitzrechten auf nachhaltige 
Bewirtschaftung auf der Grundstücksebene und untersucht gleichzeitig inwiefern soziale 
Netzwerke und Einkommensdiversifizierung des Landwirts eine Rolle spielen. Mittels einer 
Befragung, die im Mai 2010 stattfand, wurden Querschnittsdaten von 400 Haushalten in der 
Brong Ahafo Region in Ghana erhoben. Dabei wurden vier verschiedene Grundbesitzrechte 
berücksichtigt: Besitz mit beschränkten oder uneingeschränkten Rechten, ein Pachtvertrag mit 
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monetärer Pacht oder das Entrichten der Pacht als Teil der Ernte. Sozialkapitalvariablen sind 
angelehnt an ein multidimensionales Konzept. Nicht-landwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung ist 
unterteilt in selbstständige und nichtselbstständige Beschäftigung. Die Determinanten dieser 
werden anhand eines bivariaten Probitmodells ermittelt. Zwischen vier verschiedenen 
Investitionen wird unterschieden: Gräben, Kunstdünger, biologischer Dünger und Mischkultur. 
Diese werden anhand eines multivariaten Probitmodells untersucht; für Endogenität von 
Grundbesitzrechten, Sozialkapital und nicht-landwirtschaftlicher Beschäftigung wird mittels der 
2SCML kontrolliert. Der Einfluss von Investitionen auf die Produktivität wird, im Gegensatz zu 
Grundbesitzrechten anhand einer Produktivitätsanalyse, mit Hilfe des Propensity Score 
Matching erfasst, welches für mögliche Verzerrung durch Selbstselektion kontrolliert.  
Der mögliche Einfluss von Grundbesitzrechten und sozialen Netzwerken auf das 
Investitionsverhalten des Landwirts wird anhand eines dynamisch theoretischen Modells 
erklärt. Verschiedene Grundbesitzrechte führen zu unterschiedlichen Zeithorizonten, Kosten 
der Investition sind verschieden und abhängig vom Grundbesitzrecht. 
Die Ergebnisse bezüglich des Einflusses von Grundbesitzrechten, Sozialkapital und nicht-
landwirtschaftlicher Beschäftigung auf das Investitionsverhalten des Landwirts zeigen, dass 
das Pachten von Land Investitionen in biologischen Dünger hindert und Pacht als auch 
Sharecropping Investitionen in Maßnahmen mit privaten Kurzzeiteffekten fördert (chemischer 
Dünger). Ferner beeinflussen Jahre, die das Land bereits vom Landwirt kultiviert wurde alle 
Investitionen ebenfalls positiv. Darüber hinaus übt Sozialkapital einen positiven Einfluss auf 
Investitionen aus. Zusätzliche deskriptive Analysen bestätigen den positiven Einfluss 
verschiedenster sozialer Netwerke auf das Investitionsverhalten des Landwirts. 
Ausserlandwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung fördern Investitionen.  
Deskriptive Analysen belegen die Bedeutung von verschiedenen sozialen Netzwerken im 
Hinblick auf das Investitionsverhalten des Landwirts. Insbesondere Gräben und Mischkultur, 
Investitionen mit Langzeiteffekten, sind positiv verknüpft mit verschiedensten sozialen 
Netzwerken. Diese beinhalten sowohl monetäre als auch praktische Hilfe und Zugang zu 
Informationen. Die fünf Komponenten der Hauptkomponentenanalyse, basierend auf 
Hindernissen aus Sicht des Landwirts zu investieren, erfassen verschiedene Hindernisse in 
Bezug auf das Investitionsverhalten: das Fehlen von Kompetenz, Liquidität, praktischer Hilfe, 
sicheren Grundbesitzrechten und Profitabilität von Investitionen. Diese variieren zwischen den 
Grundbesitzrechten und je nach sozialen Netzwerken, wobei letzteres weniger offensichtlich 
ist. 
Die Ergebnisse der Produktivitätsanalyse ergeben, dass Grundbesitzrechte und Sozialkapital 
keine signifikanten Determinanten von Produktivität sind. Allerdings beeinflusst das Besitzen 
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eines Mobiltelefons Produktivität positiv und deutet auf die Relevanz von Kommunikation hin. 
Ein Modell mit festen Haushaltseffekten wurde verwendet, um für unbeobachtbare Variablen 
auf der Haushaltsebene zu kontrollieren, die Produktivität beeinflussen. Grundbesitzrechte 
sind ebenfalls keine signifikanten Einflussfaktoren von Produktivität. 
Ergebnisse bezüglich des Einflusses von Investitionen auf Produktivität zeigen, dass Gräben, 
Kunstdünger und Mischkultur den Erlös pro Acre signifikant erhöhen. Die Ergebnisse stimmen 
mit bisherigen Studien überein, die den Einfluss von Investitionen, die in Verbindung zu 
nachhaltiger Bewirtschaftung stehen, untersuchen.  
Die Entscheidung des Landwirts selbstständige und nichtselbstständige Beschäftigung 
auszuführen wird sehr unterschiedlich determiniert. Jüngere, weibliche und gebildetere 
Landwirte, die Land besitzen und monetär unterstützt werden, gehen eher selbstständiger 
Beschäftigung nach. Bestimmungsfaktoren von nichtselbstständiger Beschäftigung zeigen 
auf, dass auch dies heterogene Aktivitäten sind. Eintrittsbarrieren bestehen für beide Arten 
von Beschäftigung für Haushalte, die mit wenig Besitz ausgestattet sind. 
Die aktuelle Studie liefert wichtige Implikationen für die Politik. Die Bereitstellung von sicheren 
Bodenrechten und die Verlängerung der zeitlich befristeten Rechte würden aufgrund der 
empirischen Ergebnisse nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung begünstigen. Hinzu kommen 
Investitionen in Institutionen wie landwirtschaftliche Organisationen und Beratung, die den 
Informationsaustausch fördern. Damit einhergehend ist es erforderlich, die positiven Effekte 
von nachhaltiger Bewirtschaftung auf den Erlös zu kommunizieren. Da nicht-
landwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung und landwirtschaftliche Produktion zusammenhängen, sind 
komplementäre Aktivitäten erforderlich, um beides zu fördern. Der Zugang zu nicht-
landwirtschaftlicher Beschäftigung muss für die Landwirte verbessert werden, die wenig Besitz 
haben. Eine Möglichkeit wäre verbesserte Bildung. Der Zugang zu monetären Mitteln ist 
entscheidend für selbstständige Beschäftigung und verweist auf die große Bedeutung der 
Förderung des Zugangs zu Kredit.  
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1 Introduction to the study 
Agricultural productivity has been low in Ghana due to low soil fertility aggravated by soil 
degradation among other factors. Soil fertility can be increased by investing in soil conservation 
measures (Morris et al., 2007; CIA, 2018). Tenure arrangements have gained attention as a 
way to understand investment in soil conservation measures (Abdulai and Goetz, 2014). 
Secure tenure rights are claimed to increase investment, however, empirical findings 
concerning the effects of tenure arrangements on investment are ambiguous. The link between 
secure land tenure arrangements and investment in soil conservation measures has gained 
increased attention over time. Tenure arrangements on investment either have been found to 
exert a positive effect (Abdulai et al., 2011) or only an inconclusive relationship (Besley, 1995). 
Focusing on tenure arrangements alone might not be sufficient; decision-making occurs in the 
context of its social setting and social networks are therefore a promising source of explanation 
of investment behavior (Berry, 2009; 1373). Investment also implies that farmers feel secure 
enough to invest and are aware of investment possibilities and their effects (Bandiera and 
Rasul, 2006; Udry, 2008).  
A number of studies have separately analyzed the impact of land tenure arrangements and 
social networks on farmers’ investment decisions, however, both have rarely been studied 
together. A survey of current research concludes that only a few studies have focused on both, 
and even those miss important aspects. The concept of social capital is simplified, tenure 
arrangements are not assessed adequately, and investment options are aggregated (see 
Saint-Macary et al., 2010; Beekman and Bulte, 2012).  
Non-farm income accounts for around 50% of rural household income in Africa; in Ghana it is 
around 40% (Haggblade et al., 2010; Senadza, 2012). Interactions between on-farm and off-
farm activities have been analyzed in several developing countries with contradictory results. 
Off-farm activities are claimed to be beneficial in terms of providing cash, but also to hinder 
investments by diverting labor away, especially from labor-intensive conservation measures 
(Killic et al., 2009; Oseni and Winters, 2009). Productivity should be fostered in both the short-
term and the long-term. In Ghana, environmental degradation is deemed responsible for 
productivity not rising sufficiently (CIA; 2018). Therefore, the relationship between tenure 
arrangements and investment is not all that needs investigation, productivity is also of great 
importance. Previous studies focus on the effect of tenure arrangements and investment 
decisions on productivity with ambiguous results (Besley, 1995; Fenske, 2010a; Abdulai et al., 
2011). 
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Increased agricultural productivity in a sustainable manner can be facilitated not only in Ghana 
but also in other African countries, by making use of these study insights. Conclusions of this 
study are expected to support sustainable growth in agriculture in Ghana mainly by providing 
insight into determinants of investment in soil conservation measures. These insights can be 
used to adjust policy measures in order to enhance investments in both productivity-enhancing 
as well as soil conservation measures by strengthening security of tenure rights as well as 
making use of social networks.  
1.1 Research Questions 
(i) How do different land tenure arrangements influence investment in soil conservation 
measures? What is the effect of social networks and income diversification on investment 
behavior? 
(ii) What is the influence of tenure arrangements, social networks and investment on 
productivity? 
(iii) What are the determinants to engage in wage employment and self-employment? 
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this study is to gain insight into the impact of land tenure arrangements on 
farmers’ investment decisions on soil conservation measures.   
Specifically, the study seeks to: (i) examine the relationship between land tenure 
arrangements, social networks, income diversification and soil conservation measures at plot-
level while controlling for possible endogeneity within these concepts, (ii) determine the 
influence of tenure arrangements, social networks and investment on productivity at plot-level, 
while controlling for possible self-selection bias concerning the latter, (iii) analyze the farmer’s 
decision to participate in off-farm activities, specifically self-employment and wage 
employment. 
1.3 Problem statement 
Agriculture is one of the most important sectors in developing countries. For the past 40 years, 
agricultural yields and growth rates have remained low in Africa. Any growth that occurred was 
more due to the use of additional land than to an increase of yields as such. A relatively low 
and stable use of inputs such as fertilizer can also be observed. Another reason for the 
insufficient increase in yields is the poor conditions of natural resources which hinder the 
development of agriculture, along with the reduction of poverty and the increase of food 
security (Barrett et al., 2002b). 
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To increase productivity in a sustainable manner, output needs to increase while 
simultaneously ensuring that natural resources are protected for future use (Udry, 2009). Soil 
inherits a resource base which, if not replenished, is at risk of giving ever-diminishing returns 
in the future. The sustainability of agricultural yields requires the maintenance of soil fertility 
(Agwe et al., 2007). 
One means of increasing productivity is to invest in soil conservation measures. But farmers 
are faced with challenges such as insecure land tenure arrangements, especially for long-term 
investments (Knox et al., 2002). However, empirical evidence for the positive effect of secure 
land tenure arrangements on investment decisions in Africa is rather ambiguous and highlights 
the important role that context plays with regard to investment decisions (Place, 2009).  
 
The decision-making process of farmers is embedded within a social setting, and social 
networks might provide preconditions of action (Woolcock and Narajan, 2000; Woolcock, 
2010). Capacity building of farmers is crucial in that they are endowed with the necessary 
knowledge and skills (Kothari, 2004) to invest in soil conservation measures. A lack of 
information concerning investment possibilities and access to inputs and technology may 
obstruct investment (Place and Otsuka, 2002). Investment decisions might also be influenced 
by off-farm activities that constitute an important source of income and influence labor 
allocation (Barrett et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2009; Pfeiffer et al., 2009).  
1.4 Outline of thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: In chapter 2, the study area and farm 
household survey are presented. Information on the country’s economic activity and 
development, in particular, the agricultural sector, is given. The data collection method is 
outlined and a summary of focus group discussions that took place before executing the survey 
is given.  
Chapter 3 builds the backbone of the thesis. It includes the empirical analysis of the impact of 
land tenure on farmers’ investment decisions in soil conservation measures. The chapter 
provides a literature overview and an outline of land tenure and its history in Ghana. A review 
of theoretical linkages and extant empirical literature on property rights and soil conservation 
measures is presented. A dynamic framework explains the effect of tenure arrangements and 
social networks on the investment decisions that farmers make. This chapter also covers the 
methodology employed. A discussion on the empirical results concerning the impact of land 
tenure arrangements, social networks, and off-farm activities along with controlling for their 
possible endogeneity, on several investment decisions at plot-level follows. 
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Chapter 4 presents the concept of social networks in detail. First, a literature overview of the 
concept and its interlinkages to tenure arrangements in the context of investment behavior is 
presented, followed by a qualitative analysis complementing the empirical findings in chapter 
3. Constraints on investment from the farmer’s point of view are analyzed and comparisons 
are carried out between tenure arrangements and social networks of the farmer. 
Chapter 5 presents the influence of land tenure arrangements on plot-level productivity, a 
literature overview, a conceptual framework and empirical specifications and results. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the intermediate effect between tenure arrangements and productivity 
by using investment options. First, it goes through extant empirical literature analyzing the 
effect of investment decisions on productivity. Next, the conceptual framework and the 
empirical specification are presented, followed by the descriptive and empirical results. 
Chapter 7 analyzes participation in off-farm activities and gains deeper insight into the 
relationship between off-farm activities and investment decisions. It presents a review of the 
extant empirical literature on the interrelations between participation in off-farm activities and 
investment on the farm and determinants of income diversification. The farmers’ decision to 
participate in self-employment and/or wage employment is determined by a time allocation 
model based on the tested assumption of separability. This chapter includes the econometric 
model applied and the descriptive and empirical results analyzing the relationship between 
participation in off-farm work and investment while discussing participation in self-employment 
and wage employment. 
Finally, chapter 8 closes the thesis with a summary of results along with policy implications 
and suggestions for future research. 
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2 The study area and farm household survey 
 
This chapter provides an overview of Ghana and, more specifically, of the two regions where 
the survey was carried out. The sampling procedure is briefly outlined and outcomes of focus 
group discussions conducted before designing the survey are presented. 
2.1 Country profile 
Ghana is part of Sub-Saharan Africa, a group of African countries that, as the name suggests, 
are countries that lie to the South of the Sahara, constituting its own challenges and 
circumstances in comparison to the Northern countries of Africa. Ghana is in West Africa. The 
capital, and largest city is Accra. It is located on the Gulf of Guinea and shares borders with 
Cote d'Ivoire and Togo to the west and east respectively. To the North, Ghana shares border 
with Burkina Faso. A map of Ghana and its neighboring countries is shown in figure 2-1.  
      
Figure 2-1: Map of Ghana1                                             
Ghana has a population of 28 million, according to the 2012 census, with a population density 
of around 124 people per km2 (World Bank, 2016). Ghana’s population is rather young, with 
approximately 57% of the population aged below 25 years. 52% of the total population lives in 
urban centers (CIA, 20182). Ghana’s population is multi-ethnic. Akan is the predominant ethnic 
group (45%), followed by Mole-Dagbani (17%), the Ewe (14%), Ga and Dangme, and several 
 
1 Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_gh.html 
2 Estimate 2017 
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smaller ones. English is the official language but many other languages are spoken (World 
Population Review, 2017; Gocking, 2005: 8-10). 
Ghana is characterized by a tropical climate with the main seasonal change being between 
wet and dry season. In the South, one can observe various types of rainforest and experience 
two rainy seasons whereas, in the North, there is mostly savanna woodland and only the one 
rainy season (Gocking, 2005: 2). the climate differs from warm and dry along the coast in the 
Southeast, to hot and humid in the Southwest and dry in the North (CIA, 2018). 
Ghana is representative of other African countries since agriculture forms the mainstay of the 
economy and provides a means of earning a living for a large range of the population, yet with 
decreasing relevance. In 2010, agriculture accounted for nearly 30% of Ghana’s GDP, yet with 
decreasing importance for the country (World Bank, 2013) accounting for only 20% of GDP in 
2016 (World Bank, 2018). Still, farming employs more than half of Ghana’s total workforce that 
are mainly small landholders (CIA; 2018). Farming is mostly practiced on a small scale, 80% 
of agricultural production coming from an average land holding of below 1.5 hectares (Bennett-
Lartey and Oteng-Yeboah, 2008). Previous growth in crop production, like that in other African 
countries, is mostly due to land expansion and, to a lesser extent, to an improvement in yields. 
Growth in the future needs sustainable sources of growth (Diao, 2010). Growth that occurred 
was mostly owing to cocoa production and marketing, whereas sub-sectors such as food crops 
are not characterized by high improvements (NDPC, 2010, World Bank, 2010).  
Of the land available, 70% is agricultural land, 20% is arable and 12% is used for permanent 
crops, the rest for permanent pasture (CIA, 20183). The most common crops cultivated are 
maize, cassava, plantain, yam, cocoyam, rice, sorghum, and millet. In the North, sorghum, 
millet, yam, and rice play a major role, while in the South maize, cassava and plantain are 
more important crops. Vegetables cultivated are pepper, eggplant, tomatoes, okra, and beans. 
Cash crops are oil palm, cotton, coconut, tobacco, groundnut, rubber and cocoa. 
 
Exports constitute 41% of the GDP (World Bank, 20184) with a large relevance of agriculture. 
Cocoa accounts for more than 50% of total exports, followed by manganese ores and 
concentrates which comprise nearly 10% of exports (Bennett-Lartey and Oteng-Yeboah, 2008; 
World Bank, 2011a6). Other natural resources are oil, gas, gold, diamond, salt, bauxite, 
limestone, and iron ore that are also exported (Gocking, 2005: 6-8; NDPC, 2010).  
 
 
3 Estimate 2017 
4 Estimate from 2016 
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Poor soil constrains the level of agricultural production. One current environmental issue all 
over the country is soil erosion (CIA, 2018). Environmental degradation and lack of sustainable 
agriculture are responsible for productivity not rising sufficiently in agriculture (NDPC, 2005). 
Other environmental concerns, especially with export-oriented agriculture, are land 
degradation, deforestation and reduced biodiversity (World Bank, 2010; CIA, 2018). Initiatives 
have had poor success with respect to reversal of degradation of natural resources. This is 
caused by the rapid depletion of biomass without any replenishing of stocks and generally 
natural resources being inefficiently managed (UNDP, 2015).  
With regard to the Millennium Development Goals, a blueprint for development, the first and 
the seventh goals are especially related to the study. The first developmental goal of 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger has been achieved ahead of target in both urban and 
regional areas, with Ghana being the first country in Sub-Saharan African (UNDP, 2015). That 
being the case, the present GDP per capita of $1.513 is above the average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (excluding South Africa) of $1.464 (World Bank, 20185). Since 1995, Ghana has tried to 
become a middle-income country. The first national policy development framework developed 
was ‘Vision 2020’. It was followed by the GPRS I and GPRS II (NDPC, 2010), resulting in 
Ghana’s achievement of its goal of becoming a middle-income country (UNDP, 2018).  
The share of forested area to total land area is one indicator of the 7th millennium development 
goal of ensuring environmental sustainability and declined from 1990 to 2010 to 22%, a drop 
of over 10% (World Bank, 2013). Trees that have been lumbered and extension of land used 
for cultivation led to the loss of large areas of rainforest. Expansion of land is limited and the 
need for farmland comes at the cost of losing forest area (Gocking, 2005:3). The 7th millennium 
development goal has not been achieved and deforestation is occurring at an alarming rate, 
despite afforestation efforts since 2010. Part of the challenge is also linked to unsustainable 
agricultural practices (UNDP, 2015). 
Ghana has a market-based economy with relatively few policy barriers to trade and investment. 
Its economy has been supported by relatively sound management and sustained reductions 
in poverty, yet has suffered due to loose fiscal policy, high budget deficits along with a 
depreciating currency (CIA, 2018). There is potential for the private sector to enhancing 
development and some policy actions address the promotion of the private off-farm sector 
(NDPC; 2010). For instance, the GPRS II aimed at the promotion of rural off-farm businesses 
by supporting innovation and entrepreneurship and facilitating access to capital (NDPC, 2005; 
IMF, 2009). A three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was signed with the IMF as a 
 
5 Estimate from 2016 
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follow-up to the GPRS II in 2009 to, among other objectives, enhance competitiveness of the 
private sector (CIA, 2012). Data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GSS 2013) indicate 
that about 44% of households are engaged in off-farm enterprises, with about 37% in total in rural 
areas. The main off-farm activities are manufacturing, trading and other economic activities such 
as mining and construction (GSS, 2013).  In 2015, Ghana signed a $920 million extended credit 
facility with IMF. Prospects for new oil and gas production and follow through on tighter fiscal 
management are likely to help Ghana’s economy in 2018 (CIA; 2018).  
One of Ghana’s 10 regions is the Brong Ahafo Region, the ‘bread basket’, with its capital 
Sunyani. It covers an area of 39,557 km2 and has a population of 1,815,408 inhabitants. It was 
established in 1959 and used to be part of the Ashanti region. 19 administrative districts are 
part of the region with Kintampo (being separated into Kintampo North and Kintampo South) 
lying at the center of the country. Agriculture is, like in other regions, the predominant 
occupation in the Brong Ahafo Region in all districts (Government of Ghana Official Portal, 
2013). The region’s main endowments are arable land (60%) with nearly half of it under 
cultivation, followed by forestry, inland fisheries, and clay deposits.  
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Figure 2-2: Map of Ghana - Regions6         
The table 2-1 shows main differences between the sampled districts in the Brong Ahafo Region 
Kintampo North, situated in the North, and Techiman, lying more to the South (Government of 
Ghana Official Portal, 2013; Embassy of the Republic of Ghana, 2013; Kintampo North 
Municipal Assembly, 2006; Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 2013). 
Table 2-1: Characteristics of Sampled Districts Kintampo North and Techiman 
District Kintampo North Techiman 
Vegetation
/Climate 
- Guinea savannah woodland 
- Tropical Continental or 
interior Savannah type of 
climate (district lies in the 
transitional zone between 2 
major climatic regions of 
Ghana) 
- Moist semi-deciduous forest 
- Semi-equatorial and tropical 
conventional or savanna climates, 
characterized by moderate to 
heavy annual rainfall 
- 3 main vegetation zones: Guinea-
Savanna woodland (north-west) 
the semi-deciduous (south) and 
the Transitional zone (from the 
south-east and west up to the 
north of the municipality) 
Economy Agrarian, nearly every citizen is 
engaged in agricultural and related 
activities 
Agricultural production and 
agricultural marketing 
 
6 Source: http://www.feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/countries/images/map-ghana.png  
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Soil Groundwater lateral soils which cover 
nearly 3/5 of the area (poor in organic 
matter and nutrients) 
Savanna Ochrosols covering the 
remaining 2/5 of the area (more 
organic matter and nutrients) 
Forest and Savanna Ochrosols 
Land Use Crop production (mainly yam, maize, 
cowpea, cassava, rice, plantain) 
livestock production (cattle, sheep, 
goats, local poultry) 
Crop production (mainly maize, yam, 
cassava, plantain), livestock 
production (poultry, sheep, goats, 
cattle, pigs) 
Land area  5,108km² 1,119 km2 
 
2.2 Sampling procedure 
In Figure 2-3, the districts of the Brong Ahafo region are plotted. The survey was carried out in 
the two districts of Techiman and Kintampo North (marked by a dashed circle). Three villages 
in the Techiman and three villages in the Kintampo district were selected, Twimea, Aworopat 
and Fiaso, Kintampo, Kunso and Badukrom respectively. The total sample size is 400 
households with 200 households from each district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Districts of Brong Ahafo region7 
 
 
7 Source: http://ghana-net.com/Documents/776px-Brong_Ahafo_districts.png 
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The Brong-Ahafo Region was chosen due to the plenty land tenure rights observed in this 
region, allowing a comparison between those in terms of investment behavior of farmers. A 
two-stage stratified random sampling technique was employed in order to select farmers within 
each district. First, two districts were selected out of the 19 districts in the Brong Ahafo region, 
and then three villages within each district. The two districts have been selected due to one 
being in the South and one being in the North, where we could obtain variance in the data with 
regards to soil characteristics, as shown in the table above. The three villages out of each 
district have been chosen based on knowing that there are enough farmers with different land 
tenure arrangements and different distances to the next town, which might influence results. 
Second, a stratified random sampling was applied for each district to select farmers out of the 
three villages.  
The following equation presents the procedure for each district: 
Si =  
xi
X
N                                                                                                                              (2-1) 
Where Si is the stratified random sampling to be drawn from each village (stratum) i, xi is the 
population within each village, X is the total population of each district and N is the total sample 
size to be drawn from each district. In total, we obtained a sample size of 400 households, 200 
out of each district. Within the villages, the selection of farmers was random. The farmers 
partaking represented the various land tenure arrangements in the region. Table 2-2 indicates 
the sampled villages and the number and share of farmers interviewed based on the sampling 
strategy. The survey was conducted by means of questionnaire interviews which took place 
between April and May 2010.  
Table 2-2: Sampled villages and number and share of farmers interviewed  
Villages Number of farmers  Percentage 
District Techiman   
Twimea 46 0.12 
Awaropat 98 0.25 
Fiaso 56 0.14 
District Kintampo North   
Kintampo 93 0.23 
Kunso 45 0.11 
Badukrom 62 0.15 
Source: Survey data 
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2.3 Focus group discussions 
Before the survey was carried out, we executed focus group discussions in two villages. In 
each village, most of the village inhabitants came together. We informed them beforehand by 
extension services about our visit and that we would conduct a research with regards to 
investments on their land. During the meeting, we explained that the purpose of our visit was 
to perform a survey in six villages in the area and that we wanted to get some more information 
about their cultivation and conservation measures.  
The main intention of the focus group discussions was to gain information about their 
cultivation and conservation measures, their land tenure rights and social networks from their 
point of view. Through this, we obtained valuable information we used for designing the 
questionnaire. First, we wanted to get to know their most common practices applied in order 
for the survey to not miss any important data.  
We discussed the types of land tenure arrangement. The farmers informed us about taungya 
– a type of restricted landownership – where use rights are given to farmers for a couple of 
years until trees were planted by the government making farming impossible. Consequently, 
we included this type of tenure rights in the questionnaire. 
In addition, we asked for reasons not to apply specific practices. They named several aspects 
such as monetary constraints, lack of practical assistance and information. These aspects 
have been added to the questionnaire by ranking constraints of investment in order to enrich 
the quantitative analysis with qualitative information. In line with constraints of investment, we 
also asked about information sources they used and social networks they are part of and 
address for help. This knowledge improved social network analysis to a great extent by asking 
farmers questions related to their real-life experiences. 
They also showed us a couple of fields. In particular, they pointed out some practices, like 
building ditches, and showed some plants being cultivated during the time of the visit. In 
summary, the focus group discussions helped to design an enriched questionnaire and to focus 
on important aspects from the farmers’ point of view. 
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3 Land tenure arrangements and investments in soil conservation 
measures 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyze the influence of tenure arrangements on investment decisions of 
farmers. The analysis will shed further light on the relevance of tenure arrangements on 
investment behavior. The effect of land tenure arrangements on investment in soil 
conservation measures is ambiguous in extant empirical literature and needs further empirical 
attention in order to foster sustainability in agriculture. We also include the effect of social 
networks and income diversification of farmers in order to provide a holistic picture of the 
determinants influencing investment behavior of farmers. The following chapters will focus 
more deeply on social networks and income diversification. Productivity analysis focuses on 
the measurable effect for farmers. This chapter is divided as follows:  First, an overview of land 
tenure in Ghana and theoretical linkages between land tenure and investment decisions are 
provided. Next, empirical literature on land tenure arrangements and soil conservation 
measures is presented and the missing link to social networks is briefly outlined. A conceptual 
framework is presented, which mainly addresses the impact of diverse tenure arrangements 
on the investment decisions of farmers. The empirical model employed is outlined and 
necessary changes for farmers to invest in soil conservation measures are presented. Lastly, 
the investment specification is presented and the empirical results are discussed. 
3.2 Literature review 
 
3.2.1 Land tenure in Ghana  
Land in rural areas serves several crucial functions. It is a means of earning a living and it can 
also serve as an asset that can be traded, in some cases, for a home. Agricultural production 
in Sub-Saharan Africa like Ghana (except South Africa) is mainly carried out by farmers on 
small plots. Land is linked to property rights. A property right includes the capacity of the right's 
holder to induce the system of authority to come to his or her defense in case of need. It can 
also be linked to utility of the holder over time due to extracting resources and consuming them. 
In Ghana, we observe a customary tenure system and an increasing amount of land is now 
being cultivated under commercial land tenure arrangements such as sharecropping and fixed-
renting (Arnot et al., 2011; Udry, 2012).  
 
Land tenure is the relationship, both legally and customarily, among people, with regards to 
land (FAO; 2002). Arrangements around land tenure are complex because they contain 
several concepts. The most challenging term is “tenure security” and mostly linked to people’s 
perception (FAO; 2012). A common definition of tenure security is provided by Roth and Haas 
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(1998: 1-2) as “the individual’s perception of his/her rights to a piece of land on a continual 
basis, free from imposition or interference from outside sources as well as gain the benefits of 
labor or capital invested in the land, either in use or alienation.” Tenure arrangements’ security 
is also influenced by the length of duration, and the assurance that tenants are not being 
dispossessed or evicted (Place and Swallow, 2002; Place, 2009). The exclusivity of rights and 
their transferability are also addressed along with security where the importance of 
transferability depends to a large extent on the situation of the land market (Place and Swallow, 
2002).  
In Ghana, land law has evolved from a complex combination of several sources drawing from 
religion, customs, legislation, and executive. Two main types of land tenure can be 
distinguished, namely, customary land tenure and public land tenure. The latter is linked to the 
right of the government to acquire land for the greater public good (Sarpong, 2006). Customary 
law implies land to be a common asset where the individual farmer owns the crops but not the 
soil. Deeds on land are subject to lineage and the access that individuals are afforded is based 
on membership of these groups and previous land transactions. Non-members must seek the 
permission of the chief to stay in the area and can obtain land as a sharecropper from a 
landowner or the chief (Pande and Udry, 2007; Berry, 2009).  
Most of the land tenure arrangements across the country are governed by a combination of 
customary rules or convention and legislation. However, the laws and conventions governing 
inheritance vary in their application within the country. In the Akan-speaking region, matrilineal 
rules are predominant. Should a male die leaving no last will and testament, his belongings 
are distributed among his maternal family members in accordance with customary law. The 
deceased’s wife and children are excluded from any gain. In the North, among the Volta and 
the Ga, rules are patrilineal whereby the deceased’s property is divided up among his children 
which has led to plots becoming ever smaller and thus more difficult to cultivate economically 
viable (Sarpong, 2006; Pande and Udry, 2007).  
Generally, commercial land transactions such as sales, fixed-renting, and sharecropping have 
become more prevalent in the recent past in Ghana (Goldstein and Udry, 2008). Most land 
transactions are, by definition, informal, since there is no official registration and they are not 
characterized by individual property rights as in western cultural understanding (Amanor, 1999; 
Pande and Udry, 2007). Since the traditional system implies that full ownership still belongs to 
the community and individuals are faced with restricted rights, use and transfer rights are more 
important (Place and Hazell, 1993). Ghana’s tenure system is very complex. Rights are mostly 
secure as long as the plot is cultivated, rights over a plot are rarely lost while being cultivated. 
However, rights become insecure for the farmer once the land is left fallow (Pande and Udry, 
2007; Goldstein and Udry, 2008).  
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In pre-colonial times there was no land market since land was not a scarce resource (Austin, 
2005: 105). The emerging palm oil, and then cocoa industries gave way to commercial land 
transactions (Berry, 1993: 104). Cocoa trees are a long-term investment and ensured farmers 
the right to cultivate for extended periods. They even afforded farmers the right to rent out the 
plot or use it as collateral. However, over the 20th century due to population, migration and 
industrialization land was no longer abundant (Pande and Udry, 2005). The number of land 
rights claimants increased which increased competition for land. Payments for land rights rose 
and agricultural intensification became more common (Berry, 1993: 110).  
Colonial land administration forms took shape and emerged with the local chiefs being an 
inherent and supervisory part of the system. Four categories constituted land rights in the 
colonial land administration: lineage land secured access to ‘use-rights’ within the lineage 
(however, ‘use-rights’ via sharecropping could be provided to migrants by the lineage head); 
virgin land that could be sold or leased via sharecropping to migrants; concessions of mineral 
and timber rights given by the chief as a form of land usage; and individual land plots purchased 
by individual farmers from the chief. However, with respect to the last category, help from 
several members of lineage was often needed on the plot, resulting in the plot becoming 
lineage land again after the death of the farmer (Amanor, 1999). 
Following independence in 1957, the country’s national government adopted land tenure 
policies in order to change the laws on property rights and land transactions under its flagship 
of economic development. The government nationalized control over land resulting in access 
to land being mainly determined by political connections being dramatically different from 
customary tenure before (Berry, 1993: 124-125). A National Land Policy was published in 
1999, with the main objective to develop an efficient and transparent land management 
system. Customary land tenure has again been recognized by the government since 
independence (Berry, 2009; World Bank, 2011b). Yet, there is still no independent customary 
land tenure system; it is linked with other political and land administration systems (Amanor, 
1999).  
Several other national policies addressed land tenure arrangements in Ghana. Enhancing 
access to land and equity for all farmers has been one of the objectives of the Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) that has been set up for a period of three years between 
2006 and 2009 in order to accelerate growth and achieve becoming a middle-income country. 
In addition, enforcement of the Land Administration Law from 1985 (Intestate Succession Law: 
PNDCL 111) aimed at ensuring tenure security for holders of especially small plots of land 
(NDCP, 2005). The Land Title Registration Law from 1986 (PNDCL 152) complements the 
PNDCL 111 and hopes to achieve an increase in the registration of land and enhance the 
security of tenure. However, it only applies in urban areas around larger cities such as Accra 
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and Kumasi and is not applicable to peasants (Pande and Udry, 2007). A Land Administration 
Project (LAP) was initiated in 2003 in order to implement the National Land Policy and, 
amongst other things, to build up a decentralized land administration system that increases 
land tenure security, and is characterized by fairness, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness 
(Sarpong, 2006, World Bank, 2011b). Three main benefits have been attributed to the LAP: an 
improvement in security of land tenure, a reduction in time to register deeds and titles and 
easier access to land information (World Bank, 2011b).  
3.2.2 Investment decisions - theoretical linkages 
Two main schools of thought regarding the impact of land tenure arrangements on investment 
have evolved in research circles. One argues that the form of land tenure barely influences 
performance of agriculture in Africa. Other social, political and local constraints are claimed to 
be responsible, whereas customary tenure is flexible and adapts if needed in cases of 
changing circumstances. The other school of thought states that indigenous land tenure 
arrangements are not secure enough to foster agricultural investment or to provide incentives 
to use land productively. In particular, informal contractual tenure arrangements fail to promote 
investment. Accordingly, individual property rights that are secure are a key element of 
facilitating investment (Amanor, 1999; Peters, 2004). 
Several theoretical links exist between land tenure arrangements and investment, in that more 
secure and transferable rights increase the incentive to invest (Arnot et al., 2011). Three 
arguments support this link. The first, and the most apparent, is the ‘assurance effect’ which 
means that individuals can be sure of reaping the benefits of their investment in future. Hence, 
the incentive to invest, especially in measures with long-term effects such as soil conservation 
measures, becomes greater with decreasing uncertainty, since there is no fear of being 
expropriated (Feder et al., 1988: 5; Brasselle et al., 2002; Abdulai et al., 2011). The second is 
the ‘realizability effect’ and is the right to transfer land. Improved rights decrease the costs of 
exchange by selling or renting it. Thus, the incentive to invest increases which in turn leads to 
higher expected returns in cases of exchange (Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 2002). The last 
is the so-called ‘collateralization effect’, enhancing access to credit, fostering investments 
(Brasselle et al., 2002). Yet the last effect assumes the existence of formal credit markets 
where land can be used as collateral with respect to agricultural investment, which is most 
often not the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jacoby and Minten, 2007). Hence, the empirical 
significance mainly relies on the first two effects (Fenske, 2010a). 
3.2.3 Marshallian inefficiency and Monitoring approach 
With respect to productivity (efficiency) under different tenure regimes, two contradictory 
streams of theory emerged that shall be discussed below, since they are closely related to 
investment behavior of the farmer. The Marshallian inefficiency states that the farmer applies 
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fewer inputs on a sharecropped plot compared to a plot he owns, due to the sharecropper not 
receiving the full benefit of his investment, and high transaction costs of monitoring, an 
opportunity to overcome the lack of incentives, leading to lower outputs (Shaban, 1987). 
Shaban (1987) also provides empirical findings from eight villages in India. However, a study 
by Arcand et al. (2007) on Tunisia concludes that there is no Marshallian inefficiency for 
sharecroppers with respect to irrigation and transportation and no effects are found with 
respect to output per hectare. 
The other theory is the Monitoring approach. This one argues that the landlord has the means 
to monitor the sharecropper effectively and that the farmer increases input, and by this, output 
(Shaban, 1987). Jacoby and Mansuri (2009) construct a tenancy model with supervision which 
explains that the sharecropper, when supervised (around once a month as a threshold), 
reaches outputs similar to owned and rented plots, compared to unsupervised sharecropped 
plots with lower outputs. Pender and Fafchamps (2006) also relate transaction costs of 
monitoring to fixed-rent tenants in Ethiopia. On one hand, it is not necessary to monitor the 
tenant since the rent paid is not dependent on the tenant’s effort. However, on the other hand, 
it still might be necessary to monitor the fixed-rent tenant in order to avoid depleting soil fertility.  
Another concept is the threat of eviction. Kassie and Holden (2007) argue in their study on 
Ethiopia that the threat of eviction is reduced by increased output on plot, which involves more 
input on the plot in order to increase payoff. Their comparison is based on the same 
households, and they differentiate according to the relationship the tenant has in relation to his 
landlord. In a theoretical study, Banerjee and Ghatak (2004) state that a fixed-rent contract is 
beneficial for outputs. However, due to incomplete accountability, the rent the landlord can 
charge is typically low. One possibility to extract more rents is the sharecropping contract, but 
it might reduce output due to reduced incentives by the sharecropper. One possibility to 
increase incentives is eviction threats, which is in line with the argument by Kassie and Holden 
(2007). Banerjee and Ghatak (2004) even go further in their argumentation. Beyond the 
positive effect of eviction threats of increasing (unobservable) investment effort is another 
dynamic one. Investment in the present period also enhances output in the following periods.  
3.2.4 Empirical literature on property rights and soil conservation measures 
Tenure security is defined in various ways in empirical studies analyzing investment decisions. 
A common proxy for tenure security is duration of tenure and a legal title. Both proxies have 
its drawbacks. The first can be reasoned also by a short duration of tenure hindering 
investment. The latter, legal title, does not always coincide with tenure security (Arnot et al., 
2011). Land titles do not play a crucial role in West Africa, with either no widespread registration 
program or if so, then they have failed (Fenske, 2010a). A perceived measure of security from 
farmers’ point of view can be added (see Beekman and Bulte, 2012).  
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Research has determined the extent of use and transfer rights in empirical analysis very 
different. In one of the early studies analyzing the relationship between land tenure 
arrangements and investment in Ghana, Besley (1995) distinguishes between six diverse 
types of rights. These rights are being able to change the user or even owner of the land by 
renting, selling or simply giving it away or passing it onto someone and using it as collateral. 
The quantitative analysis condensed these six rights into two categories. Brasselle et al. (2002) 
in their analysis on Burkina Faso, distinguish between five categories that are a combination 
of use and transfer rights and account for a hierarchy in transfer rights. 
A slightly different approach is to distinguish between the tenure type such as mailo owner, 
long-term tenants and holders, either public or customary, combined with the extent farmers 
can actually carry out these rights (see Place and Otsuka, 2002). Smith (2004), in his analysis 
on Zambia, only bases the distinction of land tenure arrangements on the sort of land 
documentation, including those who have none as one category. Other aspects taken into 
account in previous research are perceived rights or the mode of acquisition (see Deininger 
and Jin, 2006; Deininger et al., 2008; Ali et al., 2011). 
The mapping of diverse land tenure arrangements in one study area shall best capture the 
differences. Abdulai et al. (2011), in their analysis on the effect of land tenure arrangements on 
investment and productivity in Ghana, collected information about individual rights to use and 
transfer land at the plot-level. The respective arrangements are owner-operated with full 
property rights and owner-operated with restricted property rights, sharecropping, and fixed-
rentership. The main difference between ownership with full and restricted property rights is 
that, in case of the latter, land cannot be transferred or inherited, only renting out is feasible. 
The study by Ali et al. (2012) on Pakistan applies similar categories of tenure arrangements in 
analyzing farmers’ decision to invest in several investment options. Sharecropping implies 
providing part of the output to the landlord as compensation for using the land. The share of 
compensation is most often either half of the output (abunu) or two-thirds (abusa) (see Todardo 
and Smith, 2009: 457 et seq.).  
A sizeable body of empirical research exists that has examined the effects of land tenure on 
investment and has employed diverse econometric models. Mostly, the decision whether to 
invest or not has been analyzed by means of binary response models (e.g. Brasselle et al., 
2002; Deininger and Jin, 2006; Deininger and Ali, 2008; Abdulai et al., 2011). Some studies 
determine the extent of investment and make use of tobit models due to the censoring nature 
of the investment variable (Place and Otsuka, 2002; Smith, 2004; Fenske, 2010b; Ali et al., 
2011; Ali et al., 2012). 
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Evidence for the theoretical linkages concerning land tenure and investment mentioned 
previously, is predominantly weak and incomplete (Udry, 2012). In particular, empirical results 
on Africa with regard to the relationship between tenure arrangements and investment appear 
to be ambiguous (Fenske, 2010a). Still, several recent studies confirm a positive effect of 
tenure security, in this instance defined as plot ownership, upon investment in Africa (e.g. 
Deininger and Ali, 2008; Abdulai et al., 2011). However, OLS regressions by Place and Hazell 
(1993) on data from several African countries do not reveal a significant positive relationship 
between higher tenure security and input use on the plot. The results concerning land 
improvements analyzed by logit and multinomial logit models are mixed. The study by Holden 
and Yohannes (2002) on Ethiopia also shows that tenure security does not influence both the 
decision whether or not to purchase farm inputs and the number of purchased farm inputs. 
Using survey data from Ethiopia, Pender and Fafchamps (2006) also reveal that the extent of 
input use is not influenced by the type of tenure arrangement, that is, fixed-rentership, 
sharecropping and ownership, determined by an OLS regression. 
Some reasons for poor empirical results pointed out are:  difficulty to measure tenure security, 
causality going in two directions, missing importance of credit markets and other factors 
influencing investment (Fenske, 2010a; Udry, 2012). In addition, studies that only include one 
investment option (see Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Fenske, 2010b) and studies that merge a 
number of investments (see Smith, 2004) failed to gain insight into the concrete mechanisms 
of how tenure rights might influence investment decisions. The influence of tenure security 
might be different depending on the type of investment (Deininger and Jin, 2006). 
Investment can be categorized into different types. The investment decisions analyzed in the 
study by Abdulai et al. (2011) on Ghana are the use of mineral fertilizer, the use of organic 
fertilizer (i.e. mulch and organic manure) and the planting of trees. Diverse investment 
decisions are estimated jointly, accounting for unobservables that influence investment 
decisions being significantly related, by means of a multivariate probit model. A household 
fixed-effects model accounts for unobservables at the household-level with an influence on 
investment. In both specifications, ownership of the plot is positively and significantly 
associated with all investment options. Another study on Ghana by Abdulai and Goetz (2014) 
reveals negative and significant effects of leasing variables, fixed-rent tenancy, and 
sharecropping on the extent of soil-conservation measures, specifically, investment in ditches 
and manure. Interaction terms for leasing variables with number of contract renewals show 
that fixed-rent tenants become more likely to invest in soil conservation measures due to 
increased tenure security. Sharecroppers still invest less, even when accounting for tenure 
security in line with the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis, due to outputs shared with the 
landlord. In addition, fixed-rent contracts are positively associated with investment in mineral 
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fertilizer, a short-term investment. This effect declines with increasing tenure security. Besley 
(1995), however, in the analysis of investment options such as tree planting, manuring, land 
excavation, irrigation, mulching and making shallot beds in Ghana reported mixed results. 
Enhanced tenure security facilitates investment, i.e. tree planting, in one area of research, 
whereas in another, similar findings were not robust in relation to the other investments by 
using linear probability models. 
In their study on Pakistan, Ali et al. (2012) also show that owners are more likely to invest in 
manure, fertilizer and leguminous crops compared to sharecroppers by employing a 
multivariate tobit model. The decision to construct terraces, itself a soil conservation measure, 
has been analyzed in other recent studies and is positively linked to ownership of land 
(Deininger and Ali, 2008) in Uganda and tenure security and transferability of land (Deininger 
and Jin, 2006) in Ethiopia, depending on how the effect of land tenure has been assessed. 
However, Hagos and Holden (2006), in their study on Ethiopia, have found poor effects of 
perceived tenure security, type of rental contract and duration of tenure on the decision whether 
to invest or not in soil bunds and stone terraces, and also the extent of investment measured 
by area used. One important determinant of investment has been public conservation 
programs overcoming market failures. Jacoby and Mansuri (2008) focus on the relationship 
between land tenancy and non-contractible investment across plots within the same household 
in Pakistan by using a tobit model and also estimating household fixed effects. Farmyard 
manure is used more extensively on owned plots than on leased ones. Additionally, tenure 
duration is also positively and significantly related to the respective investment. Fallowing has 
been analyzed with tenure security, being a significant predictor for the incidence of fallowing 
(Otsuka et al., 2003), the proportion of land left fallow (Fenske, 2010b) and duration of fallowing 
(Goldstein and Udry, 2008).  
The influence of titles as one indication of tenure security has been analyzed. Deininger and 
Chamorro (2004), in their analysis on Nicaragua, reveal that full registration of a plot increases 
both the propensity and the extent of land-attached investments, like irrigation-facilities. 
Wannasai and Shrestha (2008) show that land titles in Thailand exert a positive and significant 
effect on the extent of investment in perennial crops due to obtaining institutional credit. 
However, other farm resources like labor have also been pointed out to be crucial for 
investment decisions. 
Short-term investments appear to be less affected by security of tenure. A review of several 
studies examining the effect of tenure security on investment in Western Africa leads to the 
conclusion that, generally, short-term investments are not influenced by land tenure. 
Additionally, it is argued that with agriculture becoming more input-intensive, the effect of 
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tenure security might even decline (Fenske, 2010a). However, soil conservation measures that 
entail long-term effects are an essential element of making agricultural intensification more 
sustainable (Beekman and Bulte, 2012). 
3.2.5 Empirical research: The missing link 
Some research indicates a link between social networks and land tenure arrangements (see 
Brasselle et al., 2002). Pender and Fafchamps (2006) argue that sharecroppers and fixed-rent 
tenants in Ethiopia are characterized by diverse social networks, as sharecroppers are not 
recent immigrants. The type of tenure differs by transaction costs of screening and monitoring, 
and is determined by how well the landlord knows the tenant. The connection between land 
tenure arrangements and social networks in Ghana is pointed out by Berry (2009: 1373): 
“Whether or not investments are individually owned, decisions about investment and the 
disposition of property are shaped by social relations and concerns”. The study by Goldstein 
and Udry (2008) on land tenure arrangements and fallowing in Ghana reveals that farmers 
who are not subject to networks of ‘social and political power’ are faced with less tenure 
security, i.e. with a higher risk of expropriation during fallowing. Hence, they leave their land 
fallow for shorter periods than might otherwise be optimal. Accordingly, participation in social 
groups such as the family or the village determines access to land rights (Udry, 2012). 
Both concepts have mostly been applied separately in previous empirical analyses in order to 
explain decision-making of farmers. Research combining the two concepts is still in its infancy 
since few economic studies have given attention to both tenure arrangements and social 
networks, in terms of analyzing investment decisions. Saint-Macary et al. (2010) analyze 
knowledge and adoption of a soil conservation technology, agro-forestry, in Vietnam. The 
variables representing tenure security are only based on titled land and expectations about 
reallocation. Both are significant determinants of adoption. Formal social networks are 
categorized as horizontal (farmer union) and vertical (extension service) social capital and 
influence knowledge about agro-forestry positively. However, social networks have not been 
used for explaining adoption. Beekman and Bulte (2012) study the effect of social norms and 
tenure security on fertilizer use and erosion management in Burundi. They show that tenure 
security influences investment in erosion managements positively, but not fertilizer use. They 
apply similar proxies as Saint-Macary et al. (2010) for tenure security. Investments are 
aggregated in that planting trees and building ditches or terraces are one category, and 
fertilizer implies both mineral and organic fertilizer, neglecting that the latter has long-term 
effects. In addition, the decision whether to invest or not in both types of investment is 
estimated independently by two probit models. Various social norms influence soil erosion 
measures positively when estimated at the community level. Social norms do not comprise 
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social networks in detail; merely the perception of cooperative behavior is assessed. In 
addition, altruism, trust and voting behavior account for social capital (Sobel, 2002). 
The question arises, why put effort into the concept of social networks and not only focus on 
the provision of legal needs in order to enhance tenure security and diminish market failures. 
One reason is the intrinsic value of social capital (Sobel, 2002). Individuals like to be in contact 
with others and value the interaction in social networks. From this, other non-intended 
improvements can emerge. Uphoff (2000) studies the formation of farmer organizations with 
respect to water management in Sri Lanka, and points to progress in terms of qualitative 
aspects of life, as individuals value the corporate feeling in the community. He observes that 
various actions have been initiated by the group due to organizational skills, for instance, the 
provision of loans. 
3.2.6 Tenure arrangements, social capital, and endogeneity 
Generally, endogeneity arises due to simultaneity, measurement error, and omitted variables, 
and results in biased and inconsistent estimates (Jackson, 2008: 437; Wooldridge, 2010: 54-
55), and has been discussed with respect to both concepts; tenure arrangements and social 
networks respectively. 
Investment also serves different purposes than increasing yields in the short and long term. 
Farmers may undertake investments in order to increase tenure security, especially planting 
trees, since this is a legitimate procedure in claiming more secure rights (Sjaastad and 
Bromley, 1998; Place, 2009) that leads to endogeneity of tenure in estimating the effect of 
tenure rights on investment (Abdulai et al., 2011). Woodhouse (2003), in his review of four 
case studies in Africa, concludes that increasing tenure security is one of the fundamental 
factors of increasing investment. Generally, tenure arrangements and the decision to invest 
may be determined together (Ali et al., 2012). Unobservable factors such as ability or 
entrepreneurial skills of farmers linked to the type of tenure and investment are another cause 
of endogeneity (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2008). 
Few empirical studies have taken endogeneity of tenure into account in analyzing the 
relationship between land tenure and investment (Arnow et al., 2011). The possibility of land 
tenure arrangements and investment decisions to be determined jointly has been addressed, 
for example, by Brasselle et al. (2002), Abdulai et al. (2011) and Ali et al. (2012) through the 
Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood (2SCML) approach accounting for the nonlinearity 
of the investment specification.  
Even if few studies have accounted for endogeneity of tenure, a wide range of instruments 
have been applied. For instance, Brasselle et al. (2002) make use of the initial land endowment 
of farmers and two interaction terms with the first instrument, one whether the farmer is a 
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migrant and the other whether the farmer resides in a recently settled village for explaining five 
diverse categories of land rights. Abdulai et al. (2011) deal with the endogeneity of three types 
of tenure arrangements out of four analyzed, since one serves as a base category. For owners, 
they apply mode of acquisition of plot, namely if the plot was inherited, if the owner cultivating 
the plot also resides in the same village where the plot is located and the distance to the plot. 
For sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants, they make use of the distance of the plot to the 
landlord’s home and whether this landlord resides in the same village where the plot is located. 
Ali et al. (2012) apply similar instruments for owners and fixed-rent tenants in Pakistan with 
sharecropping serving as the base category. Jacoby and Mansuri (2008) apply a quite different 
approach in that they are also restricting information to those owners of plots who are not 
cultivating any of them in that there arises no selection in leasing out the plots. In a second 
strategy of approaching endogeneity, they instrument leasing by the distance of the plot to the 
owner’s home and accordingly apply an instrumental variable approach. 
The question why those belonging to one social network behave in the same way has also 
attracted the attention of many researchers. There are several determinants of behavior: 
observable and unobservable characteristics of both the individual and the network and lastly, 
the subjective expectation of the individual within the network of the average decision of the 
network members. The last implies that behavior of other network members influences 
individual decision-making (Brock and Durlauf, 2007). Unobservable network effects are 
leadership and institutions, whereas an unobserved individual effect is self-selection 
(Fafchamps, 2006). The issue at stake is that in case of full information the obstacles 
mentioned above can be solved. Thus, all these relate to omitted variable bias. Social capital 
might also be subject to reverse causality since it is affected by the factors it is assumed to 
exert influence on (Jackson, 2008: 437). 
In particular, three hypotheses around social interaction exist. One is endogenous interaction, 
meaning that the behavior of an individual depends on the action of the network, and the 
second is contextual interaction, where characteristics of the network members influence 
behavior of the individual. Third, there are correlated effects, not being a social event, only 
implying that individuals in one network act similarly due to their similar characteristics and 
institutional surroundings (Manski, 2000). Those lead to the identification problem. Manski 
(1993) refers to it as the reflection problem8. It might be possible to differentiate between the 
first two effects and the latter. However, to determine if network behavior influences individual 
 
8The term reflection refers to the movement of an individual in a mirror and his reflection. One cannot 
tell from only watching if the motion of the individual causes the motion in the mirror or the other way 
around (Manski, 2000) 
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actions or if the behavior of the network is merely an aggregation of individual actions remains 
a challenge (Manski, 1993). Specifically, the reflection problem is concerned with the 
differentiation between factors relating to behavior and factors relating to the context. The 
reflection problem is due to the fact that the individuals within the network are not assessed 
directly (Jackson, 2008: 439). 
The reflection problem can be overcome by having information about the others in the network 
with varying characteristics from the individual and with an asymmetric relationship. However, 
even if identification issues are less likely, they still can be present (Jackson, 2008: 440-441). 
A suitable approach is again to make use of instrumental variables since part of the problem 
is resulting from endogeneity (Manski, 2000; Jackson, 2008: 439). For instance, Beekman and 
Bulte (2012) address endogeneity of social capital analyzing investment decisions by two 
strategies. First, social capital is measured at community level based on the argument that 
community level social capital is not influenced by individual investment decisions. The second 
employs instrumental variables, however, it is limited in their use due to not finding suitable 
instruments for all social capital proxies.The instruments used for altruism are historical 
measures of conflict intensity in Burundi. Fafchamps and Minten (2002), when determining firm 
performance of traders in Madagascar, apply various instruments for their social capital 
variable, number of traders known, such as age, place of birth, religion, and characteristics 
related to the family. Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) use instrumental variables that are related 
to how connected a farmer is within the village, such as years of residence in the village in 
order to analyze the effect of social networks on farm performance in India. Endogeneity of 
social capital can also be approached by using latent social networks that are part of social 
capital and are not subject to endogeneity. A principal component analysis (PCA) can be 
applied in order to make use of observable factors of the social environment to generate these 
latent social capital variables as has been used by Genius et al., (2013) in Greece as well as 
in a similar approach by Willy and Holm-Müller (2013) on Kenya and Hunecke et al. (2017) in 
Chile. We follow a similar approach described in detail in section 3.6.2. 
 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
We analyze the link between tenure arrangements and investment decisions of farmers within 
a dynamic framework which provides an extension of the theoretical framework by Abdulai et 
al. (2011) and Abdulai and Goetz (2014). Within this framework, we model soil capital as a 
renewable resource of farmers, which is subject to change over time, and examine their 
interactions with agricultural production. Time is indicated by calendar time t. 
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Investment in soil conservation measures  
Farmers can invest in four investment options: in mineral fertilizer XM(t), in organic fertilizer 
manure XO(t), in ditches LD(t) and in multiple cropping M(t).  
Mineral fertilizer increases soil capital in the short-run since nutrients are made accessible for 
crops without a time lag and as a result, yields increase. Yet, as Abdulai et al. (2011) have 
rightly noted; applying only mineral fertilizer will degrade soil capital physically and chemically. 
Organic fertilizer has to be added to improve the soil structure again; it is  a productive input 
that ensures higher soil organic matter and leads to yield increases (IRRI, 2003). 
We define the agricultural production function per hectare as follows: 
 f(S(t), XM(t), XO(t))                                                                                                               (3-1) 
the function f(∙) indicates agricultural production of crops with S(t) being soil capital and XM(t) 
and XO(t) are as defined previously.  
Following the standard convention, we assume the function f(∙) to be strictly concave in its 
arguments. Since mineral fertilizer and manure are close substitutes in the short-run since both 
enhance yields by increasing fertility of the soil, we assume f(∙) to be additive separable in 
XM(t)  and XO(t), which results in the cross derivations with respect to these variables being 
zero. However, manure exerts positive effects on soil capital in the mid-term and long-term 
and it increases soil productivity, whereas an increase in S(t) decreases the marginal 
productivity of the investments XO(t)  and XM(t). Consequently, we assume fXOS and fXMS to 
be fXOS < 0 and fXMS < 0. 
As an erosion control practice, ditches hinder the negative effects of erosion. Erosion leads to 
an increase in water runoff so that consequently less water remains in the soil. Furthermore, 
erosion results in a lack of soil nutrients necessary for crop production (Pimentel et al., 1995). 
As such, ditches as a physical method of soil conservation enhance the uptake of nutrients 
and the retention of water (Ruben et al., 2006). Land is restricted, the size of the entire land 
cultivated by farmers is normalized to one, and it will be used for crop cultivation LCR(t) and 
investment in ditches LD(t)
9. Thus, ditches decrease the amount of land that can be used for 
agricultural production.  
The restriction for land is defined as follows:  
0 ≤ LCR(t) = 1-LD(t).                                                                                                           (3-2) 
 
9 Area used for trees is due to simplicity not considered here. 
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It is assumed that farmers cultivate various crops on their plots. However, this is not necessarily 
equated with multiple cropping which is described as the “intensification of cropping in time 
and space such as growing two or more crops on the same field in a year” (Sumner et al., 
1981: 168), that is intercropping and crop rotation (Knörzer et al., 2009). Crops described as 
being intercropped are planted at the same time, whilst crop rotation describes multiple 
cropping with a time lag. However, for simplification, we have restricted our attention on 
sequential cropping systems where two or more crops are grown in sequence on the same 
plot within one year involving two growing seasons. 
Crop rotation and intercropping display a range of similarly positive effects and increase soil 
capital (FAO, 2012: 58). Crop rotation maintains soil fertility despite continuous crop cultivation 
by maintaining the soil’s organic matter, conserving topsoil and suppressing higher weeds and 
pests (Liebman and Dyck, 1993). In addition, it also controls soil erosion, makes use of the 
available nutrients and water in an optimal fashion due to the differing roots of diverse crops 
and, in cases of crop rotation with legumes, enhances nitrogen fixation (AgriInfo, 2011; Infonet-
Biovision, 2011). Intercropping leads to a decrease in weed growth and positively affects soil 
erosion (Olasantan et al., 1996). Physical resources like mineral nutrients are used more 
optimal (Mutsaers et al., 1993). 
 
Soil capital changes over time and is defined in equation (3-3), the dot over the variable 
indicates 
d
dt,
 and is augmented by investment in manure used in combination with crop 
cultivation, thus it enriches soil capital by h(XO(t)) with h
'(∙) > 0. In addition, the amount of 
area used for ditches augments soil capital, determined by the function l(LD(t)) with l'(∙) > 0. 
Multiple cropping also increases soil capital over time according to m(M(t)) with m'(∙) > 0. 
Cultivation of crops f(S(t), XM(t), XO(t)) decreases soil capital due to nutrients extracted, 
indicated by the factor δ stating degradation of soil capital in proportion to the output. 
The state variable soil capital is defined as: 
Ṡ(t) = h(XO(t))LCR(t) + l(LD(t)) + m(M(t))LCR(t)-δf(S(t), XM(t), XO(t))LCR(t).                   (3-3) 
Social networks and transaction costs 
Social networks are assumed to foster investment in productivity-enhancing and especially in 
soil-conserving measures through means of better information and easier access to practical 
and monetary assistance. These effects can be operationalized by linking social networks to 
transaction costs of investment that are mainly unobservable (see e.g. Rudd, 2000; Combes 
et al., 2005; Wollni et al., 2010; Zanello, 2012).  
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Farmers are constrained in multiple ways concerning investment in soil conservation measures 
that is, among other things, limited information (Wollni et al., 2010). Place and Otsuka (2002), 
in their analysis on tenure security and investments in Uganda, conclude that the lack of 
information is crucial, that begins with being aware of investment possibilities and of the access 
to inputs and technology. Information gathering on how to apply measures and how to combine 
them also take place in the context of learning about biophysical processes which determine 
soil capital and yields (Wollni et al., 2010). For example, knowledge associated with multiple 
cropping is related to the management of the complex systems of various crops with individual 
nutritional and water needs and possible allelopathic consequences (FAO, 2012: 62).  
Social networks are assumed to reduce transaction costs and consequently to exert positive 
effects on various outcomes (Rijn et al., 2012). Gathering information has its costs and social 
networks can be one way of obtaining information at a lower level of cost and thus improving 
the possibility of action (Coleman, 1988). For example, fbos have the potential to reduce 
information search costs concerning investment (Wollni et al., 2010). Open ended questions 
posed to farmers in the survey elicit the type of assistance through social networks. Advice on 
the farm business from various sources that involve social networks, such as having friends 
includes, apart from market information, specific advice linked to investment, such as how to 
apply chemicals, how to diversify crops and when to cultivate them and control of erosion on 
the farm. Similarly, an fbo is indicated to provide inputs, loans, labor, and advice.  
Various forms of social networks assessed in the empirical analysis are represented by 
connectivity of the farmer C which indicates to what extent a farmer is connected with others10, 
it follows that C ≥ 0. The influence of connectivity on transaction costs is given by (1 + C)-∝. In 
case a farmer is not connected with others (C = 0) transaction costs are as given. However, 
in case a farmer is highly connected, transaction costs decrease. Consequently, the parameter 
∝ is positive (see Combes et al., 2005) and indicates the extent to which connectivity makes 
an influence on transaction costs. The extent is determined empirically. 
Transaction costs can be distinguished between fixed and variable (proportional) transaction 
costs. The first does not depend on the amount invested in relation to search and negotiation 
costs, and costs associated with screening the quality of inputs and monitoring of labor in case 
labor is hired for investment. Accordingly, fixed transaction costs of investment m tcm
f  influence 
the decision whether to invest or not. Variable transaction costs increase the price for 
investment and they are calculated per cost of investment unit linked with transportation of 
 
10 A farmer being part of many social networks requires him to be highly connected. In so doing, we do not 
distinguish between various effects of diverse types of social networks. This is only determined empirically. 
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inputs and imprecise information. The price paid will be higher than the market price pm for the 
respective investment by the amount tcm
v  (Key et al., 2000).  
The farmers’ decision problem 
The dynamic context of the analysis involves the consideration of the fact that current 
investment decisions influence soil capital over time. We assume the farm household 
maximizes farm net benefits subject to the evolution of soil capital over a planning horizon of 
tk-t0 with t0 denoting the initial point and tk the end of the planning horizon.  
Plots cultivated by farmers are under ownership, restricted ownership, fixed-rentership and 
sharecropping with a differing time horizon. For fixed-rent tenants and sharecroppers, time 
horizon is restricted to duration of tenure k determined by (0, k), for owners with restricted 
rights they are also restricted by time of usage k, and for owners it is (0, T), with T indicating 
the end of the planning horizon. The residual value of soil capital is given by r(S(tk)) and will 
be zero for sharecroppers and tenants, as they are restricted from selling the land. For owners 
with restricted rights, who can only rent the land out, it will be smaller than for owners with 
unrestricted rights, since they are the only ones permitted to sell the land. In order to simplify 
the analysis, we merge the two types of ownership to one category in the conceptual 
framework given similar characteristics of these two. 
The farmers’ decision problem can be stated as11: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋𝑀 ,𝑋𝑂 ,𝑀,𝐿  = 𝐽 ∫  
𝑡𝑘
𝑡0
𝑒−𝜑𝑡 [(𝑝𝑓(𝑆(𝑡), 𝑋𝑀(𝑡), 𝑋𝑂(𝑡)) − (𝑝𝑀 + (1 + 𝐶)
−∝𝑡𝑐𝑀
𝑣 )𝑋𝑀(𝑡) − (𝑝𝑂
+ (1 + 𝐶)−∝𝑡𝑐𝑂
𝑣)𝑋𝑂(𝑡) − (𝜔𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢 + (1 + 𝐶)
−∝𝑡𝑐𝑚𝑢
𝑣 )𝑀(𝑡))𝐿𝐶𝑅(𝑡)
− (𝜔𝑐𝑜𝐷+(1 + 𝐶)
−∝𝑡𝑐𝐷
𝑣)𝐿𝐷(𝑡) − 𝜏(1 + 𝐶)
−∝𝑡𝑐𝑚
𝑓 − (1 − 𝜃)𝑝𝐿
− 𝜃𝛾𝑝𝑓(𝑆(𝑡), 𝑋𝑀(𝑡), 𝑋𝑂(𝑡))𝐿𝐶𝑅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒
−𝜑𝑡𝑘𝑟(𝑆(𝑡𝑘)) 
                                                                                                                                            (3-4) 
 
Subject to: 
Ṡ(t) = h(XO(t))LCR(t) + l(LD(t)) + m(M(t))LCR(t) -  δf(S(t), XM(t), XO(t))LCR(t) 
0 ≤ LCR(t) = 1-LD(t)                                                                                                                                                                                                          
𝑋𝑀(𝑡), 𝑋𝑂(𝑡), 𝑀(𝑡), 𝐿𝐷(𝑡) ≥ 0 
 
11 In the empirical analysis, we also analyze the effect of off-farm employment on investment decisions which is not 
considered in the theoretical model, since it is not directly linked to agricultural production.  Off-farm activities are 
part of farm and household characteristics that determine the propensity to invest in the empirical model. Basically, 
two effects occur when being engaged in off-farm employment: On the one hand the farmer earns more money that 
will help him pay the price p of investment, if he is willing to spend money for agricultural investments; however, he 
also has less time to invest which increases the opportunity costs of investment. The effect will be determined 
empirically and it will be distinguished between different types of off-farm employment. 
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where τ is equal to 1 for each investment m in case farmers invest in the respective investment 
and 0 otherwise, (1-θ)pL represents the annual rent paid in cases of fixed-renting for using the 
land or the annual cost of capital for owners with θ = 0 for fixed-rent tenants and the rent paid 
is the constant pL. and with θ = 1  for sharecroppers, where γpf(S(t), XM(t), XO(t))LCR(t) is the 
amount of cultivated crops paid to the owner with γ indicating the respective share of yields 
that are used as payment.  
The market price pm includes both the cost of purchasing the investment in case of investment 
in mineral fertilizer and manure, and the costs of labor involved for each type of investment. 
Mineral fertilizer and manure are linked to a price p. Ditches also decrease agricultural outputs 
since the area is used as indicated by LCR that is area reduced by LD. Multiple cropping and 
ditches are not associated with a price p but are associated with costs co that are either a 
decrease in immediate output or additional cost outlays. For soil conservation measures, costs 
depend on the sharing rule between the landlord and the tenant, indicated by ω and can range 
between 0 and 1 and indicates the share the tenant is paying, while the magnitude of ω differs 
depending on whether it is a fixed-rentership or sharecropping. When ω is 1 the landlord is not 
paying anything, when ω  is 0, the tenant is paying nothing. For fixed-rentership, costs paid by 
the landlord may be included in the rent paid pL. However, all investments are linked with 
transaction costs as outlined above. 
All parameters except t0, tk and St0 are grouped in a vector named ω. The components are 
connectivity, the respective transaction costs and prices and for output and inputs and costs 
for inputs, δ degradation of soil capital and φ discount rate, and previously introduced 
parameters γ and pL. 
The solution of the farmer’s maximization problem (3-4) is given by: 
J(XM
* (t), XO
* (t), M*(t), LD
* (t); t0, tk, S(t0), ω) = J
*(t0, tk, S(t0))                                                  (3-5) 
where the superscript * represents the evaluation of the variable along its optimal trajectory 
given the parameter values of (t0, tk, S(t0)) and ω. Consequently, J
*(t0, tk, S(t0)) illustrates the 
maximized discounted farm net benefits aggregated over the time horizon tk-t0 given the initial 
soil capital S(t0) = St0. 
For analyzing the effect land tenure may have on investment choices, while also considering 
the effect of connectivity, we evaluate the first order conditions of the farmer’s decision-making 
problem given in equation (3-4). In order to simplify notation, we remove the argument t from 
the variables, as well as those of the costate variables and Lagrange multipliers, which will be 
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introduced later, and define according to Abdulai et al. (2001) the current value Lagrangian, L, 
by: 
𝐿 =  (𝑝𝑓(𝑆, 𝑋𝑀 , 𝑋𝑂) − (𝑝𝑀+(1 + 𝐶)
−∝𝑡𝑐𝑀
𝑣 )𝑋𝑀 − (𝑝𝑂+(1 + 𝐶)
−∝𝑡𝑐𝑂
𝑣)𝑋𝑂
− ((𝜔𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢 + (1 + 𝐶)
−∝𝑡𝑐𝑚𝑢
𝑣 )𝑀)𝐿𝐶𝑅 − (𝜔𝑐𝑜𝐷+(1 + 𝐶)
−∝𝑡𝑐𝐷
𝑣)𝐿𝐷 
                              −𝜏(1 + 𝐶)−∝𝑡𝑐𝑚
𝑓 − 𝑝𝑙(∙)                    
                              +𝜇1𝐿𝐶𝑅 + 𝜇2(1 − 𝐿𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶𝑅) 
                              +𝜉1𝑋𝑀 + 𝜉2𝑋𝑂 + 𝜉3𝑀 + 𝜉4𝐿𝐷 
                              +λs(h(XO)LCR +  l(LD) + m(M)LCR-  δf(S, XM, XO)LCR)                                  (3-6) 
with pl(∙) = (1-θ)pL + θγpf(S, XM, XO)LCR is defined as above and where μ1 and μ2 are the 
Lagrange multipliers associated with the restrictions related to availability of land, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3 and 
ξ4 are the Lagrange multipliers related to non-negativity of control variables and λs is the 
corresponding costate variable to the state variable soil capital. 
The first order conditions are given by: 
δL
δLCR
= pf-(pM+(1 + C)
-∝tcM
v )XM-(pO+(1 + C)
-∝tcO
v )XO-(pmu + (1 + C)
-∝tcmu
v )M-θγpf + λs(h +
m-δf) + μ1-μ2 = 0                                                                                                                  (3-7) 
δL
δXM
= (pfXM-pM-(1 + C)
-∝tcM
v -(θγp + λsδ)fXM)LCR+ξ1 = 0                                                     (3-8) 
δL
δXO
= (pfXO-pO-(1 + C)
-∝tcO
v - θγpfXO + λs(h
'-δfXO))LCR+ξ2 = 0                                            (3-9) 
δL
δM
= -(ωcomu-(1 + C)
-∝tcmu
v + λs(m
'))LCR+ξ3 = 0                                                              (3-10) 
δL
δLD
= -(ωcoD-(1 + C)
-∝tcD
v + λs(l
')+ξ4-μ2 = 0                                                                      (3-11) 
λ̇s = φλs-((p-θγp-λsδ)fsLCR)                                                                                                (3-12) 
We do not consider endogeneity of tenure, even if we do account for it in the empirical analysis, 
a further exploration of the issue can be found by Abdulai et al. (2011). The first- order 
conditions differ by the payment of the sharecropper’s share of the value of the marginal 
product and by the planning horizon that is k-years for fixed-renters and sharecroppers and T 
for owners. In addition, the value of transaction costs determines the costs of each soil 
conservation measure. 
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In the following section, we analyze the effect of land tenure arrangements and connectivity 
on the optimal choice of investment in mineral fertilizer, manure, multiple cropping, and ditches. 
In order to derive the optimal short-run behavior, we assume the initial soil capital S(0) =  S0 
to be identical for all tenure arrangements. However, soil capital is subject to change over time 
and we will consider this individual change within the long-run behavior.  
Short-run behavior 
Since the cross derivatives of the agricultural production function with respect to XO(t) and 
XM(t) are zero, we can analyze the first order conditions (3-8) and (3-9) for each investment 
option notwithstanding the value of the other investment option given that S(t) = S0.  For an 
interior solution ξ1 = 0, and pfXM(∙)|S(t)=S0 the solution of equation (3-8) is presented in figure 
3-1 (continuous lines)12. We can see that owner-cultivators do consider the shadow cost of the 
soil λs, where tenants and sharecroppers do not consider these costs. The levels of mineral 
fertilizer applied for fixed-rent tenants, sharecroppers, and owners are XM
R , XM
Shand XM
O  
respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: The optimal amount of mineral fertilizer 
 
12 The short-run solutions are only shown graphically for investment in mineral fertilizer and manure, since we 
can observe the production function here. Multiple cropping and ditches are not directly linked to output and 
therefore their solutions are only shown for the long-term and not the short-term. 
€ 
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Observation 1: Given that initial soil capital is identical for all three types of farmers, figure 3-
1 shows that fixed-rent tenants initially apply more mineral fertilizer than sharecroppers and 
owner-cultivators. A direct comparison between sharecroppers and owners is not feasible. 
In the short-run, owners and sharecroppers tend to apply similar levels of mineral fertilizer 
given γ = λsδ/p. The behavior of sharecroppers depends on the share of harvest γ given to 
the landlord. In addition, transaction costs of investment are determined by connectivity of the 
farmer. A high value of C leads to a low value of tcM
v , shifting the cost curve downwards. Hence, 
each unit of mineral fertilizer applied becomes cheaper for them due to variable costs being 
lower. Farmers who face fewer transaction costs thanks to being highly connected apply more 
mineral fertilizer, since it is cheaper for them. In detail, higher connectivity involves better 
information and more assistance, which lowers the costs associated with investment in mineral 
fertilizer, like gathering information on how to apply it correctly and where to buy it. To what 
extent connectivity (social networks) influences investment decisions can only be derived 
empirically. 
The optimal amount of organic fertilizer can be derived from an interior solution ξ2 = 0, and 
pfXO(∙)|S(t)=S0of the first order equation (3-9) and is presented in figure 3-2 (continuous lines). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: The optimal amount of manure 
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                         Note: *h'-δfXO < 0, soil degradation effect of manure due to increase in quantity harvested outweighs 
soil improvement effect; **h'-δfXO > 0, soil improvement effect of manure outweighs its soil degradation 
effect, due to increase in quantity harvested. 
Observation 2: Given that initial soil capital is identical for all three types of farmers, figure 3-
2 shows that owners apply more manure than fixed-rent tenants if the effect on soil 
improvement by the manure outweighs the effect of soil degradation produced by an increase 
in harvest. Fixed-rent tenants apply more manure than sharecroppers. 
Since owners consider the shadow cost of the soil (λs), they apply more manure than fixed-
rent tenants since they do not place any value on the shadow costs of the soil, provided that 
the soil improvement effect h' is greater than the soil degradation effect δfXO and can be seen 
by comparing XO
O** and XO
R. However, in cases where the soil degradation effect outweighs the 
soil improvement effect h'-δfXO < 0 fixed-rent tenants apply more manure than owners and that 
is illustrated by comparing XO
O* and XO
R respectively. Figure 3-2 also shows that sharecroppers 
apply less manure XO
Sh than fixed-rent tenants since their costs are higher than the share of 
output given to the landlord. Additionally, in cases of connectivity C being high, transaction 
costs tcO
v  will be low respectively. The horizontal cost curve indicating the direct price of manure 
plus transaction costs and share of output for sharecroppers or shadow cost of the soil for 
owners is shifted downwards, and farmers apply more manure because it is cheaper for them. 
A higher connectivity results in, for example, more information on how to apply it, where to get 
it and practical assistance linked to bringing manure onto the fields. Farmers without a high 
connectivity need more resources to get information and practical help, increasing transaction 
costs and shifting the cost curve upwards.  
Long-run behavior 
The previous analysis is valid for the cases, where S(t) = S0 is identical for all tenure 
arrangements. This assumption is reasonable for the beginning of the planning horizon. 
However, it is unlikely over a longer time-horizon, since owners, sharecroppers and fixed-rent 
tenants value soil capital differently. For the determination of the long-run behavior of farmers, 
we establish the optimal evolution of soil capital over time. We distinguish between two 
scenarios: one in which S(t) > S0, initial soil capital is below long-run soil capital, and the other 
S(t) < S0 in which initial soil capital is above long-run soil capital. Even if fixed-rent tenants 
and sharecroppers do have short-term contracts for periods around two or three years, we still 
consider their long-term behavior by interpreting and extrapolating the sequence of their short-
term behavior into a theoretical model of their behavior in the long-run. 
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In figures 3-1 and 3-2, we see that (dashed lines), provided owners build up soil capital, owners 
will tend to reduce the application of mineral fertilizer XM
O  and manure XO
O** or XO
O*,  whereas 
sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants increase the application of both, given that their soil 
capital declines, indicated by XM
R , XM
Sh and XO
R, XO
Sh respectively13. Connectivity does still have 
the same effect as outlined within the short-run behavior. Other situations can also be depicted 
from figure 3-1 and 3-2; however, we only focus on the most likely ones. The shift of graphs is 
taken randomly and cannot be analyzed within the model.  
To determine the effect of land tenure on investment in multiple cropping, we analyze the first 
order condition (3-10). This condition shows that the marginal value of soil capital due to 
application of multiple cropping λs(m
') has to equal the marginal costs that are costs of 
application and transaction costs and therefore  ξ3 = 0. So far, we have indicated λs = 0 for 
sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants. However, this is not totally true. There will be a marginal 
value of soil capital due to investment in multiple cropping for all farmers, as across all tenure 
arrangements, soil capital, S(t), influences yields14. The more immediate the effect of the 
investment on soil capital, the higher is λs also for sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants
15 along 
with longer contract period. Figure 3.3 shows that to what extent owners and tenants invest, 
depends on ωThe tenant’s share of the cost (𝜔) declines as the owner is covering some part 
of the costs, the marginal cost function rotates to the right and the optimal amount of multiple 
cropping increases. For example, if costs decrease from 1 to 𝜔 ˆ or 𝜔 ˜ for renters, investment 
increases from MSh/R to M̃Sh/R and M̌
Sh/R
 respectively.  
Investment also depends on the shadow value of the soil. Shadow value is based on the 
willingness to pay principle, the most accurate measure of the value of a good is what, in this 
case farmers, are willing to give up in order to increase social capital. The shadow value of the 
fixed-rent tenant or sharecropper is less than the shadow value of the owner given for any 
similar soil capital S due to the shorter time period t<T. Since the shadow value of the soil is 
determined by the discounted farm profits with respect to a marginal improvement of soil quality 
from time t until the end of the planning horizon, their values are dependent on the length of 
the planning horizon. If the contract duration is short, the shadow value of the soil is zero and 
 
13 In the short-run, given that the soil improvement effect outweighs the soil degradation effect of manure, owners 
apply more manure than fixed-rent tenants and sharecroppers, hence soil capital increases and pfXO evaluated 
when the initial soil capital is below the long-run soil capital, moves to the left due to the cross derivative fXOS being 
negative. Concerning fixed-rent tenants and sharecroppers, the analysis in the short-run shows they apply less 
manure than owners. We can either assume they build up soil capital, but to a lesser extent than owners, or they 
are depleting soil capital. This is the case accordingly pfXO moves to the right. 
14 Concerning investment in mineral fertilizer and manure λs will also be unequal to zero for sharecroppers and 
fixed-rent tenants, however, for a more explicit graphical illustration it was neglected. The argumentation would not 
change. 
15 Immediate denotes the investment increases soil capital directly and in the short-run and the marginal value 
arises due to more agricultural output. 
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it would be optimal for tenants not to invest at all. Yet, as indicated above the shadow value 
increases with tenure duration and given that the shadow value is positive, the landlord can 
choose duration of rental period k and 𝜔 so that the optimal long-term investment in multiple 
cropping is in line with the investment behavior of the tenant. When the landowner fully 
commits to rewarding improvements in soil quality (i.e. committing to a long term tenure 
duration for the tenant), fixed-rent tenants and sharecroppers as residual claimants should be 
fully incentivized and there is no hold-up problem (commitment problem). 
This situation is shown in Fig. 3.3. where investment in multiple cropping for the owner and 
investment in multiple cropping for the tenant match. We can conclude, investment in multiple 
cropping on rented plots is apart from the tenancy arrangement, also driven by the share of 
the cost of investment covered by the landlord and time of rental period, which is not depicted 
here. 
Connectivity of farmers has the same influence as indicated for investment in mineral fertilizer 
and manure, which is lowering transaction costs of investment by gaining knowledge linked to 
the management of the complex system of various crops with individual nutritional and water 
needs and possible allelopathic consequences (FAO, 2012: 62). 
 
 
Figure 3-3: The optimal amount of multiple cropping 
Observation 3: Figure 3.3 shows, the optimal investment in multiple cropping by owners is 
higher than by both, fixed-renters or sharecroppers. The optimal investment in multiple 
cropping on leased plots increases with the share of cost covered by the landlord. 
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Lastly, to determine the influence of tenure arrangements on investment in ditches, we analyze 
the first order condition (3-11). This condition again suggests that the marginal value of soil 
capital due to building ditches λs(l
') has to equal its costs plus the opportunity costs of land μ2, 
and consequently  ξ4 = 0. Given the opportunity costs of land are equal for all types of farmers, 
the extent to which owners, fixed-renters, and sharecroppers invest in ditches is in a similar 
way as outlined above dependent on the sharing rule of cost ω and the shadow value of the 
soil, which increases with tenure duration and as such a longer tenure duration enhances 
investment. The latter is not shown in the theoretical model directly and can be found in Abdulai  
and Goetz (2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: The optimal amount of ditches 
Observation 4: Figure 3.4 shows, the optimal investment in ditches by owners is higher than 
by both, fixed-renters or sharecroppers. The optimal investment in ditches on leased plots 
increases with the share of cost covered by the landlord. 
The opportunity costs of land, in case of land abundance, is zero μ2 = 0, . However, in case 
land for agricultural production is scarce, the opportunity cost of land, according to equation 
(3-7) is μ2 = pf-(pM+(1 + C)
-∝tcM
v )XM-(pO+(1 + C)
-∝tcO
v )XO 
-((1 + C)-∝tcmu
v )M- θγpf + λs(h + m-δf) + μ1. Differences in the opportunity costs of land 
between the types of farmers will lead to diverse results. The effect of connectivity will be the 
same for the other investment options. A high connectivity of the farmer C reduces costs of 
investment and implies more investment in ditches. For example, a higher connectivity linked 
to practical assistance would make it easier for the farmer to build ditches than hiring someone 
to help him or building ditches on his own. 
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3.4 Multivariate probit model 
From the first order conditions (3-8)-(3-12) in section 3.3 we derive that farmers invest in soil 
conservation measures if it leads to positive expected farm net benefits, taken as an aggregate 
over the length of planning horizon. Yet, we do not observe the expected farm net benefit 
because of its subjective nature, but we observe the decision of farmers to undertake 
investments. According to the maximization problem outlined in equation (3-6), farmers invest 
in soil conservation measures only if it maximizes farm net benefit, i.e. δJ/δLD ,  δJ/δXM,  δJ/δXO,
δJ/δM > 0. The empirical model determines factors exerting an influence on the likelihood of 
farmers investing in soil conservation measures. 
As indicated previously, expected farm net benefit  J* cannot be observed but can be stated as 
a function of observables and generates an observable variable J representing the household’s 
decision to invest in soil conservations measures or not. We define the latent propensity 
variable for investment m on plot j, by farmer l as Jjlm
* that can be linked to plot and farm and 
household characteristics  Zjlm among others such as plot size, household size and education, 
tenure arrangements Rjlm,  social capital of the farmer SClm, off-farm activities of farmers 
NFlm and unobservables εjlm in the following latent variable model: 
Jjlm
* =  β1 Zjlm + β2Rjlm +  β3SClm  + β4NFlm + εjlm,  (m = ditches, fertilizer, manure, multiple 
cropping)                                                                                                                           (3-13) 
Ditches, mineral fertilizer, manure and multiple cropping can be denoted according to the 
theoretical model by LD, XM, XO, M respectively, and farmers face a discrete binary choice. An 
applicable model would be a binary probit model with the following link to the underlying latent 
variable.  
Ĵjlm = {1 if Jjlm
* > 0;  0 if Jjlm
* ≤ 0. } (m = LD, XM, XO, M)                                                      (3-14)                                                    
Investment in the soil conservation measure is observed if Jjlm
∗ > 0 , in which case Ĵjlm = 1. 
Else, investment in the soil conservation measure is not observed, Ĵjlm = 0 .  
However, investment decisions are likely to be substitutes or complements for one plot. A 
multivariate model can be employed building an extension to binary models as equations are 
added and addressing interrelations of investments (Ali et al., 2012). Hence, we assume that 
εjlm (m = LD, XM, XO, M) jointly follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and 
variance 1 and the variance-covariance matrix ∑    , expressed as (εLD , εXM,εXO , εM)~MVN(0, ∑  
 
 )                                                              
(Abdulai et al., 2011). 
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Land tenure arrangements, social capital, and off-farm activities are assumed to be 
endogenous when estimating the effect of these concepts on investment decisions, as theory 
and empirical results have indicated. The most underlying effect for tenure arrangements to 
be endogenous is the assurance effect, investment incentive comes through security of 
reaping benefits of investment. Social networks are linked to information sharing enhancing 
investments, whereas off-farm activities are linked to both enhancing as well as diminishing 
effects on investment (see Oseni and Winters, 2009; Abdulai et al., 2011; Beekman and Bulte, 
2012). The variables become correlated with the error term and estimates will be biased and 
inconsistent (Jackson, 2008: 437; Wooldridge, 2010: 54).  
The most common procedure when accounting for endogeneity is the Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) method, which is an instrumental variable approach. Given the use of a 
nonlinear model, where the dependent variable is discrete, a standard instrumental variable 
approach is not applicable, since standard errors would be downward-biased (Brasselle et al., 
2002). Therefore, we make use of the control function approach. Given the endogenous 
variables are discrete, and the investment specifications as well, both the Rivers and Vuong 
(1988) (which requires the endogenous variable to be continuous) and Smith and Blundell 
(1986) (which also requires the outcome variable to be continuous) approaches are not 
suitable. Following this, we used the Wooldridge (2014) control function approach, where we 
first estimate probit models and then retrieve the generalized residuals to use in the second 
stage. These generalized residuals in the second stage account for endogeneity of potential 
endogenous variables. This approach provides consistent estimates in the average structural 
function. 
Land tenure arrangements, and off-farm activities each were regressed by a probit on the 
instrument, a vector of variables, and all other variables used for specifying investment: 
Endogeneity of other variables, i.e. social capital, will be addressed differently and discussed 
in chapter 3.6.2. ‘variables subject to endogeneity’. 
Rjlm =  γ0 + γ1Zjlm + γ2SClm + γ3NFlm + γ4Wjlm + ρjlm                                                    (3-15) 
NFlm =  δ0 + δ1Zjlm + δ2SClm + +δ3Rjlm + δ4Xlm+φjlm                                                    (3-16) 
where  Wjlm and Xlm are vectors of instrumental variables for each vector of variables that is 
subject to endogeneity that are correlated with the particular variable subject to endogeneity 
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and uncorrelated with εjlm. The variables  ρjlm  and φjlm are the respective generalized error 
terms and the other variables are defined as above16. 
The equations need to be identified considering the fact that they include as many instruments 
as possible for the endogenous variables we want to instrument, satisfying the order condition. 
In case of having more instruments than variables subject to endogeneity, the model is 
overidentified. The rank condition asks for enough correlation between the instruments and 
the possible endogenous variables (Baum, 2006: 190-191)17.  
The generalized residuals from equations (3-15) - (3-16) will be used in the second stage for 
determining the investment decision of the farmer: 
                                      (3-17) 
The t-statistics on each of the residuals provide a valid test for exogeneity of land tenure 
arrangements and off-farm activities in estimating investment in soil conservation measures, 
β5 ≠ 0, β6 ≠ 0 and reveal endogeneity, whereas β5 = 0 and β6 = 0 suggest that they are 
exogenous variables and ρjlm = ϑjlm, and φjlm = ϑjlm. In case of endogeneity, standard errors 
and test statistics are not strictly valid and the parameters β1,   β2, β3 and β4 are only estimated 
up to scale that is tackled by making use of an M-estimator (Wooldridge, 2010: 587). A joint 
Wald test can be performed on the vector β in order to analyze overall exogeneity of tenure 
arrangements (Brasselle et al., 2002)18. 
3.5 Hypotheses of the study 
The main hypothesis is that secure land tenure arrangements have a positive impact on 
farmers’ decision to invest in soil conservation measures. In line with previous literature we 
use the term tenure security to refer to the insecurity of the claim of the investment at the end 
of the contract (Abdulai and Goetz, 2014). Secure land tenure arrangements are believed to 
 
16 We define the latent propensity variable for investment m on plot j, by farmer l as Jjlm
*
 that can be linked to plot 
and farm and household characteristics  Zjlm among others such as plot size, household size and education, tenure 
arrangements Rjlm,  social capital of the farmer SClm, off-farm activities of farmers NFlm . 
17 In general, it is preferred to have more instruments than possible in case of endogenous variables, so as to 
increase accuracy and also to test validity of instruments. However, due to not being able to observe the true error 
terms, our instrument might not be the best to use. Additionally, the relationship with the variables that need to be 
instrumented for might not be strong enough to produce estimates where endogeneity has been sufficiently 
accounted for (Manski, 1993; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993: 234; Jackson, 2008: 437).  
18 Wooldridge (2014) proposed an alternative procedure, quasi-LIML approach that can be used to obtain one-
step estimators for nonlinear models with endogenous explanatory variables. In case of 2SML, it maintains 
specification of a full set of conditional distributions. It must be assumed that the reduced forms of the 
endogenous variables have additive errors that are independent of the variables exogenous in the structural 
equation. 
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influence investment decisions positively through the assurance, the realizability and to a 
lesser extent through the collateral effect that they intrinsically offer.  
3.6 Results and discussions 
3.6.1 Descriptive results 
Household characteristics 
Socio-economic characteristics of the household that are employed within the empirical 
analyses are presented in table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Household characteristics 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Age Age of farmer (years) 46.75 13.22 
Male 1 if farmer is male, 0 otherwise 0.84 0.37 
HH-size Household size 5.8 2.05 
Adults Number of household members between 15 and 64 
years old 
3.35 1.70 
Educyrs Years of formal education of farmer 3.80 4.89 
Distm Distance to the nearest market (km) 6.49 4.95 
Yrsr Years of residence in the village 19.61 15.47 
Lvstckvlue Value of farmers’ livestock in GHS* 0.01 7.76 14.59 
Implts Number of farmers’ implements 15.36 15.80 
Assetn Number of farmers’ assets 1.28 1.15 
Mobile 1 if farmer has a mobile phone, 0 otherwise 0.61 0.49 
Credit 1 if farmer has access to credit, 0 otherwise 0.09 0.28 
Chrstn 1 if farmer is Christian, 0 otherwise 0.59 0.49 
Moslem 1 if farmer is Moslem, 0 otherwise 0.29 0.46 
Reloth 1 if farmer belongs to traditional, other or no religion, 0 
otherwise 
0.12 0.32 
Off-farmb 1 if the farmer participates in off-farm activities, 0 
otherwise 
0.49 0.50 
Extens 1 if farmer received technical assistance from an 
extension officer, 0 otherwise 
0.36 0.48 
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Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). Exchange rate: €1 = ₵3.6 in 201419 
Source: Survey data 
The average farmer is around 47 years old with 84% of male respondents and a household of 
five or six family members, including three adults and almost 4 years of formal schooling. The 
average distance to the nearest market is about 6.5km and farmers have lived in the village 
for an average of 20 years. With respect to wealth, the average farm owns livestock amounting 
to ₵776 and has 15 farm implements such as cutlasses or hoes. No farmer owns a tractor, 
they perhaps possess one asset such as a bicycle or television, and half of them own a house. 
More than half of the farmers own a mobile phone as an essential tool for communication. 
There is only a small proportion of farmers, less than 10%, that have access to credit and who 
are not feeling credit constrained20. With respect to religion, 59% of the households are 
Christian, 29% are Moslems, and 12% belong to another religious denomination, being 
representative for this area. Nearly half of the farmers participate in off-farm activities. Since 
we analyzed off-farm activities in more detail, we provide a more precise overview of off-farm 
activities in table 3-3. 
Tenure arrangements 
400 farmers were interviewed about the number of plots they are cultivating and the type of 
tenure arrangement (see Abdulai et al., 2011). Thus, we are not concentrating on several 
perceived rights, we determine major forms of tenure arrangements in the study area and 
assess the subjective perceptions at a different stage, with respect to constraints on investment 
placed on the farmer. 
In summary, those 400 farmers are cultivating 656 plots, with 198 farmers cultivating multiple 
plots. Out of the 656 plots, 215 are owner-operated with the remaining 441 being tenant-
operated. Regarding the latter, 158 of these are under fixed-rentership, 139 are sharecropping, 
71 are cultivated under taungya, 20 are leased from grant chief, and 19 received the plot and 
its usage as a gift21.  
Ownership implies unrestricted property rights, such as transfer rights, which means the plot 
can be sold. Sharecroppers provide some of their output to the landlord as a payment for using 
the land. Two systems can be distinguished here: Abunu, where one-half of the output belongs 
to the tenant and the other half is given to the owner of the plot; and abusa, where one-third of 
the output belongs to the tenant. In the dataset, only a small share operates under abunu (10 
 
19 Data is for all exchange rates from the 10th of March 2014 
20 Access to credit is assessed by means of a subjective measure since farmers had to rank from 5 (very high) to 
1 (very low) if they feel credit constrained in order to invest in soil conservation measures and apart from this, a 
dummy variable has been constructed with those feeling very low and low credit constrained in relation to having 
access to credit, 0 otherwise. 
21 For the non-owner operated plots we have 34 missing values, as not all tenants indicated the type of tenure. 
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plots). Fixed-rent tenants pay a rent to the landlord. Due to the small number of farmers who 
leased the plot from the grant chief, and since this is also one type of fixed-rent tenure, we 
merged the two to form one category. Plots obtained as a gift or under the forest management 
system taungya are characterized by restricted ownership since transfer rights are limited and 
are also merged into one category, ownership with restricted rights. Taungya is a forest-
management system by which food crops are purposively planted simultaneously with 
seedlings of trees. After a couple of years, the tree canopy closes and the farmer is prevented 
from further agricultural production. He then must give back the land, in most cases to the state 
forest agency (Agyeman et al., 2003). The following descriptive statistics presented in the table 
3-2 summarize land tenure security: 
Table 3-2: Tenure arrangements 
Variable          Definition Mean S.D. 
Owner 1 if plot is owner-operated with full rights, 0 otherwise 0.34 0.48 
Sharecrop 1 if plot is under sharecropping contract, 0 otherwise 0.22 0.41 
Rent 1 if plot is under fixed-rent contract, 0 otherwise 0.29 0.45 
Other 1 if plot is owner-operated with no rights, 0 otherwise 0.15 0.35 
Source: Survey data 
Plot characteristics22 
Plot characteristics are assessed since the analysis of investment and productivity is subject 
to the individual plot. 
Half of the plots are cultivated with more than one crop in the major rainy season with nearly 
one third being planted with three crops, whilst the minor rainy season adds even more 
variability. We obtain shares of crops cultivated on the plot, based on an area devoted to crops, 
two times for both major and minor rainy season, and deduce from these results that the major 
crop cultivated on the plot, as is presented in table 3-3. 
Table 3-3: Main crops cultivated on plot  
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Maize 1 if maize is major crop cultivated on plot, 0 otherwise 0.58 0.49 
Yams 1 if yams is major crop cultivated on plot, 0 otherwise 0.27 0.44 
Cass 1 if cassava is major crop cultivated on plot, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.23 
Othrs 1 if others are major crops cultivated on plot, 0 otherwise 0.09 0.28 
 
22 Descriptives of plot characteristics and investment options are only presented for those, who indicated a 
specific type of tenure. 
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Source: Survey data 
Maize and yams are the major crops, while cassava and other crops have minor importance. 
Other crops are an aggregate of plantain, cocoa, vegetables, and beans. Table 3-4 presents 
plot characteristics other than crop composition. 
Table 3-4: Plot characteristics 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Pltsize Size of plot in acres 4.31 4.88 
Slope 1=flat, 2=mild, 3=severe 1.37 0.53 
Pltforest 1 if vegetation on plot is forest, 0 savanna 0.40 0.49 
Soilfert 1 if farmer perceives soil on plot as fertile,  
0 otherwise 
0.88 0.33 
Sand 1 if soil on plot is sandy, 0 otherwise 0.49 0.50 
Clay 1 if soil on plot is clay, 0 otherwise 0.13 0.34 
Loam 1 if soil on plot is loamy, 0 otherwise 0.34 0.48 
Soilothr 1 if soil on plot is other soil, 0 otherwise 0.04 0.19 
Yield  Value of output per acre 2009 (GHC*0.1) 56.37 124.23 
Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). Exchange rate: €1 = ₵3.6 in 2014; Source: Survey data 
The average plot size is 4.3 acres though with quite some variation. The plot is mostly flat, with 
a nearly equal distribution of forest and savanna, and mainly perceived as fertile. Half of the 
plots consist of sandy soil followed by loam and clay soils. Sandy soils are the easiest to work 
with and cultivate, however, they dry out quickly and do not contain a lot of nutrients. The rest 
of the plots are covered by clay soil which is very fertile and drains slowly, while loamy soils is 
a mixture of both, well-drained and easy to work with (Royal Horticultural Society, 2011). The 
value of crop output per acre 2009 was on average ₵563.7 not considered for the share used 
for own consumption. 
Investment options 
One can differentiate between diverse types of investment options. We classify them into four 
groups: erosion control measures (terraces, ditches, windbreaks, and earth dams), agronomic 
measures (multiple cropping, mulching, and cover crops), soil management measures (farm 
and green manure, deep ploughing, and compost) and cultivation measures (minimum and 
zero tillage, ridging across and along the slope). Trees planted on the plot are also assessed.  
Farmers mentioned the use of mineral fertilizer (NPK 15-15-15, NP 20-20, urea (sulfate of 
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ammonia)) and pesticides (pesticides, fungicides, herbicides and weedicides), planting 
material and new seeds purchased. 
We also asked farmers to quantify investments in monetary terms. However, in the case of 
some investment options, it seems difficult for farmers to attach a monetary value to it. For the 
sake of briefness, the extent of investment is not presented here. An overview of investment 
options by group of investment is provided in the tables 3-5 – 3-9. Trees are added to the 
category erosion control measures since they also control for soil erosion alongside other 
functions. 
Table 3-5: Erosion control measures 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Terraces 1 if farmer invests in terraces on plot, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.18 
Ditches 1 if farmer invests in ditches on plot, 0 otherwise 0.35 0.48 
Windbreaks 1 if farmer invests in windbreaks on plot, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.17 
Earth dams 1 if farmer invests in earth dams on plot, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.17 
Trees 1 if farmer has planted trees on plot, 0 otherwise 0.32 0.47 
Source: Survey data 
Of the erosion control measures, the most prevalent is investment in ditches up to a 35%, 
whereas the other investment options are only rarely applied. Trees have been planted on 1/3 of 
the plots. 
Table 3-6: Agronomic measures 
Variable Definition Mea
n 
S.D. 
Multiple cropping 1 if farmer applies multiple cropping on plot, 0 otherwise 0.53 0.50 
Mulch 1 farmer applies mulching on plot, 0 otherwise 0.16 0.36 
Cover crops 1 if farmer applies cover crops on plot, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.23 
Source: Survey data 
The most prevalent agronomic measure with on more than half of plots applied is multiple 
cropping, whereas only on a minor share of plots mulching and cover crops are applied. 
Table 3-7: Soil management measures 
Variable Definition Mean S.D
. 
Deep ploughing 1 if farmer applies deep ploughing on plot, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.24 
Compost 1 if farmer applies compost on plot, 0 otherwise 0.04 0.19 
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Farm manure 1 if farmer applies farm manure on plot, 0 otherwise 0.09 0.29 
Green manure 1 if farmer applies green manure on plot, 0 otherwise 0.04 0.20 
Source: Survey data 
Soil management measures are quite rare in application. In the analysis, we do merge 
compost, farm and green manure to manure. 
Table 3-8: Cultivation measures 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Mtillage 1 if farmer applies minimum tillage on plot, 0 otherwise 0.47 0.50 
Ztillage 1 if farmer applies zero tillage on plot, 0 otherwise 0.18 0.38 
Racrsl 1 if farmer applies ridging across slope on plot, 0 otherwise 0.21 0.40 
Ralosl 1 if farmer applies ridging along slope on plot, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.23 
Source: Survey data 
Within investment options, minimum and zero tillage are the least laborious ones. The farmer 
does not need to be active; he is rather passive not undertaking tillage operations that are 
applied in sum on 65% of the plots. Ridging operations are undertaken on around one quarter 
of the plots. 
Table 3-9: Input use 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Fert 1 if farmer applies fertilizer on plot, 0 otherwise 0.33 0.47 
Pest 1 if farmer applies pesticides on plot, 0 otherwise 0.46 0.50 
Input 1 if farmer applies planting material/improved seeds on 
plot, 0 otherwise 
0.58 0.49 
Source: Survey data 
Input use is quite common. A third part of the plots use fertilizer, almost a half of the plots use 
pesticides and for more than half of the plots planting material and improved seeds are 
purchased. 
What needs to change from the farmer’s point of view in order to invest 
In order to assess data from the farmers’ point of view, farmers interviewed had to mention at 
most three necessary changes in order to invest in soil conservation measures starting with 
the most crucial one and proceeding in descending order. Table 3-10 below presents these 
changes and their respective frequency according to farmers’ responses, which suggest 
options of how investment can be facilitated. 
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Table 3-10: Necessary changes from the farmer’s point of view in % 
Change  1st change  2nd change 3rd change 
Access to credit 45.31 24.77 14.29 
Access/lower prices of inputs 38.54 42.90 28.11 
Improved knowledge about how to apply 
measures 
4.17 14.80 26.73 
Banning of bushfires 2.86 2.72 2.43 
Change in land tenure system 1.04 6.95 7.83 
Enhanced practical assistance  3.02 4.62  
Others 1.09 4.84 15.99 
Source: Survey data 
The most important change that should be taken into consideration in relation to credit is that 
nearly half of the 384 farmers interviewed mentioned better access to/lower prices of inputs. 
Of minor importance and in descending order, we can mention an improved knowledge about 
how to apply measures, a banning of bushfires and a change in land tenure systems. Other 
named changes are very diverse.  
Out of the 331 farmers who stated their second necessary change, slightly more than 40% of 
them named better access/lower prices of inputs, while a 25% mentioned a change in credit 
availability. 15% of the farmers interviewed stated the necessity of improved knowledge about 
how to apply measures. Almost 7% preferred a change in the land tenure system. Among 
minor issues, we can mention enhanced practical assistance, banning of bushfires and others 
related to infrastructure.  
217 farmers answered questions in relation to the third necessary change. Better access/lower 
prices of inputs is still the most preferred change with 28%, followed by improved knowledge 
with nearly 27%, and access to credit with around 14%. Nearly 8% of the answers are related 
to a change in the land tenure system. Minor issues are in line with those indicated previously. 
The answers reveal a few issues with high relevance, such as access to credit and access and 
prices of inputs. The strong notion concerning access to credit is also mentioned by Pande 
and Udry (2007). Private mortgage lending is very restricted in Ghana since interest rates of 
up to 50% are charged per annum from banks and other formal lending institutions (Berry, 
2009). The results indicate a minor priority given to insecurity of tenure. However, these 
findings should be taken with care, since these are merely qualitative statements. Still, they 
reveal the complexity of constraints farmers face in terms of investment. The following 
quantitative analyses will provide more insight into the relevance of tenure arrangements for 
investment decisions. 
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Descriptive comparison of plots under different tenure arrangements  
Before investment decisions are determined, we examine differences by means of the 
variables included in the model (except village dummies) among farmers of owned, 
sharecropped and fixed-rented plots, by bonferroni multiple comparison t-tests that are 
presented in table 3-11. We want to test the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis suggesting 
that sharecroppers invest less on their plots than owner cultivators and fixed-renters, due to 
high transaction costs of monitoring, leading to lower outputs (Shaban, 1987). Therefore, we 
expect investments to be lower on sharecropped plots compared to the other plots; along with 
lower outputs. 
Table 3-11: Differences in key characteristics between tenure arrangements 
Variable Owner1 Sharecropper2 Tenant3 2-1 3-1 3-2 
Yield (GHS*0.1/acre) 39.80 72.94 62.19 33.18* 22.39 -10.75 
Maize (dummy)  0.47 0.64 0.63 0.17** 0.16** -0.01 
Yams (dummy) 0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 
Cassava (dummy)    0.33 0.26 0.24 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 
Othrs (dummy)    0.10 0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.03 
Trees (dummy) 0.45 0.16 0.14 -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.02 
Plot size (acre) 5.78 3.73 3.73 -2.05*** -2.05*** 0.00 
Loamy soil (dummy) 0.35 0.34 0.31 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
Credit (dummy) 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.04 
HH-size per acre 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Livestock (GHS*0.01) 8.57 8.10 11.36 -0.47 2.79 3.26 
Age (years) 49.20 45.70 46.91 -3.5** -2.29 1.21 
Years of residence  26.7 13.2 18.2  -13.5*** -8.5*** 5.0*** 
Extension (dummy) 0.39 0.27 0.34 -0.12* -0.05 0.07 
Fbo (dummy)  0.24 0.33 0.23 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 
Distm (km)  7.14 6.50 5.40 -0.64 -1.74*** -1.10 
Ditches (dummy)  0,39 0,40 0,36 0.01 0,04 -0,04 
Fertilizer (dummy) 0,28 0,30 0,48 0,02 -0,20*** 0,12*** 
Manure (dummy) 0,14 0,22 0,14 0,08 0,00 -0,08 
Mult.Crop. (dummy)  0,55 0,65 0,59 0,10 0,04 -0,06 
Note: The difference measured for each combination of tenure arrangements is 
difference = mean (tenure arrangement X)-mean (tenure arrangement Y), 
with H0: diff = 0 and H1: diff ≠ 0; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The test is carried out by rejecting Hi if pi < αi, where αi =
α
n
 and n is the number of comparisons 
Source: Survey data 
Output on plots under sharecropping (72.94 Ghs*0.1/acre) is 45 percentage points higher than 
on plots under ownership (39.80 Ghs*0.1/acre) and this difference is statistically significant, 
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albeit only at the 10% level. Soil conservation measures do not directly lead to higher yields or 
even decrease yields in the short-run. As outlined in the theoretical framework, ditches reduce 
land used for cultivation of crops, which is one explanation for owners having lower outputs. It 
is also important to note that lower yields per acre do not necessarily translate into total lower 
production (see Stiefel and Minten, 2008).  
Crop choices differ between tenure arrangements. Maize is mostly planted on sharecropped 
and fixed-rented plots compared to owned plots, whereas for other crop choices no difference 
exists. Maize is the most predominant crop. Trees are most common on plots that are owner-
cultivated. This finding is not surprising, as a range of studies provide evidence that owners 
are more likely to plant trees (see Deininger and Ali, 2008; Abdulai et al., 2011; Ali et al., 2011). 
Most trees planted are teak and cashew, respective outputs do not provide such a high return 
per acre as food and cash crops planted on sharecropped plots and provide one additional 
explanation for the difference in revenues. Having trees might be linked to lower output per 
plot due to space needed by plots and linked to higher outputs for sharecroppers and fixed-
rent tenants. 
Household characteristics differ little between types of tenure except years of residence in the 
village. There is no difference in access to credit with only a small share of farmers having 
access. Concerning age, farmers of sharecropping contracts are younger than farmers who 
own land. Years of residence in the village differs greatly among those different types of tenure. 
Owners live on average already 27 years in the village, sharecroppers only 13 years. 
Sharecroppers are mostly national migrants from the North settling in the commonly notated 
‘Food basket of Ghana’23 and as such are characterized by a shorter period of time living in 
the area (Geest et al., 2010). Sharecroppers also have less contact with an extension officer 
than farmers of the other two tenure arrangements.  
With respect to location, farmers of fixed-rent contracts live closer to the nearest market than 
farmers who own land. Opposingly, owner-operated plots are the largest. 
We also observe differences in investment across land tenure arrangements. Fertilizer is 
significantly more applied in case of plots with fixed-rentership and is in line with our theoretical 
framework in that, fixed-renters extract nutrients from the soil in a very short time without 
considering long-time effects. The Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis suggests that 
sharecroppers invest less on their plots than owner cultivators, due to lower incentives as they 
do not receive the full benefit of their inputs due to giving away part of the output to the landlord 
and therefore invest too little. One way of overcoming the Marshallian inefficiency has been 
 
23 http://www.ghana.travel/places-to-visit/regions/brong-ahafo/, accessed 07.02.2019 
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claimed to be monitoring, yet this is limited due to high transaction costs of monitoring (Shaban, 
1987). From the descriptive data, it appears that sharecroppers invest more in ditches, manure 
and multiple cropping than owners or renters and are also not producing less output compared 
to owners and fixed-renters. Hence, the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis cannot be 
confirmed by only looking at the descriptive comparisons and will be analyzed in detail in the 
empirical analysis. In addition, it is in line with the above observation that sharecroppers have 
mostly moved to the area24 and engaging in farming might be their main purpose of staying 
there creating an incentive to invest highly in farming. 
3.6.2 Empirical results 
Variables included in the model 
We make use of plot-level data. The variables included in the model are presented in table 3-
12. Four different types of investment, as indicated earlier in the conceptual framework, have 
been chosen to cover a broad range of investment options. These belong to the main 
innovations a farmer in Sub-Saharan Africa can invest in to enhance production (Rijn et al., 
2012). We have decided for the erosion control measure ditches, the productivity-enhancing 
input fertilizer, the soil management measure manure and the agronomic measure multiple 
cropping. As it was previously stated, all investment options, except for fertilizer, are soil 
improving, together with fertilizer and manure as productivity enhancing techniques. The 
incidence of each investment option is measured by dummy variables, where one indicates a 
respective investment was made on the plot and zero otherwise. 
The choice of the explanatory variables is based on previous research and the conceptual 
framework in section 3.3. Tenure arrangements are included according to the differentiation 
by Abdulai et al. (2011). Accordingly, we distinguish between unrestricted ownership of plots, 
restricted ownership of plots, fixed-rentership and sharecropping. As previously mentioned in 
section 3.6.1, unrestricted ownership implies unrestricted property rights, including transfer 
rights so the plot can be sold. Restricted ownership limits transfer rights since the plot cannot 
be transferred by selling it. These plots are obtained as a gift or under the forest management 
system taungya. Fixed-rent tenants pay a rent and sharecroppers provide some of their output 
to the landlord. Empirical findings of the effect of tenure arrangements on investment differ 
(Place, 2009). Still, according to the conceptual framework, we assume ownership to exert a 
positive effect on investment in soil conservation measures, in particular on those with long-
term effects. 
 
24 Only 10% of sharecroppers are originally from Techiman and Kintampo North, whereas more than 60% of 
owners are from either Techiman or Kintampo North 
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Social capital is assumed to foster positive investment decisions, as outlined in the conceptual 
framework. The latent nature of social networks is employed, and observable factors are used 
in an explorative principal component analysis. Components are interactions related to 
investment and as well as to different types of assistance while including the underlying factor 
trust in the community. Information on the principal component analysis (PCA) in detail is 
provided in the next section ‘variables subject to endogeneity’. In addition, the observable 
formal social network, membership of an fbo is included as a binary variable to evaluate its 
individual effect. 
Off-farm activities are added to the model. Since extant empirical results concerning the effect 
on investment behavior on the farm are ambiguous and chapter 07 is focusing on off-farm 
employment only, we forego to assume a certain direction of influence. However, wage 
employment as part of off-farm employment is more related to push factors (Woldenhanna and 
Oskam, 2001) because cash constraints may be overcome. It is likely that wage employment 
is used to obtain cash for investment on the farm. In case of self-employment, income can be 
used for both, investment on the farm and investment in the self-employment business, 
depending on where the farmer expects a higher payoff. 
Control variables consist of plot characteristics and farm and household characteristics. Plot 
characteristics determine the differences in plot quality, which influences investment (Abdulai 
et al., 2011). Household size, age, education and its squared term, contact to an extension 
officer, the value of livestock and farm implements represent household characteristics. The 
latter two are a proxy for wealth of the household.  
The use of instruments that are excluded from the second-stage regression of the investment 
specification is due to variables that are possibly subject to endogeneity and are explained in 
the following section. 
 
Table 3-12: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variables Variable definition Mean S.D. 
Investment options      
Ditches 1 if farmer applies ditches on plot, 0 otherwise 0.39 0.49 
Fert 1 if farmers applies fertilizer on plot, 0 otherwise 0.34 0.47 
Manure 1 if farmer applies organic manure on plot, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.34 
Multcrop 1 if farmer applies multiple cropping on plot, 0 otherwise 0.58 0.49 
Independent variables   
Owner 1 if plot is under owner-operated with full rights, 0 
otherwise 
0.36 0.48 
Sharecropping 1 if plot is under sharecropping contract, 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 
Rent 1 if plot is under fixed-rent contract, 0 otherwise 0.28 0.45 
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Other 1 if plot is under owner-operated with no rights, 0 
otherwise 
0.16 0.37 
Pltsize Plot size in acres  4.35 5.08 
Pltyrs Years plot has been under use by current cultivator 8.70 9.62 
Age Age of farmer (years) 48.12 13.15 
Educyrs Years of formal education of farmer 4.13 5.08 
Educyrs2  42.77 56.85 
Lvstckvlue Value of livestock wealth (GHS*0.01) 9.05 17.55 
Implts Number of implements the farmer owns  15.58 14.87 
HH-size Number of permanent household members between 15 
and 65 years  
3.36 1.63 
Netw_inv Principal component network investment 0.01 1.14 
Netw_ass Principal component network assistance 0.03 1.01 
Extens 1 if farmer received assistance by extension officer, 0 
otherwise 
0.36 0.48 
Fbo 1 if farmer is member of an fbo, 0 otherwise  0.31 0.46 
Off-farm 1 if farmer is engaged in off-farm activities, 0 otherwise 0.49 0.50 
District 1 if district of household is Kintampo North, 0 Techiman 0.63 0.48 
Instruments    
Yrsr Years of residence in village 20.23 15.47 
Ethnic 1 if farmer belongs to ethnic group Brong, 0 otherwise 0.25 0.43 
Pop_nonagr Share of population in non-agricultural employment in 
district 
34.86 7.78 
Distm 
 
Distance to the market in km 6.74 5.25 
Observations   505   
Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). Exchange rate: €1 = ₵3.6 in 2014 
Source: Survey data 
Variables subject to endogeneity 
 
Possible endogeneity of tenure arrangements 
Tenure arrangements might be subject to endogeneity as outlined before. Ownership with 
restricted rights is the base category in the empirical analysis and we only need to consider 
endogeneity of the other three tenure arrangements. Ownership without restricted rights is less 
likely to be subject to endogeneity in our context since ownership is mainly determined by 
inheriting a plot (correlation 75%). 
 
The use of instruments is based on previous research and accounts for the context of the 
study. Ethnicity and years of residence in the village are not determinants of investment yet 
influence access to land. According to literature, membership in social groups determines 
access to land rights (Udry, 2012). In line with this argument, one variable used as an 
instrument for sharecroppers is ethnic identity. Being part of the most common ethnicity, Brong, 
makes engagement in sharecropping less likely; minority ethnic groups are more likely to 
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engage in sharecropping. As outlined in the descriptive comparisons across tenure rights in 
section 3.6.1, sharecroppers are also characterized by significantly fewer years of residence 
in the community. We also apply years of residence as an instrument, since those farmers who 
haven’t lived in a village for a lengthy period of time are more likely to be tenants (see Pender 
and Fafchamps, 2006), in this case sharecroppers. The share of population engaged in 
nonagricultural employment by district describes the economic possibilities in the district 
making the need to lease land stronger in cases of fewer other viable options. Therefore, the 
instrument used for fixed-rentership is share of population engaged in nonagricultural 
employment by district. The higher the share of nonagricultural employment, the less likely the 
engagement in fixed-rentership since other income opportunities are accessible. 
 
Figure 3-5 provides an overview of tenure arrangements and the respective instruments used. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Tenure arrangements and instruments 
 
Possible endogeneity of social networks 
Social capital is based on individual choices that might be subject to endogeneity. Endogeneity 
of social capital was approached by using latent social networks that are part of social capital 
and are not subject to endogeneity. We apply a principal component analysis (PCA) in order 
to make use of observable factors of the social environment to generate these latent social 
capital variables as has been used by Genius et al., (2013) in Greece as well as in a similar 
approach by Willy and Holm-Müller (2013) on Kenya and Hunecke et al. (2017) in Chile. 
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We used several social capital variables, as shown in table 3-13, that go beyond interaction 
related to farming and investment in farming, such as trust in the community and membership 
in a religious organization. We have captured several other types of social interaction: 
interactions linked to investments, monetary assistance in case of any need, as well as 
practical assistance and farming advice. These social capital variables are potentially relevant 
in explaining investment behavior and capture general trust in the community as well as 
networks based on information exchange, and practical and monetary assistance (Genius et 
al., 2013; Fafchamps, 2006).  
 
The social network variable: investment networks (component 01) and assistance networks 
(component 03), are important aspects of social capital, but not directly observable (Krishna, 
2004). Different networks provide a platform for information exchange and lower the cost of 
access to information as well as practical and monetary assistance (Hunecke et al., 2017). 
 
Table 3-13: Descriptives social capital variables 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Trust 1 if farmer thinks people can be trusted, 0 otherwise 0.80 0.40 
Nnboa 1 if farmer gets practical assistance by nnboa, 0 otherwise 0.35 0.48 
Monasall How many individuals farmer knows he would get monetary 
assistance from in case of need 
1.23 2.59 
Tradass 1 if farmer gets assistance in trading, 0 otherwise 0.67 0.47 
Advice 1 if farmer gets advice about farming business from family, 
friends, neighbors and others, 0 otherwise 
0.80 0.40 
Invstall How many individuals farmer knows who invest in soil 
conservation measures 
2.05 4.15 
Tlkothrs 1 if farmer discusses investments with others, who invest, 0 
otherwise 
0.36 0.49 
Relorg 1 if farmer is a member of a religious organization, 0 
otherwise 
0.42 0.49 
Source: Survey data 
 
A PCA is applied with orthogonal rotation, adequacy for the analysis is veriﬁed using Kaiser–
Meyer–Oklin (KMO) statistics and the Bartlett's test of sphericity to test whether correlations 
between variables were large enough. Components obtained with eigenvalues greater than 1 
were selected. The factor scores in each PCA component were summed up for each social 
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capital component to obtain a single score. Further specifications of the analysis can be found 
in the appendix, as well as a more thorough overview of the methodology in section 4.  
 
Table 3-14: KMO and Bartlett test of sphericity 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
 
 0.549 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-square 
df 
Sig. 
416.446 
15 
0.00 
 
The KMO value of 0.549 is above the cut-off point 0.5 and is a mediocre value. Patterns of 
correlations are compact, and they provide distinct and reliable components for principal 
component analysis (Field, 2005: 640). We also have to reject the null hypothesis of Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity that explains that variables are not correlated with each other, confirming the 
prior KMO value and supporting the assumption that the data is suitable for principal 
component analysis. After assessing suitability of the data, eigenvalues are determined (see 
appendix). The loadings of the observed social capital variables on the three extracted latent 
social capital components after rotation25 are presented in the component matrix table 3-15; 
loadings below 0.4 are left blank. The loadings show that component 01 is mainly linked to 
investment networks (number of people the farmer knows who have invested in soil 
conservation measures; if farmer discusses investment with others). Component 02 is linked 
to general trust (trust in the community, farming advice given by friends, family, and neighbors), 
and component 03 is linked to assistance networks (how many individuals the farmer knows 
he would get monetary assistance from if needed; if farmer gets practical assistance by nnboa). 
Table 3-15: Component matrix 
 Comp. 1 
Netw_inv 
Comp. 2 
Netw_trust 
Comp. 3 
Netw_ass 
trust                0.7727  
nnboa                 0.6677 
monasall               0.8305 
invstall               0.7960   
tlkothrs              0.7846   
advice  0.7494  
 
 
25 Rotation of the data serves to ease the structure of the principal components. Oblique rotation is 
applied (oblimin (0.5) oblique), hence the components are allowed to correlate with each other 
(terminal punctuation?) 
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Finally, farm-based organizations also constitute a social network that has not been part of the 
PCA, since we wanted to analyze its own distinguished effect. Participation in a farm-based 
organization is less likely to be endogenous in our context since, apart from the individual 
choice of farmers participating in an fbo, some farmers are participating in more than one fbo. 
As such, participation reflects external local availabilities of farm-based organizations rather 
than individual choice (Key et al., 2000) and participation in an fbo resembles a union of local 
availabilities. farm-based organizations serve several different purposes ranging from 
education, labor provision, access to inputs and loans as well as land, and support in selling 
produce, as farmers stated in an open-ended question. 
Possible endogeneity of off-farm activities 
In order to analyze possible endogeneity of off-farm activities (see section 7.2.1 for more 
details), we make use of local availabilities of off-farm employment, that is, distance to the 
market. A smaller distance to the market is associated with less rural areas providing more 
sources of off-farm activities, but not linked to investment choices (see Abdulai and Huffman, 
2005; Abdulai and Huffmann, 2014). 
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Table 3-16: Probit estimates of determinants of land tenure arrangements 
VARIABLES Fixed-rent Sharecropping  
      
Pop_nonagr/ethnic -0.035*** -0.967***  
 (0.008) (0.223)  
Yrsr  -0.024***  
  (0.007)  
Pltsize -0.027* 0.003  
 (0.014) (0.014)  
Pltyrs -0.015** -0.014  
 (0.007) (0.011)  
Off_farmb 0.290** -0.377***  
 (0.126) (0.146)  
Age 0.001 0.002  
 (0.005) (0.006)  
Male 0.345* 0.028  
 (0.204) (0.244)  
HH-size -0.041 0.066  
 (0.039) (0.047)  
Implts 0.001 -0.004  
 (0.004) (0.005)  
Educyrs -0.112** 0.030  
 (0.054) (0.078)  
Educyrs2 0.008* -0.006  
 (0.00) (0.007)  
Lvstckvlue 0.006* -0.003  
 (0.003) (0.005)  
Fbo -0.298** 0.180  
 (0.141) (0.157)  
Extens 0.067 -0.258  
 (0.135) (0.162)  
Network_inv 0.108* -0.102  
 (0.058) (0.072)  
Network_ass 0.024 0.087  
 (0.063) (0.072)  
Constant 0.600 -0.128  
 (0.501) (0.378)  
    
F-test of 
instruments  
[p-values] 
 30.48 
[0.000] 
 
    
Observations 539 531  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
aThe variable ‘pop_nonagr’ is the respective instrument for fixed-rentership, and ‘ethnic’ is the instrument 
used for sharecropping  
 
Table 3-16 presents the results of the (first-stage) estimations of determinants of tenure 
arrangements. The instruments applied are all significant at the 1% level. In addition, F-tests 
on the joint significance of the instruments for sharecropping are reported. The hypothesis that 
the instruments are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1% level of significance. The sign of 
these instruments is as described. Years of residence in the village and belonging to the Brong 
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ethnicity have a negative influence on sharecropping. Share of population engaged in 
nonagricultural employment has a negative influence on engagement in fixed-rentership. 
 
Table 3-17: Probit estimates of determinants of off-farm employment 
VARIABLES off_farmb 
  
Distm -0.029** 
 (0.012) 
Owner -0.010 
 (0.196) 
Sharecropping -0.381* 
 (0.200) 
Fixed-rent 0.142 
 (0.193) 
Pltsize -0.007 
 (0.012) 
Pltyrs -0.014* 
 (0.007) 
Age -0.014*** 
 (0.005) 
Male 0.142 
 (0.186) 
HH-size -0.023 
 (0.038) 
Implts -0.001 
 (0.004) 
Educyrs 0.112** 
 (0.053) 
Educyrs2 -0.006 
 (0.005) 
Lvstckvlue 0.014*** 
 (0.004) 
Fbo 0.004 
 (0.134) 
Extens -0.087 
 (0.131) 
Network_inv -0.012 
 (0.057) 
Network_ass -0.084 
 (0.062) 
Constant 0.709** 
 (0.348) 
Observations 509 
 
Table 3-17 presents the results of the (first-stage) estimations of determinants of off-farm 
employment. The instrument distance to the market is significant at a level of 5% and negative. 
A smaller distance to the market is positively related to engagement in off-farm employment 
due to having more possibilities in less rural areas. We forego any interpretation of other 
variables as we analyze participation in off-farm work at the household level in Chapter 7 while 
additionally differentiating across wage employment and self-employment. 
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Results multivariate probit (2SCML) 
The empirical results for the second-stage investment specifications are presented in table 3-
18. For estimating a multivariate probit model, the most common procedure is to make use of 
a simulation method, the Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane (GHK) simulator is applied. This 
simulator makes use of the property of a multivariate normal distribution function which can be 
constructed as “the product of sequentially conditional univariate normal distribution functions” 
(Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003: 281)26. The model is estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors. These are asymptotically valid irrespective of the type of heteroscedasticity 
and in case of homoscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2010: 61). 
The log-likelihood ratio statistic is 299.35 and is significant at the 1% level, which indicates that 
the independent variables together influence the decision of the farmer to invest27. The cross-
equation correlations28 (ρ) show that it is more efficient to estimate these investment choices 
jointly since, except for ditches and fertilizer, ditches and multiple cropping, as well as fertilizer 
and manure, all other investment decisions are statistically interrelated. A positive value of rho, 
as is the case for all significant correlation coefficients, shows that unobserved factors that 
influence one investment decision positively also increase the likelihood of a positive 
investment decision of the other, suggesting complementarity between the investment options 
(Marenya and Barrett, 2007). 
We also aimed at estimating a household fixed effects model in order to analyze unobservables 
at the household-level. However, for estimating the unconditional fixed effects probit model, 
there is too little variation within the household with respect to investment on various plots. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 The multivariate probit model was specified with the cmp option in STATA, with no difference in results compared 
to the classical mvprobit command except computation time which makes the cmp option more convenient. 
27 Multicollinearity (spellcheck this) of the explanatory variables is tested (see table A1 in the Appendix); test 
statistics reveal no problem of highly correlated variables. 
28 For checking on correlation between the error terms justifying the joint estimation, the cmp option specifies 
‘atanhrho’ being a transformed parameter ‘rho’, the transformation is the inverse arc-hyperbolic of rho (Roodman, 
2009). 
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Table 3-18: Multivariate probit regression of investment in soil conservation measures 
VARIABLES Ditches Fertilizer Manure Multiple Cropping 
Owner 0.241 -0.040 0.378 0.331 
 (0.235) (0.224) (0.273) (0.211) 
Sharecropper 1.302** 1.069* 2.834*** 1.326** 
 (0.572) (0.578) (0.722) (0.528) 
Fixed-rent 4.575*** 1.577** -3.975*** 0.895 
 (0.807) (0.753) (1.005) (0.743) 
Pltsize 0.017 0.032** 0.001 0.064*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) 
Pltyrs 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.021* 0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) 
Off_farmb 1.501 5.166*** 5.995*** 2.78*** 
 (1.090) (1.120) (1.729) (1.037) 
Age 0.016** 0.017** 0.033*** 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) 
Male -0.410* -0.274 0.570* -0.608*** 
 (0.238) (0.236) (0.331) (0.223) 
HH-size 0.039 0.0472 0.060 0.087** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.040) 
Implts 0.005 0.004 0.015*** -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Educyrs 0.011 -0.167** -0.189 -0.188*** 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.115) (0.072) 
Educyrs2 -0.001 0.008 0.007 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Lvstckvlue -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.017* -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
Fbo 0.506*** 0.372** -0.135 0.329** 
 (0.172) (0.166) (0.205) (0.161) 
Extens 0.057 0.456*** 0.326* 0.164 
 (0.145) (0.143) (0.182) (0.138) 
Network_inv 0.169*** -0.045 0.351*** 0.138** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.080) (0.063) 
Network_ass 0.164** 0.187** 0.373*** 0.166** 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.103) (0.078) 
Res_off_farmb -1.300* -3.091*** -3.159*** -1.600** 
 (0.675) (0.686) (1.052) (0.639) 
Res_fixedrent -2.796*** -0.928* 2.109*** -0.452 
 (0.509) (0.474) (0.605) (0.472) 
Res_sharecrop -0.424 -0.269 -1.095*** -0.398 
 (0.331) (0.325) (0.402) (0.299) 
Constant -3.694*** -4.544*** -6.021*** -1.818** 
 (0.837) (0.853) (1.285) (0.778) 
χ2 -statistic for joint 
sig. of tenure 
residuals [p-value] 
33.14  
[0.000] 
5.62 
[0.10] 
15.45 
[0.000] 
2.53 
[0.280] 
     
Cross-equation 
correlations   
 
 
ρDF-0.007 ρDMa0.299*** ρDMu0.086 
  
ρFMu0.385*** ρMaMu0.431*** ρFMa-0.037   
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Log-likelihood ratio 
statistica 299.3>χ2(80)  
 
 
     
Observations 503                 503 503 503 
     
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a The log-likelihood ratio statistic is given by LR = 2(LΩ-Lω) where LΩ is the unrestricted maximum 
likelihood and Lω is the restricted maximum likelihood with an asymptotic χ
2(k) distribution, where k is 
the number of restrictions. 
The significance of several variables representing the residuals derived from the first-stage 
estimations indicates the importance of controlling for endogeneity. With the exception of 
multiple cropping, the coefficients of the residual for fixed-rentership for all other investments 
are significant. The results suggest that the tenure arrangement is correlated with the error 
term which influences investment. We also observe a significant coefficient of the residual for 
sharecropping on investment in manure, suggesting that the tenure arrangement is correlated 
with the error term which influences investment in manure. 
We tested the hypothesis that the residuals from the first-stage estimations for tenure 
arrangements are jointly equal to zero. We performed a Wald test on the vector of these 
residuals for each individual investment specification with the null hypothesis that the residuals 
are jointly equal to zero. Rightly, the null hypothesis for investment in ditches and manure has 
to be rejected. For multiple cropping, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected as there is no 
simultaneity bias and the parameters have been consistently estimated. However, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for investment in fertilizer with one individual residual that is 
marginally significant. Overall, a simultaneity bias is present and not controlling for endogeneity 
would have resulted in biased and inconsistent estimates for tenure rights. 
The residual from the first-stage estimation for off-farm activities is significant for all investment 
options. A simultaneity bias is present and not controlling for endogeneity would have resulted 
in biased and inconsistent estimates for off-farm activities. 
Property rights have been analyzed to a great extent in the past. Due to the diverse empirical 
findings on the relationship between land tenure arrangements and investment, its importance 
still needs to be analyzed in different settings (Ali et al., 2011). These results shed some more 
light on the relevance of these institutions.  
Owners are not more likely to invest in soil conservation measures compared to restricted 
ownership. We merely observe a positive non-significant effect for all three investments that 
entail long-term positive effects and a negative non-significant effect for investment in fertilizer. 
The results are in line with Place and Hazell (1993) who, on data from several African 
countries, could not link higher tenure security with more input usage on plots, as well as 
Pender and Fafchamps (2006) who also reveal that the extent of input use is not influenced by 
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the type of tenure arrangement on survey data in Ethiopia. However, a positive significant 
effect of ownership on soil conservation measures has been found by several empirical studies 
for Ghana (see Besley, 1995; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Abdulai et al., 2011; Abdulai and 
Goetz, 2014).  
Farmers on owned plots are not more likely to invest in ditches. This finding is not 
straightforward regarding the conceptual framework, and also that farmers on sharecropping 
and fixed-rent contracts are more likely to invest in ditches compared to plots under restricted 
ownership. The marginal value of soil capital should be higher for owners, which would lend 
support to the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis for sharecroppers. The effect of fixed-
rentership and sharecropping on investment in ditches is given in relation to the base category, 
restricted ownership, and can serve as one possible explanation. Restricted ownership 
includes the forest management system taungya, where seedlings of trees are purposely 
planted to provide soil erosion control, making investment in ditches less likely. As shown in 
the descriptive results, owners are much more likely to have planted trees on their plots, 
serving as a soil erosion measure possibly being a substitute to ditches. 
Fixed-rentership and sharecropping are positive and significant determinants of investment in 
fertilizer which is an investment with private short-run effects (Beekman and Bulte, 2012). This 
finding is partly supported by results reported by Abdulai et al. (2011), where fixed-rentership 
is also positive and significant for investment in fertilizer. The result is in line with our 
conceptual framework indicating fixed-renters apply more fertilizer compared to owners. 
Fixed-rentership is negative and significant for investment in manure, an investment with 
positive long-term effects, compared to ownership with restricted rights. These results are in 
line with the conceptual framework showing that fixed-renters are less likely to invest in manure 
than owners if the effect on soil improvement by the manure outweighs the effect of soil 
degradation produced by an increase in harvest. Overall, we can disentangle complex 
mechanisms of how diverse tenure arrangements influence various types of investment. 
Deininger and Jin (2006) have rightly noted that the influence of tenure security is diverse 
across different types of investment. 
The results can also be explained in light of the three main presumed effects of tenure security 
on investment decisions. The first, and in our case the most important one, is the assurance 
effect. The investment incentive comes through security of reaping benefits of investment. The 
second one is the realizability effect; investment increases the value of the plot along with 
expected returns in case of exchange. Abdulai et al. (2011) indicate land purchase to be rare 
in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana. In addition, Atwood (1990) argues that even in cases of 
land market existence, the increased value of the plot due to investment does not play any 
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role. Owners simply do not have an interest in selling the land. Hence, the realizability effect 
might be negligible. The third, the collateral effect, is also of minor importance. Nearly all 
farmers in the data set (94%) obtained credit, however, only 0.05% did so from a formal credit 
source, i.e. a bank or credit union. The collateral effect cannot enhance investment with a 
predominantly informal lending sector (see Atwood, 1990; Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996; 
Brasselle et al., 2002).  
The negative effect of fixed-rentership on investment in manure compared to owners with 
restricted rights underlines the assurance effect of ownership. The positive effect of 
sharecropping and fixed-rentership on investment in ditches compared to owners with 
restricted rights suggests that even if there was a risk of expropriation, this effect would be too 
little to exert an effect on investment behavior (see Fenske, 2010a). Usage rights of the plot 
by tenants are sufficient to increase investment in ditches even for sharecroppers. This shows 
that in our context the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis does not reveal this one to be a 
dominant mechanism driving underinvestment.  
Sharecroppers appear to be more likely to invest in all investment options compared to owners 
with restricted rights in our study that might be linked to the special context of renters in our 
study. As already outlined, sharecroppers and fixed-renters typically have significantly fewer 
years of residence in the community and are most often from other districts. The Brong-Ahafo 
region has experienced internal migration since colonial times from the North to the South of 
Ghana due to the so-called environmental push, finding better natural conditions for farming in 
the Brong-Ahafo region (Geest et al., 2010). 
Plot characteristics do play a role in some investment decisions. Plot size is positively and 
significantly associated with investment in fertilizer and multiple cropping. This might be due 
to larger plots being run more commercially, increasing investment in fertilizer as well as having 
the needed space for multiple cropping. The number of years the plot has been used by the 
cultivator is positive and significantly different from zero for all investment choices. The longer 
a plot has been cultivated, the more likely investments are in fertilizer and measures that 
increase soil capital. This might be due to learning effects or due to increased security of 
cultivating the plot in the future. This finding is consistent with empirical results of studies by 
Wollni et al. (2010) for Honduras and Abdulai et al. (2011) and Abdulai and Goetz (2014) for 
Ghana. The overall positive effect of years the plot is under use on investment indicates that, 
in cases where the rental contract has been renewed in the past, farmers are assured to reap 
the benefits of their investment even without formal ownership. 
Farm and household characteristics are important since they explain investment decisions, 
albeit differing between investments. Age appears to have a positive and significant impact on 
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investment in ditches, fertilizer, and manure. Older farmers might have gained more 
experience in farming linked to higher investment. 
The effect of education on investment is non-linear. Years of formal education is negative and 
significant for investment in fertilizer and multiple cropping, yet positive for the squared term. 
The general level of education is low, and within the average years of education (4 years) there 
is no positive significant effect. Beyond the average level of education, the probability to invest 
increases. Investment is knowledge-intensive and human capital is important for positive 
investment decisions, as has been found, for example, by Smith (2004), Deininger and Jin 
(2006) and Abdulai et al. (2011).  
Livestock is a negative and significant predictor of investment in all investment options despite 
multiple cropping that might be linked to deprioritizing farming in the case of owned livestock. 
Household size is positively and significantly associated with investment in multiple cropping 
indicating the more labor available in the family, the more investment likely in multiple cropping. 
Social networks linked to information along with a reduction in transaction costs of investment 
are beneficial for the farmer’s decision making. The component information networks and the 
component assistance networks are highly significant for all investment options except 
information networks for investment in fertilizer, indicating that other types of assistance are 
more relevant. Therefore, being part of a network with others who invest in soil conservation 
measures as well as discussing investment proves to be a significant determinant of 
investment; similarly, knowing people who would assist in the case of monetary need as well 
as assist practically influences investment positively. This proves that there is interaction 
related to the farming business that facilitates investment in soil conservation measures. Social 
learning plays a significant role in fostering investment, as it has been found also in other 
applications (see Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 
2010).  
The variable membership of an fbo is positive and significant for investment in ditches, fertilizer, 
and multiple cropping. These institutions reduce information search costs concerning 
investment (Wollni et al., 2010) and highlight the relevance of formal social networks to support 
investment behavior. 
We have outlined three main hypotheses around social interaction, namely endogenous 
interaction, contextual interaction, and correlated effects. We accounted for endogeneity of 
social capital variables by making use of observable factors and translating it into latent social 
interaction variables that are not subject to endogeneity by means of principal component 
analysis. In addition, the approach reduces the reflection problem by employing social 
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interaction variables that go beyond interaction linked to investment, and the latent nature of 
the components affords us the opportunity to account for some of the correlated unobservable 
factors. Unfortunately, this approach does not allow us to disentangle the endogenous effects 
from the contextual and correlated effects.  
Being a member of a farm-based organization was not controlled for endogeneity. Individual 
participation might be an endogenous choice. However, some farmers are participating in more 
than one fbo, as such participation reflects external local availabilities of fbos rather than 
individual choice (Key et al., 2000) and participation in an fbo resembles a union of local 
availabilities. farm-based organizations serve several different purposes, as farmers stated in 
an open-ended question, ranging from education, labor provision, access to input, loans as 
well as land, and support in selling produce. 
Having contact with an extension officer is also positively and significantly associated with 
investment in fertilizer and manure and suggests that access to information influences 
investment decisions greatly. The findings are consistent with results reported by Saint-Macary 
et al. (2010), where having contact with an extension officer increases the likelihood of 
knowledge about a soil conservation technology. Abdulai and Huffman (2014) also find a 
positive and significant effect of extension services on adoption and underline extension 
services to be crucial for adoption through being a major source of information. 
The effect of off-farm work on investment relates to the new economics of labor migration. 
There are two main effects: the insurance and income effect, and the lost-labor effect. The first 
indicates a strategy for family members to generate income and liquidity to invest in on-farm 
activities and ensure against production risks. It is an approach of a household to overcome 
obstacles in local production (Taylor, 2003). According to Taylor and Martin (2001), family 
members migrating provide liquidity and insurance overcoming lost labor on the farm. The 
mechanism can be tested by the effect of off-farm work on cost intensive investments, like 
investment in mineral fertilizer. Higher income obtained might lead to improved liquidity and 
reduced risk of investments. In contrast to this possible positive effect, labor on the farm gets 
lost and might reduce labor intensive investments, like building ditches.  
Off-farm employment is positive and highly significant for investment in fertilizer, manure and 
multiple cropping linked to the income effect of new economics of labor migration. With respect 
to investment in fertilizer, income obtained seems to be used to purchase fertilizer since 
monetary constraints are overcome. In the case of investment in multiple cropping, cash 
earned in off-farm activities can also be used to hire labor since wages for hiring labor are 
usually lower than the wage rate in other off-farm activities (Reardon, 1997). Generally, off-
farm work can be the reason for the farmer having more access to information facilitating 
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investment (Wollni et al., 2010). Similar results have been found by Oseni and Winters (2009) 
for Nigeria. The study on tenure arrangements and investment in Ethiopia by Deininger and 
Jin (2006) also shows a positive and important effect of off-farm work of the head of the 
household on investment decisions; for possible endogeneity bias is not controlled.  
Marginal effects are presented in table 3-19. Marginal effects indicate to what extent the 
probability to invest in each investment option changes if the independent variable changes by 
one unit, holding all the other variables constant (ceteris paribus)29. The marginal effects are 
calculated at the mean of the regressors. Since the model is nonlinear, the standard errors of 
the marginal effects are constructed by the delta method (see Greene, 2008: 69)30. Given the 
focus of this study, we are particularly interested in the marginal effects of tenure arrangements 
and social networks and forego a detailed interpretation of the other marginal effects. 
Table 3-19: Marginal effects on the marginal probability of investment (%)  
VARIABLES Ditches Fertilizer Manure Multiple Cropping 
Owner 0092 -0.014 0.065 0.126 
 (0.090) (0.080) (0.051) (0.079) 
Sharecropper 0.484** 0.40*          0.793*** 0.416** 
 (0.180) (0.021) (0.156) (0.116) 
Fixed-rent 0.944*** 0.567** -0.408*** 0.317 
 (0.029) (0.228) (0.104) (0.288) 
Pltsize 0.006 0.001** 0.000 0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Pltyrs 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.003* 0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Off_farmb 0.524 0.982*** 0.954*** 0.822*** 
 (0.321) (0.025) (0.988) (0.161) 
Age 0.006* 0.006** 0.005*** 0.0003 
 (0.094) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Male -0.160 -0.069 0.069* -0.215*** 
 (0.238) (0.029) (0.029) (0.068) 
Adults 0.014 0.017 0.010 0.033** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) 
Nimplts 0.001 0.001 0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Educyrs 0.004 -0.060** -0.030 -0.073 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.019) (0.028) 
Educyrs2 -0.0004 0.003 0.001 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Nlvstckvlue -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.003* -0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fbo 0.194*** 0.136** -0.021 0.125** 
 
29 With a multivariate probit model, there is also the option of estimating conditional marginal effects (Greene, 2008: 
821), however, we have chosen for unconditional marginal effects given by multiplying the coefficient estimates β 
by ∅(β'Z) at the mean values of the independent variables Z (Maddala, 1997: 23). 
30 The delta method is a common procedure to estimate standard errors of estimates of a nonlinear function with 
an asymptotic approximation (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004: 202-203). 
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 (0.066) (0.006) (0.031) (0.060) 
Extens 0.021 0.166*** 0.056* 0.063* 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.013) (0.053) 
Network_inv 0.064*** -0.016 0.057*** 0.054*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.013) (0.024) 
Network_ass 0.0621** 0.067** 0.060*** 0.064*** 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.016) (0.030) 
     
Considering the marginal effects of tenure arrangements, farmers on plots that are 
sharecropping are more likely to invest in ditches by 48%, in fertilizer by 40%, in manure by 
79% and in multiple cropping by 41%. Being a fixed-renter increases the probability to invest 
in ditches by 94%, as well as to invest in fertilizer by 57%, yet decreases the probability to 
invest in manure by 41%. 
Looking at the marginal effects of social capital, knowing one more person who invests in soil 
conservation measures and talking those who invested (component information network) 
increases the probability to invest by 5%-6% for all investment options except fertilizer. 
Knowing one more person who would assist in case of monetary need as well as assisting 
practically (component assistance network) increases the likelihood to invest in all investment 
options by around 6%. Being part of a farm-based organization increases investment in ditches 
by 19%, in fertilizer by 14%, and in multiple cropping by 13%. 
3.7 Summary and conclusions 
This analysis, which uses cross-sectional data of farmers in the Brong-Ahafo region in Ghana, 
has shed some further light on the relationship between land tenure arrangements and 
investment in soil conversation and productivity-enhancing measures. A dynamic framework 
has been deployed to examine the relationship between diverse tenure arrangements, social 
networks and farmers’ investment in soil conservation measures. Diverse tenure arrangements 
lead to different time horizons and costs of investment differ depending on the type of tenure. 
Our empirical results are mainly consistent with the conclusions from the conceptual 
framework. 
In particular, results of the multivariate probit model explaining investment decisions at plot-
level, while controlling for endogeneity of tenure arrangements, social capital, and off-farm 
activities, reveal that farmers who rent land are less likely to invest in manure, a soil improving 
investment option with positive long-term effects. Farmers on sharecropping contracts and 
under fixed-rentership are more likely to invest in fertilizer, a short-term investment option 
decreasing soil quality over time. The number of years the plot is under use by the cultivator is 
positively associated with all investment options, supporting the notion of tenure security as an 
important factor to enhance investment in soil conservation measures. In our specific context, 
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we observe sharecroppers to be more likely to invest in all investment options, possibly due to 
the fact that sharecroppers tend to be national migrants from the North of Ghana. 
Investment is largely driven by social networks. Being part of information networks as well as 
networks related to other types of assistance is positively related to nearly all investment 
options. In addition, participation in a farm-based organization increases the likelihood of 
investment in ditches, fertilizer and multiple cropping. These results are consistent with the 
theoretical framework which suggests the positive effect of social networks to occur through a 
reduction in transaction costs.  
Off-farm employment increases the likelihood to invest in fertilizer, manure and multiple 
cropping. Income obtained might be used for overcoming monetary and labor constraints 
enhancing investment. The crucial role of human capital for progress in the agricultural sector 
is indicated by education revealing a nonlinear pattern.  
Generally, the results support the call for improved tenure security of farmers. This can be 
done in different ways, for example, by land registration programs or offering long-term 
contracts to tenants. Long-term contracts seem to be especially appealing based on our study 
results. The effect of social networks and off-farm work along with statements by farmers 
revealing access to credit and inputs as major obstacles of investment show that there is no 
simple solution. Solving the issue of tenure security alone is not enough. Investments in 
institutions which provide information and social interaction, like fbos or extension officers, and 
in institutions which provide access to credit and off-farm employment need to be considered 
in order to foster sustainability in agriculture. In addition, investment in education provides a 
payoff in terms of decision making on the farm. 
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Annex 
 
After having accessed suitability of the data for a principal component analysis, eigenvalues 
are determined. Table A1 presents the variance explained by each component in column two, 
the proportion of variance as explained in column three and the respective cumulative values 
in the last column.  
Table 3-1: Eigenvalues 
Component  Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative  
1 1.48      0.25        0.25 
2 1.05      0.17        0.42 
3 1.02      0.17        0.59 
4 0.97     0.16        0.75 
5 0.83   0.14        0.89 
6 0.65    0.11        1.00 
According to Kaiser’s criterion, all components with an eigenvalue above 1 are extracted with 
3 components respectively, with the first having the highest eigenvalue and the others are 
decreasing in its eigenvalue.  
 
Table 3-2: Variance inflation factors multivariate investment decision 
VARIABLES VIFa 
Owner  2.71 
Sharecropper 1.96 
Fixed-rent 2.29 
Pltsize 1.11 
Pltyrs 1.31 
Off_farmb 1.14 
Age 1.33 
Male 1.06 
Adults 1.13 
Nimplts 1.07 
Educyrs 21.32 
Educyrs2 20.86 
Nlvstckvlue 1.13 
Fbo 1.17 
Extens 1.15 
Network_inv 1.21 
Network_ass 1.18 
aThe VIF is defined as: VIFj =
1
1-Rj
2 where Rj
2 is the R2 belonging to the regression of the jth explanatory 
variable on the remaining explanatory variables 
All individual VIF values and the mean VIF are far below 10, except education where we 
created the squared term, a value where one has to worry about multicollinearity. 
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4 Land tenure arrangements and social networks 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we will analyze the linkage between social networks, land tenure arrangements 
and investment in soil conservation measures. This allows a deeper insight into the relations 
determined in the conceptual framework and the investment specification in Chapter 3. First, 
an overview of the concept and empirical literature is given. Next, in depth results including 
qualitative analysis of constraints placed upon investment from the farmer’s point of view are 
presented, shedding further light on the influence of social networks on investment in soil 
conservation measures. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Social networks 
The social networks concept, closely related to social capital, responds to the metacultural 
thought that we humans are social beings and this influences other issues of relevance 
(Woolcock, 2010). The underlying intuition of social capital is that social networks provide an 
asset to the individual that has intrinsic value, assistance in times of need or the like and helps 
with material issues (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Analyzing social capital implies analyzing 
“network-based processes that generate beneficial outcomes through norms and trust” 
(Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005: 1644), which indicates that social capital can also be referred 
to as ‘social network capital’ (Hayami, 2009). Accordingly, we define social networks as social 
capital and make use of the concepts interchangeably.  
Economic theory has begun to concentrate on social networks and there is a tendency towards 
this increase in focus providing a basis for social capital analysis within economics 
(Fafchamps, 2006). There is a large range of theory on social capital. Some writers have 
proven themselves influential, although their individual views differ. They are Putnam, Coleman 
and Bourdieu and Wacquant (Field, 2003: 13). Putnam can claim most of the credit for the 
popularity of the term (Paldam, 2000). Several concepts and approaches evolved (see 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Pretty and Ward, 2001). A range 
of literature exists providing an overview of the various definitions and conceptualizing these 
(see Paldam, 2000; Adam and Roncevic, 2003; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005). Paldam (2000) 
distinguishes between three families of social capital definitions:  trust, networks, and 
cooperation. Trust is an essential aspect of social capital (Dowling & Chin-Fang, 2007: 259). 
According to Fukuyama (1996, 26) “Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of 
regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of 
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other members of that community…”. However, in other conceptualizations, trust is seen as 
an outcome of social capital with inherent feedback loops (Woolcock, 2010) indicating the 
dynamic aspect of social capital. 
The networks view stresses social capital to be a multidimensional concept with different forms 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) – bonding, bridging and linking – Dufhues et al. (2012). The 
distinction on these 3 different forms is based on Granovetter (1973), who differentiates 
between weak and strong ties, whereby strength is defined by time invested in the relationship, 
the intensity of emotions attached to the relationship, the familiarity of each with one another, 
and also any reciprocal actions. In case of weak ties; the counterpart of the network is more 
likely to have access to diverse amounts of information as he circulates in other networks that 
are different from strong ties. Bonding refers to close relations between family, friends or 
neighbors and bridging refers to more distant relations to associates or acquaintances (Gittel 
and Vidal, 1998: 15; Woolcock, 2001). These are both horizontal relations, whereas linking 
refers to vertical relations with differences in power (Titeca and Vervisch, 2008). Each form has 
different characteristics and effects on behavior, and diverse combinations of characteristics 
lead to different outcomes (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Woolcock, 2001). A distinction is 
made between formal networks such as organizations and informal networks with specific 
social support (Pichler and Wallace, 2007). 
Measuring social capital empirically by membership of groups and networks is now widespread 
(Fafchamps, 2004) and is linked to social network analysis in assuming that individuals are 
surrounded by and are part of social exchanges (Borgatti et al., 2009). Udry and Conley (2004) 
analyze diverse social networks in Ghana and rightly note that these impose benefits, yet also 
imply costs of creation, maintenance, and responsibility.  
Social network analysis differentiates between diverse purposes of networks such as risk-
sharing (see Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), labor-sharing (see Krishnan and Sciubba, 2009) 
and information (see Conley and Udry, 2010). Networks within the family or with friends that 
provide learning effects have been studied in different applications (see Bandiera and Rasul, 
2006; Kremer and Miguel, 2007). Fafchamps and Minten (2002), in their analysis on social 
networks of agricultural traders in Madagascar, distinguish between several different types of 
networks. There are networks with respect to trade within the family and non-family and family 
and friends willing to help in cases where it is needed. 
Recent literature has increasingly focused on information networks. One approach is to also 
include data on geographic proximity. This could indicate a strong presence of social effects 
but also only reflect strong correlations in, for example, growing conditions. Bandiera and Rasul 
(2006), in analyzing technology adoption decisions in Mozambique, base their measure of 
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social networks on direct data on conversation between individuals. Whereas Conley and Udry 
(2010) use information about actual identities of individuals who might represent social 
networks for information flows to determine a willingness to adopt a technology in Ghana. 
Other approaches, such as the one by Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) on Ethiopia, include 
network structure, which indicates who is connected to whom within a network in order to 
analyze farm performance.  
4.2.2 Land tenure arrangements and social networks 
Land tenure arrangements and social networks are interrelated. Access to credit, for instance, 
is not only determined by the collateral the farmer provides, but also by social networks, as 
credit decisions are based on how well the lender knows and trusts the borrower (Feder et al., 
1988: 6). Social networks can thus fulfill the requirements necessary for the farmer to invest in 
soil conservation measures. The significance of social capital arises mostly in situations where 
natural resources are to be managed in a sustainable manner (Sanginga et al., 2007) and new 
agricultural technologies are to be adopted (Rijn et al., 2012). Secure tenure arrangements 
might not sufficiently provide incentives to invest, especially in soil conservation measures 
which produce positive externalities, and might even clash with the goal of increasing yields in 
the short-run. Social capital comes to the fore as it changes attitudes (Bruni, 2009), a 
precondition for positively influencing sustainability in the long-run (Bouma et al., 2008). 
Investment in conservation measures where especially long-term benefits are expected, tend 
to be knowledge-intensive. Farmers need to gain knowledge concerning new skills and 
biophysical processes (Wollni et al., 2012). The necessary knowledge is due to 
interdependencies between diverse measures and multiple resources used. For instance, 
plants need soil capital and water as well. Thus, it is the proper management and allocation of 
these resources, and not simply the use of an input, that is required (Barrett et al., 2002b). 
Consequently, among other determinants explaining investment, specific attention is given to 
information access, with information rarely being costless and symmetric, and learning (Aker, 
2011).  
Social capital is also assumed to enhance access to information (Rijn et al., 2012). The process 
of learning in developing countries is a social one. Social learning, or simply the interaction 
between individuals, is the main way of assessing the benefits and applicability of innovations 
(Barrett et al., 2002a). Thus, social learning is closely linked to soil conservation measures, 
and it is “a process that fosters innovation and adaptation of technologies embedded in 
individual and social transformation” (Pretty, 2003: 26). Social networks are related to social 
learning since the latter takes place in social groups and by means of interaction (Pretty and 
Buck, 2002). 
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A lack of practical help can also cause a barrier to investment. One approach that addresses 
the challenges of natural resource management is collective action. It has been defined in 
many ways, and yet all of the definitions include the deliberate involvement of a group of 
individuals with a common interest leading to a common action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). 
Collective action is also assumed to raise awareness of environmental threats and investment 
in conservation measures (Cramb, 2006). Social capital is linked to collective action. It 
determines the capacity of collective action (Pretty and Buck, 2002). Transaction costs of 
acting together are reduced and this then enables cooperation (Pretty, 2003). 
Tenure arrangements might constitute a precondition for capturing the benefits of social capital. 
Pretty (2003) points out that only strengthening social and human capital is insufficient in 
obtaining desired outcomes with respect to agricultural production and natural resource usage. 
For example, Ostrom (1994) delineates necessary assumptions in order to carry out collective 
action. Apart from conditions related to the network, tenure arrangements have to be secure, 
in order to be able to receive the benefits from collective action at a later stage. Land that 
changes its user every year will probably not be subject to investment in work-intensive soil 
conservation measures, as no farmer using the land for just one year has any incentive to 
invest in land that someone else will then cultivate next year (Hayami, 2009).  A holistic 
framework that takes national policy into consideration, among other things such as property 
rights, is needed.  
 
The link between social capital and investment is not analyzed as frequently as the relationship 
between land tenure and investment, but it is more homogenous (Beekman and Bulte, 2012). 
For example, Isham (2002) finds that social capital, estimated at the village level, increases 
the likelihood of fertilizer adoption in Tanzania while employing a probit model. Cramb (2006) 
analyzes the effect of social capital, measured by means of participation in networks, on 
adoption of soil management practices in the Philippines. The logit estimates reveal that social 
capital enhances adoption. Similarly, Wollni et al. (2010) analyzes the determinants of adoption 
of soil conservation practices such as crop rotation and manure in Honduras and finds farm-
based groups to be a positive predictor applying an ordered probit model. Bouma et al. (2008) 
study the effect of social capital on community resource management in India. Trust and social 
homogeneity serve as proxies for social capital. Both proxies at the village level are positively 
correlated with soil conservation measures. The relationship is analyzed by estimating the 
determinants of soil and water conservation and the determinants of maintaining existing 
conservation infrastructure by two separate probit models. Rijn et al. (2012) distinguishes 
between bonding and bridging social capital while analyzing the adoption of several agricultural 
innovations such as multiple cropping and fertilizer use in various African countries. Empirical 
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results of OLS and Poisson regressions suggest bridging social capital to be particularly 
important since access to knowledge and resources is facilitated. 
Many studies have attempted to investigate knowledge accumulation through social networks. 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), using panel data on India, find that lack of information is a 
main barrier for rural Indian households’ adoption of new high-yielding seed varieties (HYV). 
Learning from others constitutes a main element in overcoming this barrier. Specifically, how 
much of HYV is used, determined by hectares and in monetary terms, is equally positively 
influenced by experience of the neighbor and experience of the individual that are represented 
by previous HYV use. The study by Conley and Udry (2010) shows that social learning is 
important for diffusion of a new technology in Ghana. In particular, they analyze the change in 
fertilizer use per pineapple plant as a result of information from neighbors, based on direct data 
on communication. They reveal that veteran pineapple farmers are less responsive to 
information networks. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) analyze sunflower adoption in Mozambique. 
The results of the linear probability model show that friends and family, being adopters of the 
new crop and adopters within religious networks, influence adoption. The impact of the friends 
and family is four times larger than religious networks, which reflects the strength of social ties 
to exert an effect. However, the relationship between propensity of adoption and number of 
individuals within the social network is shaped as an inverse U, showing strategic delay. 
Strikingly, the effect of land tenure has not been considered in these studies, missing out on 
explaining a possible main driver of investment decisions. Merely Bandiera and Rasul (2006), 
when asking farmers about reasons for non-adoption, learned that having no land available 
constitutes, among other things, a barrier to adoption. 
The effect of social networks might not always be linear. Social networks can also lead to 
strategic delay, free riding on the knowledge gained by others in the network (Bardhan and 
Udry, 1999). Bandiera and Razul (2006) analyze strategic delay empirically in the context of 
sunflower adoption in Mozambique. Their results reveal that the relationship between 
technology adoption and number of adopters is shaped as an inverse U. Farmers are more 
likely to adopt when a few farmers in the network have already adopted but are less likely to 
adopt when many in the network have already adopted. 
Few economic studies have given attention to both tenure arrangements and social networks, 
in terms of analyzing investment decisions. Gong et al. (2010) explain participation in a forest 
project qualitatively. They conclude that social capital, determined by daily interactions 
between and across village members, can overcome insecure tenure. Weak social capital on 
the other hand adds to the negative effect of insecure tenure arrangements. Katz (2000) 
indicates, in her qualitative analysis on Guatemala, that social capital can be a substitute for 
90 
 
insecure tenure with regards to investment in natural resource management by inducing rules 
and sanctions. A lack of social capital, since farmers are migrants from different regions with 
no collective action in the past and little homogeneity, leads to farmers exploiting natural 
resources and not conserving the resource base. 
Saint-Macary et al. (2010) analyze knowledge and adoption of a soil conservation technology 
(agro-forestry) in Vietnam. The variables representing tenure security are only based on titled 
land and expectations about reallocation. Both are significant determinants of adoption. Formal 
social networks are differentiated between horizontal (farmer union) and vertical (extension 
service) social capital, which influence knowledge about agro-forestry positively. However, 
social networks have not been used for explaining adoption. A paper by Beekman and Bulte 
(2012) studies the effect of social norms and tenure security on fertilizer use and erosion 
management in Burundi. They show that tenure security influences investment in erosion 
management positively, but not fertilizer use. They apply similar proxies as Saint-Macary et al. 
(2010) for tenure security. Investments are aggregated, in that planting trees and building 
ditches or terraces are one category, while fertilizer implies both mineral and organic fertilizer, 
neglecting that the latter has long-term effects. In addition, the decision whether to invest or 
not, in both types of investment, is estimated independently by two probit models. Various 
social norms influence soil erosion measures positively when estimated at the community 
level. Social norms do not explain social networks in detail, merely build the basis for 
cooperative behavior. In addition, altruism, trust and voting behavior account for social capital. 
Willy and Holm-Müller (2013) determine the influence of collective action on soil conservation 
measures by means of an ordered probit model, counting the number of soil conservation 
measures in Kenya after having analyzed participation in collective action by social 
participation and support, trust and reciprocity. Collective action is positively associated with 
investment in soil conservation measures due to the possibility of exchanging labor, 
information and planting material. Land tenure is positively, albeit not significantly, linked with 
investment.  
4.3 Conceptual framework 
In explaining social capital, we focus on social networks, since these are concrete and 
accessible aspects of social capital (Sabatini, 2008). 
Social networks are subdivided according to the type of assistance. The possible effect of 
information networks accounting for social learning is represented by other farmers investing 
in soil conservation measures the farmer is in contact with (see e.g. Conley and Udry, 2010), 
general advice about the farming business from various sources and membership in a farm-
based organization (fbo). Networks for specific purposes are differentiated into networks for 
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financial, trading and practical assistance, the latter accounting for some form of collective 
action (see Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Krishnan and Sciubba, 2009).  
The distinction between the three forms of social capital based on the networks view - bonding, 
bridging and linking - is applied in order to enlarge the multidimensional concept of social 
capital (see Woolcock, 2001, Rijn et al., 2012). Bonding implies interaction between neighbors, 
family, and friends. Bridging is assessed by membership of an fbo or by membership in a 
religious community.  
Figure 4-1 below presents a classification of social capital, with some examples based on level 
of assessment, (village level green-colored, individual level red-colored), and type of 
assistance. Information networks can be distinguished as formal networks or informal 
networks.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Classification of social capital 
In Chapter 3, in the conceptual framework, we have already outlined the positive effect of social 
networks on investment in productivity-enhancing and soil-improving measures, by means of 
decreasing transaction costs. Based on this model, we have included social networks in the 
empirical investment specification in the same chapter in section 3.6. Now, a thorough analysis 
improves our understanding of interdependencies between social capital and incidence of 
investment. 
4.4 Hypothesis 
Since social capital is linked with positive outcomes in various respects (Durlauf and 
Fafchamps, 2005), we hypothesize that social networks, representing social capital, enhance 
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investment in soil conservation measures by various forms of assistance, such as access to 
information. 
4.5 Results and discussion 
4.5.1 Descriptive results 
In table 4-1 you see an overview of the social network variables assessed in the survey: 
 
Table 4-1: Social capital 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Trust 1 if farmer thinks people can be trusted, 0 otherwise 0.80 0.40 
Nnboa 1 if farmer gets practical assistance by nnboa, 0 otherwise 0.35 0.48 
Monasall How many individuals farmer knows he would get monetary 
assistance from in case of need 
1.23 2.59 
Tradass 1 if farmer gets assistance in trading, 0 otherwise 0.67 0.47 
Advice 1 if farmer gets advice about farming business from family, 
friends, neighbors and others, 0 otherwise 
0.80 0.40 
Invstall How many individuals farmer knows who invest in soil 
conservation measures 
2.05 4.15 
Tlkothrs 1 if farmer discusses investments with others, who invest, 0 
otherwise 
0.36 0.49 
Relorg 1 if farmer is a member of a religious organization, 0 
otherwise 
0.42 0.49 
Fbo 1 if farmer is member of an fbo, 0 otherwise 0.32 0.46 
Source: Survey data 
The measure of trust in the community reveals that 80% of respondents trust people in general 
within the community. With regards to the several types of assistance, 35% of all farmers have 
received practical assistance from nnboa31, and each farmer knows at least one person to 
whom he could turn to for monetary assistance in case of need. 67% of all farmers are or have 
been assisted in trading activities. Advice on farming business is provided to 80% of the 
farmers by family, friends, neighbors, and others. The farmer knows an average of two persons 
who have invested in soil conservation measures, though only slightly more than 30% discuss 
 
31 Form of practical assistance in rural Ghana, by which farmers get assistance by other farmers within the 
community to support in agriculture (Gyekye, 2013: 230). 
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their investment with other investors. Membership in organizations is common and 42% are in 
a religious organization with around 30% being members of an fbo.  
To continue, we test if social capital is higher for those having invested than those that have 
not. By this, we analyze if social capital is positively associated with investment decisions. 
Results of a simple t-test comparing means can be found in table 4-2. 
Table 4-2: Social capital by type of investment 
Variable Ditches Mineral Fertilizer Manure Multiple Cropping 
Trust +*** + - +** 
Nnboa - + + +* 
Monasall +*** + +*** + 
Tradass + + - + 
Advice -* + - + 
Invstall +*** - + +** 
Tlkothrs +*** - + +** 
Relorg -* -* -* -* 
Fbo +** + + + 
Note: The difference measured is difference = mean (no investment)-mean (investment), with H0: diff =
0 and H1: diff > 0 ; + difference is positive, - difference is negative; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We find several social capital variables that are positively associated with investment options. 
At first glance, it stands out that ditches and multiple cropping are strongly associated with 
social capital, which supports the notion that it is mainly soil conservation measures that are 
fostered by social capital. Fertilizer, a short-term investment, is not significantly and positively 
linked with social networks. Investment in ditches is deeply associated with many social capital 
variables that are trust, receiving monetary assistance, getting advice, knowing farmers who 
have invested in soil conservation measures and having talked to others who have invested 
and being a member of an fbo. Thus, specific social networks either linked to investment 
decisions directly or not and general trust in the community is likely to foster positive investment 
decisions. Investment in manure is only positively and significantly associated with monetary 
assistance. These results reveal that own livestock is not the only source of manure and that 
it is also purchased. Multiple cropping is positively related to several social networks (i.e. trust, 
nnboa) knowing farmers who have invested and having talked to them. The association with 
talking to others who have invested underlines the assumptions made in the conceptual 
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framework. Multiple cropping is linked to knowledge required that leads to transaction costs of 
implementation. Social networks reduce these costs.  
4.5.2 Qualitative analysis 
We assessed constraints on investment from the farmer’s point of view, in order to bring out 
the relationship between constraints on investment, tenure arrangements, and social networks 
clearly. 
Constraints are covered by 18 individual items that relate to socio-economic and structural 
issues. Constraints are based on previous research and the context of the study. The extent 
of constraints on investment is assessed by a 5-point Likert Scale, ranging from 1 (none) to 5 
(very high). Table 4-3 provides an overview of the 18 specific items rated by the farmer. 
Table 4-3: Constraints on investment 
Category Specific constraints 
Socio-economic 
issues 
1 lack of access to inputs, 2 high prices of inputs, 3 lack of access to 
credit, 4 lack of land, 5 insecurity in extension of tenure duration, 6 
high effort of applying practices, 7 lack of practical help, 8 lack of 
implements/tools to apply practices, 9 lack of remunerative options to 
gain benefits from investment, 10 insecurity in reaping benefits of 
investments, 11 lack of good experience from others, 12 high social 
pressure, 13 high complexity of applying combination of practices, 14 
lack of support from family/neighbors, 15 low increase in (short-term) 
productivity in comparison to increase in cost of production due to 
investment 
Structural issues 16 lack of information on possible practices, l7 lack of knowledge of 
how to apply practices, 18 lack of advice/guidance on how to apply 
practices 
Source: Own data 
In order to reduce dimensionality of the 18 constraints, a principal component analysis is 
conducted. The two main preliminary tests, the KMO criterion for all constraints together and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity, are presented in table 4-4.  
Table 4-4: KMO and Bartlett’s test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
 
 0.77 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-square 
df 
Sig. 
9768.55 
136 
0.00 
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The KMO value of 0.771 is above the cut-off point 0.5 and is a mediocre value. Patterns of 
correlations are compact and they provide distinct and reliable components for principal 
component analysis (Field, 2005: 640). We also have to reject the null hypothesis of Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity that explains that variables are not correlated with each other, confirming the 
prior KMO value and supporting the assumption that the data is suitable for principal 
component analysis32. KMO values for each individual variable confirm the results of the two 
previous test statistics that the data is appropriate for principal component analysis as shown 
in the Annex A2. 
After assessing suitability of the data, eigenvalues are determined. Table 4-5 presents the 
variance explained by each component in column two, the proportion of variance as explained 
in column three and the respective cumulative values in the last column.  
Table 4-5: Total variance explained 
Component  Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative  
1 4.22      0.25        0.25 
2 2.13      0.13        0.38 
3 1.47       0.08        0.46 
4 1.29       0.08        0.54 
5 1.04     0.06        0.60 
6 0.98      0.06        0.66 
7 0.83      0.05        0.71 
8 0.80      0.05        0.76 
9 0.68       0.04        0.80 
10 0.66      0.04        0.84 
11 0.57      0.03        0.87 
12 0.55        0.03        0.90 
13 0.49   0.03        0.93 
14 0.43    0.02        0.95 
15 0.34     0.02        0.97 
16 0.26   0.02        0.99 
17 0.25             0.01        1.00 
According to Kaiser’s criterion, all components with an eigenvalue above 1 are extracted with 
5 components respectively, with the first having the highest eigenvalue and the others are 
decreasing in its eigenvalue. Figure A1 in the Annex provides a graphical illustration of the 
eigenvalues.  
 
Rotation of the data serves to ease the structure of the principal components. Oblique rotation 
is applied (oblimin (0.5) oblique), hence the components are allowed to correlate with each 
 
32 Constraint 1 is characterized by a KMO value, which is smaller than 0.5, the cut-off point. Constraint 1 represents 
lack of access to inputs, a low KMO value indicates diffusion in the structure of correlations and this constraint might 
not correlate well with other variables to a composite component (Field, 2005: 640) and hence is neglected in the 
analysis. 
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other33. The loadings of the constraints on the five extracted components after rotation are 
presented in the component matrix in table 4-6, loadings below 0.4 are left blank.  
Table 4-6: Component matrix 
 Comp. 1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 Comp. 5 
constr_2               0.99                                         
constr_3               0.91                                         
constr_4               1.02                    
constr_5                 0.95                    
constr_6                0.83                              
constr_7                0.65                              
constr_8              -0.41               0.70                              
constr_9                0.54                 0.79        
constr_10                  1.04        
constr_11               0.44     0.51                                         
constr_12               0.47     0.55                             
constr_13               0.63                0.50        
constr_14               0.53                                        
constr_15               0.78               -0.60                  
constr_16              0.93                                                    
constr_17             0.93                                                   
constr_18              0.90                                                   
A factorially confounded structure is revealed. Since the loadings of the crossloading 
constraints mostly are not above 0.5 and higher, the component structure seems to be not 
erroneous with no poor quality of the constraints (Costello and Osborne, 2005). It stands out 
that for two items the value is above 1 (constraint 4 and constraint 10). When correlation 
between the components is allowed, the loadings are no longer correlations, instead, they are 
regression determinants and can be larger than 134. The results of principal component 
analysis without rotation are presented in table A3 in the Annex; loadings improve by rotation. 
A correlation matrix of the components (see Annex table A4) provides evidence of having 
decided correctly for allowing the components to be correlated when applying rotation, and the 
SMC statistic reveals reasonable communalities, variance that is shared with other constraints, 
for each constraint after extraction of components (Annex table A5). 
The reliability of the components and constraints loading on the component is tested by 
Cronbach’s alpha. The results of the reliability analysis are presented in tables 4-7 – 4-11. In 
 
33 We also tried the promax rotation as another option of oblique rotation. However, the results of the factor loadings 
were not satisfactory. The same accounts for the oblimin oblique option given by default. 
34 Values above 1 might indicate multicollinearity (Jöreskog, 1999). However, since the values are only slightly 
higher than one, the issue can be neglected. 
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case one item loads on more than one component with a value above 0.4, it is decided for the 
component with the highest loading for constructing the test of reliability and interpreting the 
components. Next to the constraints used for each component, the second column refers to 
the sign of covariance with other constraints, and the third column represents the overall alpha, 
in case the respective constraint is not used for the analysis. Given that only two constraints 
make up one component, the alpha, in case one constraint is deleted, is not provided, since 
then only one variable is left. At the bottom of each table, the overall reliability of the component 
is presented. As previously indicated, we extract five components by the Kaiser’s criterion and 
apply a cut-off point for the loadings of each constraint of 0.4.  
Table 4-7: Cronbach’s alpha component 1 
Item Sign alpha Label  
constr_16 + 0.84 constraint 16 lack of information on possible practices  
constr_17 + 0.76 constraint 17 lack of knowledge on how to apply practices  
constr_18 + 0.75 constraint 18 lack of advice/guidance on how to apply practices  
Test scale  0.84 Mean   
 
Table 4-8: Cronbach’s alpha component 2 
Item Sign alpha Label 
constr_2 + 0.51 constraint 2 high prices of inputs 
constr_3 + 0.42 constraint 3 lack of access to credit 
constr_11 + 0.48 constraint 11 lack of good experiences from others 
constr_14 + 0.51 constraint 14 lack of support from family/friends to invest 
constr_15 + 0.46 constraint 15 low increase in (short-term) productivity in 
comparison to cost in investment 
Test scale  0.53 Mean  
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Table 4-9: Cronbach’s alpha component 3 
Item Sign alpha Label 
constr_6 + 0.57 constraint 6 high effort of applying practices 
constr_7 + 0.58 constraint 7 lack of practical help 
constr_8 + 0.64 constraint 8 lack of implements and/or tools to apply practices 
constr_12 + 0.62 constraint 12 high social pressure 
constr_13 + 0.60 constraint 13 high complexity of applying combination of practices 
Test scale  0.66 Mean  
 
Table 4-10: Cronbach’s alpha component 4 
Item Sign alpha Label 
constr_4 +  constraint 4 lack of land 
constr_5 +  constraint 5 insecurity in extension of tenure duration 
Test scale  0.62 Mean  
 
Table 4-11: Cronbach’s alpha component 5 
Item Sign alpha Label 
constr_9 +    constraint 9 lack of remunerative options to gain benefits from investment 
constr_10 +      constraint 10 insecurity in reaping benefits from investment 
Test scale  0.74 Mean  
Overall, Cronbach’s alpha values for each component range between 0.5 and 0.8, which is of 
considerable size, since below 0.5 would be unacceptable. However, it is not bounded below 
by a strict cut-off value (George and Mallery, 2003: 231; Gliem and Gliem, 2003). The values 
suggest that the constraints cover similar aspects and the components are characterized by 
internal consistency. The individual Cronbach’s alpha values fulfill the requirements that they 
are lower than the overall Cronbach’s alpha, but around the same value (Field, 2005: 672-
673). A component with less than three items needs to be considered with care since it might 
be weak and unstable (Costello and Osborne, 2005). However, for the last two components 
with only two constraints for each component, the reliability is considerably high.  
Scores for each component are extracted that are standard variables. Based on the constraints 
loading highly on the five components, we construct a label representing the general meaning 
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of the component. Component one consists of three items loading highly on it that are linked 
to gaining expertise by others. Thus, we name the component missing expertise. The second 
component comprises five items. These relate to monetary constraints but also refer to social 
aspects. We sum the constraints to the component monetary constraints, being aware that 
social aspects play a role. The third component is also composed of five items, mostly related 
to practical constraints leading to the component to be named practical effort. The fourth 
component consists of two items, both are linked to tenure arrangements, the component is 
labeled tenure constraint. The last component also comprises two items being related to 
unprofitability of investment and hence can be summed up in the component unprofitable 
options. 
Constraints on investment, tenure arrangements, and social networks35 
We link constraints placed upon investment from the farmer’s point of view to tenure 
arrangements and social networks in order gain more insight into the interdependencies 
between social networks and tenure arrangements. The principal components can be treated 
as usual variables. However, they cannot be interpreted that straightforward, since the change 
in one principal component can only be interpreted qualitatively. Therefore, the comparison of 
constraints on investment between tenure arrangements and by social networks is undertaken 
by merely showing if there is a significant difference in means for each component. 
Comparisons between tenure arrangements at plot-level estimated by a bonferroni multiple 
comparison t-test, and the direction of difference are presented in table 4-12. Having a high 
positive value indicates that the farmer feels highly constrained. 
Table 4-12: Comparison constraints on investment between tenure arrangements 
Principal 
component 
Sharecropper- 
Owner 
Fixed-rent tenant-
Owner 
Fixed-rent tenant-
Sharecropper 
Missing expertise +** -*** -*** 
Monetary constraint + +*** + 
Practical effort + -*** -*** 
Tenure constraint +*** +*** + 
Unprofitable options +* +*** + 
Note: The difference measured is the difference for each combination of tenure arrangements 
difference = mean (tenure arrangement X)-mean (tenure arrangement Y ), 
with H0: diff = 0 and H1: diff ≠ 0; + difference is positive, - difference is negative 
The bonferroni test is carried out by rejecting Hi if pi < αi, where αi =
α
n
 and n is the number of 
comparisons.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We observe significant differences in constraints between types of tenure arrangements that 
can be related to the empirical results of the investment specification in section 3.6.2. Farmers 
on sharecropped plots feel more constrained by missing expertise than farmers on owned and 
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fixed-rented plots, with the latter feeling less constrained than farmers who own land. With 
respect to monetary constraints, farmers on fixed-rent contracts feel more constrained than 
farmers on plots that are owner-cultivated. The constraint practical effort is least prevalent 
among farmers on fixed-rent contracts compared to farmers of the other two tenure 
arrangements and might be one possible explanation for the significant positive effect of fixed-
rentership on investment in ditches that are labor-intensive in the investment specification. As 
expected, farmers on sharecropped and fixed-rented plots feel more tenure constrained 
compared to farmers on plots that are owner-cultivated. The same relation holds for 
unprofitable options. Generally, it stands out that farmers on sharecropping contracts feel most 
constrained in various aspects with no observable ranking for the other farmers, despite them 
investing more based on the descriptive comparisons and the investment specification. 
Next, we also connect constraints placed upon investment from the farmer’s point of view to 
social networks, in order to reveal possible interdependencies between the farmer feeling 
constrained and his social capital. In particular, we analyze if those farmers who are part of 
social networks and have contact to an extension officer as a source of information, employed 
in the investment specification and productivity analysis, feel less constrained than those that 
are not, by means of simple t-tests of comparing means presented in table 4-13. 
Table 4-13: Comparison constraints on investment by social capital variables36 
Principal 
component 
trust nnboa Monasalla tradass advice Invstalla tlkothrs relorg fbo 
Missing 
expertise 
-*** - -** + + -** -** - + 
Monetary 
constraint 
+ + + -** + + + - + 
Practical effort  + - + + - + - -**** + 
Tenure 
constraint 
-** + - -*** - - + - - 
Unprofitable 
options 
+ + + + - + + -*** + 
Note: The difference measured is difference = mean (no social capital)-mean (social capital), with 
H0: diff = 0 and H1: diff > 0 ; + difference is positive, - difference is negative; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a variables have been converted to binary variables, either getting 
monetary assistance or not, knowing people who have invested or not, for analysis 
The comparison of constraints reveals partly positive and significant correlations between 
social capital variables and feeling less constrained concerning investment. This is consistent 
with the effect of social capital on investment behavior in the investment specification, where 
we observe a positive significant effect on most investment options.  
 
36 Results are at plot-level; however, for results at the household-level, we observe the same results. 
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In particular, trust in the community is positively linked to feeling less constrained by missing 
expertise and tenure constraints. The latter links to the fact, that tenure rights are formed within 
social groups and trust in the community in general fostering tenure security. Those who 
receive monetary assistance in case of need feel less constrained by missing expertise, 
probably due to compensating lack of expertise with monetary assets. Those, who receive 
trade assistance feel less constrained by missing expertise and tenure constraints. Knowing 
others who invested in soil conservation measures and talking to those who invested is not 
surprisingly linked to farmers feeling less constrained by missing expertise; social interaction 
accounts for knowledge transfer, i.e. social learning. Being part of a religious organization is 
positively associated with farmers feeling less constrained by practical effort and unprofitable 
options; farmers might get practical assistance through the religious community. 
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
The linkages between several types of social capital and investment decisions have been 
examined by means of descriptive statistics and making use of qualitative data.  
Social networks are certainly associated with soil conservation measures. Investment in 
ditches and multiple cropping are positively linked with several types of social capital, such as 
trust in the community, knowing others who have invested in soil conservation measures and 
talking to them. These results underline the theoretical and empirical literature stating the 
positive effect of social capital on sustainability in agriculture. In addition, constraints placed 
upon investment from the farmer’s point of view are related to both tenure arrangements and 
social networks. As expected, farmers on sharecropped and fixed-rented plots feel more 
tenure constrained compared to farmers on plots that are owner-cultivated. The same relation 
holds for unprofitable options. Generally, it stands out that farmers on sharecropping contracts 
feel most constrained in various aspects with no observable ranking for the other farmers, 
despite them investing more based on the descriptive comparisons and the investment 
specification. Constraints placed upon investment are also linked to social capital to some 
extent. This is consistent with the effect of social capital on investment behavior in the 
investment specification, where we observe a positive significant effect on most investment 
options 
Taken together, the analysis reveals the importance of social networks for investment. Hence, 
efforts to increase tenure security, as indicated in the previous chapter, should be 
accompanied by efforts to enable farmers to partake in social networks.  
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Annex 
A1 Methodology Principal Component Analysis 
Dimensionality of the constraints on investment, ranked by the farmer by means of a 5-point 
Likert Scale, shall be reduced. Basically, two methods are available for this purpose, the factor 
analysis and the principal component analysis (Jolliffe, 2002: 160). Data, i.e. correlated 
variables, is reduced to a reasonable amount of components. Principal component analysis 
constructs linear components from the data, and the analysis aims at revealing the contribution 
of variables (constraints on investment) to that component, whereas factor analysis estimates 
underlying factors that are explanatory concepts (Field, 2005: 630-631; Hamilton, 2009: 346; 
Brown et al., 2012: 176). Since our objective is more in line with the underlying reasoning of 
principal component analysis, we decided on this method. 
Principal component analysis is a method with various steps, in order to reduce variables to 
components. A reliable principal component analysis shall be applied to sample sizes that are 
at least three times as large as the number of items (Backhaus et al., 2006: 331)37. Preliminary 
analysis consists of mainly two tests. The first one is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterion (KMO), 
described as the “ratio of the squared correlation between variables to the squared partial 
correlation between variables” (Field, 2005: 640), ranging between 0 and 1, with a cut-off point 
of 0.5. A value close to 0 includes the sum of partial correlations to be large in relation to the 
sum of correlations that is an indicator for diffusion in the structure of correlations. In contrast, 
a value close to 1 suggests the structure of correlations to be compact and accordingly 
principal component analysis to be suitable. The KMO not only describes the sum of variables, 
it can also be interpreted for each variable. A related preliminary analysis is the anti-image-
correlation matrix that constitutes a measure of adequate sampling for the variables 
respectively that can be assessed in the matrix on diagonal, that are the KMO statistics for 
individual variables. These along with the overall KMO criterion shall be above 0.5. The second 
one, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, identifies if the correlation matrix of the constraints is an identity 
matrix implying variables to be independent of each other. However, with a principal 
component analysis clusters of variables are built measuring related issues. When rejecting 
the null hypothesis that the variables are not correlated with each other, the data is appropriate 
for a principal component analysis. (Field, 2005: 640-642; 650). 
After having assessed suitability of the data, components are extracted with the construction 
of eigenvalues as the first step. Eigenvalues linked to each component are the variation 
explained by the particular component. The most common criterion taken for components is 
the Kaiser’s one, with a value of 1 being the lowest value allowed to be extracted as a 
 
37 This requirement is fulfilled in our analysis. 
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component. The rationale behind it is that the sum of eigenvalues of all possible components 
equals the number of variables. An eigenvalue that is smaller than one does not assist in the 
main goal of principal component analysis, data reduction since it accounts for a smaller 
amount of variation than one variable. Another tool to be used for components is a graphical 
representation; each eigenvalue is plotted against the associated component, which is a 
screeplot. At the inflection of the emerging curve the cut-off point can be found (Field, 2005: 
632-633; Brown et al., 2012: 148).  
Principal component analysis constructs a component matrix that displays the loadings of each 
variable onto each component. These loadings serve to determine how clusters of variables 
are most linked to one or another component. A common practice for a cut-off point for loadings 
is 0.4; however, several guidelines exist (Field, 2005: 637; Acock, 2008: 302). One variable 
can load on more than one component implying the structure to be factorially confounded. 
These crossloading variables which load very high on several components might link to poor 
quality of the variables or the component structure to be erroneous (Costello and Osborne, 
2005; Acock, 2008: 302). Generally, loadings are correlations between the variable and the 
component, thus range between -1 and 1. However, in case one allows the components to be 
correlated, loadings become regression determinants that can be higher than 1 (Jöreskog, 
1999). 
In order to allow components to be correlated, rotation can be employed. Rotation leads to 
simplification and clarification of the data structure (Costello and Osborne, 2005). It aims at 
maximizing loadings of each constraint on one of the principal components and, at the same 
time, minimizing the loading on the other components, thus to ease the structure of the 
components. The mechanism is the change in absolute values of the constraints and, at the 
same time, not changing their differential values. Basically, two rotation options are available 
depending on the structure of the data, orthogonal and oblique rotation, where the first 
assumes the components to be independent of each other and the latter enables correlation 
between them. Mostly, it is reasonable to allow for correlation between components. Various 
options are available, being distinct in the way components are rotated (Field, 2005: 636, 644; 
Hamilton, 2009: 341)38.  
Eigenvalues are a characteristic of the component and communalities are a characteristic of 
each variable. The amount of variance in each constraint that can be explained by the 
extracted components are the communalities after extraction. Several ways of estimating the 
communalities are available, one of them is the squared multiple correlations (SMC) which is 
the most common application to measure the amount of common variance and are lower 
 
38 An overview of various options can be found in Field (2005). 
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bounds of communalities. The SMC ranges between 0 and 1, a high value indicates a high 
common variance with other variables. However, principal component analysis firstly assumes 
a common variance of 1. After extraction of the components we gain insight into the real 
common variance. The retained components cannot explain all the variance, as some 
information is omitted, due to not making use of all components (Field, 2005: 630,653-654.; 
Brown et al., 2012: 158; 195). Magnitudes of communalities in social science range between 
0.4 and 0.7. Low values might link to another component to be explored (Costello and Osborne, 
2005). The formula for SMC, the squared multiple correlation coefficients  Ri
2, is given by 
(Brown et al., 2012: 201-202): 
SMC = Ri
2 = 1-
1
rii
                                                                                                                   (6-1) 
where rii is the ith diagonal entry of the inverse correlation matrix R-1. 
Reliability is tested by means of Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951), the most widespread 
measure of scale reliability (Bland and Altman, 1997):  
α =  
k
k-1
(1-
∑ si
2
sT
2 )                                                                                                                     (6-2) 
where k is the number of constraints, si
2 is the variance of the ith constraint and sT
2 is the 
variance of the total score calculated by summing all constraints. The idea behind the formula 
is to split data in two parts in every possible combination, and to compute the correlation 
coefficient for each with the average of these values being Cronbach’s alpha. (Field, 2005: 
667-668). Cronbach’s alpha values range between 0 and 1, a value close to 1 suggests greater 
internal consistency of the constraints in the component (Gliem and Gliem, 2003). Several 
guidelines for α exist, George and Mallery (2003: 231) provide threshold values for evaluating 
α with a value of below 0.5 being unacceptable. Another important tool of this reliability test is 
to consider alpha in case one variable of the respective component is deleted. This value shall 
not differ considerably from the overall alpha for the component, and it shall also not be higher 
in that deleting this constraint would not increase alpha (Field, 2005: 676). 
After having assessed reliability, the extracted components are named according to their 
constraints they load on. The components are scores that are linear composites by 
constructing constraints to a mean of zero and a unit variance and then using score coefficients 
as weights, and lastly summing up these standardized weighted constraints for each 
component. The scores for each component are standard variables like others in the data set 
and can be used for consecutive analysis (Hamilton, 2009: 344-346). Generally, these scores 
range between values of -3 and +3 (Bühl and Zöfel, 2005: 470). 
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Table 4-1: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Variable                   KMO  
Constr_2    0.54 
Constr_3    0.82 
Constr_4    0.59 
Constr_5    0.58 
Constr_6    0.81 
Constr_7    0.86 
Constr_8    0.76 
Constr_9    0.69 
Constr_10    0.71 
Constr_11    0.84 
Constr_12    0.81 
Constr_13    0.79 
Constr_14    0.77 
Constr_15    0.80 
Constr_16    0.77 
Constr_17    0.80 
Constr_18    0.82 
 
Table 4-2: Component matrix unrotated* 
Variable Comp. 1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp.4 Comp. 5 
constr_2    0.64                    
constr_3      
constr_4                          0.55                               
constr_5   0.42     0.43                    
constr_6      
constr_7      
constr_8                                     0.41                                    
constr_9                                    0.43                                     
constr_10     0.65        
constr_11      
constr_12      
constr_13      
constr_14      
constr_15   -0.42                             
constr_16      
constr_17      
constr_18      
*blanks are abs(loading)<0.4 
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Figure Appendix 1: Screeplot 
The screeplot plots the eigenvalues on the vertical axis against the components with which 
they are associated on the horizontal axis and reveals their importance. The red horizontal line 
at eigenvalue 1 indicates the cut-off point due to the Kaiser’s criterion. The screeplot supports 
the Kaiser’s criterion in that the flexion of the curve can be observed at component 5; therefore 
the screeplot is consistent with the Kaiser’s criterion. 
 
Table 4-3: Correlation matrix of components 
 Comp. 1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 Comp. 5 
Comp. 1 1     
Comp. 2 -0.62 1    
Comp. 3 0.73 -0.63 1   
Comp. 4 -0.59 0.69 -0.61 1  
Comp. 5 -0.55 0.70 -0.44 0.53 1 
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Table 4-4: Squared Multiple Correlations 
Variable     
SMC 
Variable       
SMC  
constr_2    0.15  constr_11   0.39  
constr_3    0.26  constr_12   0.35  
constr_4    0.33  constr_13   0.28  
constr_5    0.26  constr_14   0.14  
constr_6    0.32  constr_15   0.22  
constr_7    0.40  constr_16   0.55  
constr_8    0.26  constr_17   0.61  
constr_9    0.57 constr_18   0.62  
constr_10   0.39   
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5 Land tenure arrangements and productivity 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of the productivity analysis is to determine the possible influence of land 
tenure arrangements on productivity at plot-level. Knowing the influence of tenure 
arrangements on productivity is decisive for policy. In the previous analysis of this work, the 
linkage between land tenure arrangements, social networks, and investment has been 
analyzed. Since investment is a means to an end, to increase productivity in the long-run, it 
makes sense to examine the direct effect of land tenure arrangements on productivity. 
Therefore, no intermediate effect of land tenure arrangements on investment and in turn on 
productivity is analyzed. This perspective along with empirical analysis will be covered in 
chapter 06. This chapter presents a literature overview of existing bibliography, the conceptual 
framework and empirical specification and results. 
5.2. Literature review 
 
5.2.1 Land tenure arrangements and productivity 
The linkage between land tenure arrangement and productivity remains a hotly debated topic 
and is part of broader literature about the influence of institutions on development (Chand and 
Yala, 2009). The assumed underlying mechanisms are the influence of tenure security on 
incentives of the farmer to invest and make efforts and might be linked with unobservable 
stocks of previous non-visible investments (Deininger et al., 2008). Again, the three effects 
(the assurance, the realizability, and the collateral effects), between secure land tenure 
arrangements and investment decisions outlined in chapter 3 leading to higher investments, 
are assumed to lead to higher productivity in turn (Bellemare, 2013). 
A number of studies have investigated the influence of land tenure arrangements on 
productivity that has been estimated by employing a Cobb-Douglas production function (e.g. 
Place and Hazell, 1993) or a linear function (e.g. Abdulai et al., 2011). 
Empirical findings concerning the relationship between land tenure arrangements and 
productivity differ (Place, 2009). This might be due to the fact that land tenure arrangements 
that are not secure can still be efficient (Fenske, 2010a). One of the early studies by Place and 
Hazell (1993) determines the effect of land tenure arrangements on productivity in Ghana, 
Kenya, and Rwanda. Input use, land improvement, and yields are regressed amongst other 
variables on tenure security. Yields are assessed by value of crop output per hectare. No 
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significant relationship has been found between land tenure arrangements and yields. In 
addition, no significant relationship between land tenure arrangements and inputs could be 
determined, confirming the previous result. Place and Otsuka (2002), in analyzing the effect of 
land tenure arrangements on investment and productivity in Uganda, explain the insignificance 
of tenure in the value of production and profit regressions, concluding that the effort of 
managing the land is equal across diverse land tenure arrangements. Otsuka et al. (2003) 
analyze the effect of tenure arrangements on tree planting, leaving land fallow, net revenue 
and labor use in a cocoa growing area in Ghana. With regard to the effect of land tenure 
arrangements on net revenue, tenure security appears to have no significant positive effect. 
The levels regression and fixed-effect models reveal that all tenure dummies are not 
significantly related to productivity. They explain the insignificance by management intensity 
which is equal across different tenure arrangements after cocoa trees have been planted. 
Studies from Holden et al. (2001) on Ethiopia and Fenske (2010b) on Cote d’Ivoire have also 
found no effect of tenure security on productivity.  
In his analysis on tenure arrangements and productivity in Madagascar, Bellemare (2013) 
distinguishes between formal titles and informal land tenure, measured by perceived rights of 
the farmer on what they are allowed to do with the plot. Instrumental variable estimations reveal 
no significant positive effect of land titles on productivity when accounting for possible 
endogeneity of titles and fixed effects estimations in case of unobserved heterogeneity 
between households. Informal land tenure rights appear to show diverse effects depending on 
the estimation specification and the type of perceived rights. The right to plant trees is certainly 
associated with productivity. However, the right to build a tomb has a negative effect. The latter 
is associated with plots belonging to a clan without any chance of becoming private ownership 
(Bellemare, 2013). 
Some of the more recent studies appear to show a positive relationship between security of 
tenure and productivity. Deininger and Jin (2006) confirm a positive effect of terracing on net 
revenues that, in turn, is determined by security and transferability of tenure rights by means 
of an instrumental variable approach. Thus, no direct effect is estimated. Chand and Yala 
(2009) analyze the influence of private, common and indigenous land tenure on fresh fruit 
bunches per ha of palm oil in Papua New Guinea. Land purchased under the settlement 
scheme appears to be positively related to productivity compared to village-owned plantations. 
Abdulai et al. (2011) examine the impact of four diverse tenure arrangements39 on productivity. 
Productivity is measured at plot-level by the value of crop output per acre. The study reveals 
 
39 owner-operated with full property rights, owner-operated with restricted property rights, fixed-rent and 
sharecropping contracts 
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that ownership exerts a positive and significant effect on productivity. This effect can also be 
observed when household fixed effects are employed. Goldstein and Udry (2008) analyze the 
relationship between fallowing and productivity in Ghana. Results reveal that a fallow period is 
positively associated with profits, while fallow duration is determined by tenure security. 
Consequently, output is lost because tenure is insecure, and these plots are left fallow for 
shorter periods. Another study on Pakistan by Ali et al. (2012) also finds a significant positive 
relationship between ownership, fixed-rentership and output per hectare, compared to 
sharecropping which supports the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis. 
Relatively little attention has been paid to the effect of social capital on productivity. Social 
capital is more analyzed in light of long-term sustainable solutions (Bouma et al., 2008). 
However, a few empirical studies indicate a positive relationship between social networks and 
productivity. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), when analyzing adoption and profitability of HYV 
and employing panel data on India, reveal that, apart from own experience, learning from 
others (learning spillovers) exerts a positive effect on profitability and diminishes over time. 
Fafchamps and Minten (1999) analyze social networks of traders in Madagascar and point to 
various roles they might have among others when sharing information, access to credit and 
risk. They conclude that the success of traders is determined by their networks. A follow-up 
study (2002) investigates the effect of social capital on firm performance by productivity 
analysis. The study reveals that social capital has a positive effect on firm performance and 
provides preliminary evidence that part of the effect is due to a reduction in transaction costs. 
The study by Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) on Ethiopia also reveals that social networks 
influence farm performance in a positive manner. 
5.3 Conceptual framework and empirical specification 
 
Productivity analysis determines plot-level productivity. Productivity is the chosen measure 
since various multiple crops are planted on one plot. Hence, a linear regression, OLS, can be 
employed to determine productivity. Production is estimated by means of a linear function (see 
Abdulai et al., 2011) and can be specified as: 
                                                      (5-1) 
where Yjl is the value of output per acre on plot j of farmer l, β0 is the intercept,  Rjl are tenure 
arrangements, SCl is social capital, Zjl are household characteristics, Pjl is a vector of variables 
at plot-level other than tenure arrangements, and εjl is the error term. Since yields may vary 
systematically between villages, village dummies are included to account for climatic and other 
local conditions. 
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‘Access to credit’, a household characteristic, might be subject to endogeneity in analyzing the 
effect of credit on productivity, because land and crops might serve as collateral for obtaining 
credit (see Abdulai et al., 2011). Since productivity is determined by OLS, the Two-Stage Least 
Squares method (2SLS) is used in order to control for endogeneity (see Wooldridge, 2010: 96-
97). The first-stage estimation is a probit model that determines credit by means of an 
instrument and the other variables that determine productivity: 
                                                           (5-2) 
where Cl is access to credit of the farmer, Il is the instrument applied that is strongly correlated 
with credit and uncorrelated with the error term of the production function, Zjl is defined as 
above with credit being excluded from Zjl and δjl is the error term. 
In the production function, the original credit variable is substituted by the predicted value Ĉl:  
                                                           (5-3) 
According to Wooldridge (2010: 97), it is better to apply 2SLS jointly rather than apply the two-
step procedure by hand, as otherwise, the standard errors will be incorrect, and we follow the 
advice. 
Validity of the instrument is tested by the Wu-Hausman test. A Wald statistic is employed, the 
residual from the production function without accounting for endogeneity is regressed on the 
instrument used (see Fafchamps and Minten, 2002). In case the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, the instrument is exogenous and valid. Thus, the instrument is rightly excluded from 
the production function and not correlated with the error term with TR2 as the test statistic, T 
being the number of observations and R2 being the uncentered R2 from the regression, with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments and a χ2 distribution (see Davidson 
and McKinnon, 2004: 337-338; Greene, 2008: 387). 
To analyze unobserved household effects that might influence productivity, household fixed 
effects are employed. This procedure allows for removing all influences arising from 
differences among households (Markussen, 2008). Any variables that do not vary across plots 
of one household drop out of the regression. This is due to the random correlation of the latent 
variable with the independent variables, and that it cannot be differentiated between 
observables and unobservables that do not vary across plots (Wooldridge, 2010: 285 et seq.) 
Household fixed effects estimation leads to the following specification:       
                                                                                        (5-4) 
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where γl represents all household-specific characteristics not considered, Pjl is a vector of 
variables at plot-level other than tenure arrangements and ϑjl is the error term. 
5.4 Hypothesis 
In regard to productivity, we hypothesize secure land tenure arrangements to exert a positive 
influence on farm performance. We also assume a positive effect of social capital on farm 
performance. 
5.5 Results and discussion 
Variables included in the model 
Table 5-1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables at plot-level. The number of 
observations used reduces to 438 due to missing observations. Productivity is assessed by an 
aggregate measure of output that includes revenues from crops and trees. Amount harvested 
per each crop/tree type on the plot is multiplied by the price the farmer obtained (see Place 
and Hazell, 1993; Abdulai et al., 2011). In so doing, one neglects that a share of the output is 
used for own consumption.  
The four respective tenure arrangements are employed in order to see the likely effect of tenure 
on plot-level productivity. We assume secure tenure rights to enhance farm performance. 
We take into consideration differences in productivity due to crop composition by making use 
of dummy variables which indicate the most prevalent crop based on area devoted to the 
respective crop in both major and minor rainy season (see Jacoby and Mansuri, 2009). For 
prevalence of trees on plot is controlled for. We assume a negative effect on outcome, as more 
trees imply less focus on crops reducing the output per acre (see Hayes et al., 1997). In 
addition, trees having been planted recently do not provide any return. 
Other plot characteristics included are the size of the plot and if the soil of the plot is loamy. 
Loamy soil contains the best soil characteristics compared to sandy and clay soils since this 
one combines advantages of both (Royal Horticultural Society, 2011).  
Information on individual and household characteristics is included. Having access to credit 
underlines the possible importance and already proven significance of access to credit in 
enhancing productivity. As indicated previously, access to credit might be endogenous (see 
Abdulai et al., 2011). The instrument applied is the number of implements the farmer owns and 
serve as a proxy for determining access to credit. The number of household members between 
15 and 64 years old per acre represents family labor force (see Smith, 2004) along with the 
number of days hired labor is used throughout the year per acre. For the age of the farmer is 
controlled for. On the one hand, it might account for experience of older farmers, while on the 
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other hand it accounts for entrepreneurial skills of younger farmers. The value of livestock 
represents wealth of the household. The variable representing social capital is also added to 
determine productivity, given the partly positive and significant results in the investment 
specification, and having contact with an extension officer, which represents access to 
information as well. Additionally, having a mobile phone is included in the specification. It is 
assumed that a mobile phone is a means of providing information and coordination and 
enhances productivity (Jensen, 2007; Aker, 2011). The district dummy represents climatic and 
other local conditions. 
The natural logarithm of the variables size of plot, household size per acre, hired labor days 
per acre, value of livestock and the output per acre are applied in order to see the percentage 
changes in output, due to percentage changes in the respective variables and to provide a 
clearer interpretation. 
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Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Variable definition Mean S.D. 
Yield Value of output per acre on plot (GHS*0.1)  59.38 117.06 
Owner 1 if plot is under owner-operated with full rights, 0 
otherwise 
0.34 0.47 
Sharecrop 1 if plot is under sharecropping contract, 0 otherwise 0.22 0.41 
Rent 1 if plot is under fixed-rent contract, 0 otherwise 0.30 0.46 
Other 1 if plot is under owner-operated with no rights, 0 
otherwise 
0.14 0.35 
Maize 1 if farmer mainly cultivates maize on plot, 0 otherwise 0.61 0.49 
Yams 1 if farmer mainly cultivates yams on plot, 0 otherwise 0.26 0.44 
Cass 1 if farmer mainly cultivates cassava on plot, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.21 
Othrs 1 if farmer mainly cultivates other crops on plot, 0 
otherwise 0.09 0.29 
Trees 1 if trees have been planted on plot, 0 otherwise 0.33 0.47 
Pltsize Plot size in acres 4.58 0.81 
Loam  1 if soil on plot is loamy, 0 otherwise 0.34 0.47 
Credit  1 if farmer has access to credit, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.22 
HH-size per 
acre  
Number of permanent household members between 15 
and 64 years per acre 
1.37 1.30 
Hlabour Hired labour days per acre 32.24 65.07 
Age Age of farmer (years) 47.79 13.11 
Lvstckvlue Value of livestock wealth (GHS*0.01) 9.00 17.25 
Fbo 1 if farmer is member of an fbo, 0 otherwise  0.28 0.45 
Extens 1 if farmer received assistance by extension officer, 0 
otherwise 0.37 0.48 
Advice 1 if farmer gets advice about farming business, 0 
otherwise 0.81 0.39 
Mobile 1 if farmer has a mobile phone, 0 otherwise 0.63 0.48 
District  District of household, 1= Kintampo, 0=Techiman 0.59 0.49 
Instrument 
Implts Number of implements the farmer owns 15.21 13.50 
Observations   438   
Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). Exchange rate: €1 = ₵3.6 in 2014 
Source: Survey data 
Empirical Results 
In table 5-3 the results of the 2SLS plot-level productivity analysis and the household fixed 
effects model are presented. In the pooled cross-section model, the adjusted R2 is nearly 0.2 
and indicates how much variance in the outcome is explained by the explanatory variables, in 
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case the model has been obtained from the population from which the sample has been drawn 
(Field, 2005: 723)40. The model is estimated to be robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 
The instrument for the possible endogenous variable access to credit is tested on its 
exogeneity and validity by means of a Wu-Hausman test. The χ2 statistic fails to reject the 
hypothesis that the variable ‘number of implements the farmer owns’ is exogenous and valid. 
The first stage estimation is presented in table 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 We test multicollinearity of the explanatory variables and normal distribution (see Annex this chapter), test 
statistics reveal no problem of highly correlated variables and nearly normal distribution. 
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Table 5-2: Results First stage estimation credit 
Variables credit 
    
Implts 0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
HH size per acre (log) -0.010 
 (0.021) 
Owner 0.013 
 (0.038) 
Sharecrop 0.017 
 (0.041) 
Rent 0.027 
 (0.041) 
MAIZE 0.001 
 (0.037) 
YAMS -0.029 
 (0.039) 
CASS -0.0540 
 (0.054) 
Trees -0.029 
 (0.024) 
Pltsize (log) -0.014 
 (0.025) 
Loam 0.032 
 (0.022) 
Age -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Lvstckvlue (log) -0.009 
 (0.008) 
Fbo -0.006 
 (0.025) 
Extens 0.037 
 (0.023) 
Advice -0.039 
 (0.027) 
Mobile 0.001 
 (0.023) 
Kintampo -0.040 
 (0.043) 
Kunso -0.086* 
 (0.048) 
Badukrom -0.036 
 (0.045) 
Awaropat -0.015 
 (0.044) 
Fiaso 0.005 
 (0.053) 
Constant 0.085 
 (0.077) 
Observations 449 
Adjusted R2 0.096 
Note: *predicted value; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
soil fertility dropped due to high collinearity with villages variables 
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Table 5-3: Results 2SLS productivity analysis and household fixed effects. 
Variables Pooled cross-section Household fixed effects 
Owner -0.049 
(0.202) 
-0.653 
(0.579)  
Sharecrop 0.183 
(0.218) 
-0.227 
(0.457)  
Rent 0.136 
(0.219) 
-0.004 
(0.448)  
Maize 0.121 
(0.225) 
0.107 
(0.299)  
Yams 0.498** 
(0.247) 
0.595** 
(0.298)  
Cass -0.187 
(0.322) 
-0.342 
(0.449)  
Trees 0.118 
(0.119) 
-0.258 
(0.219)  
Pltsize (log) -0.391*** 
(0.121) 
-0.459** 
(0.178)  
Loam 0.006 
(0.106) 
0.065 
(0.181)  
Credit* 0.671 
(1.427) 
 
  
HH-size per acre (log) 0.090 
(0.093) 
 
  
Age -0.002 
(0.004) 
 
  
Lvstckvlue (log) 0.099** 
(0.046) 
 
  
Fbo -0.130 
(0.110) 
 
  
Extens 0.021 
(0.116) 
 
  
Advice 0.026 
(0.150) 
 
  
Mobile 0.187* 
(0.106) 
 
  
Kintampo -0.370* 
(0.218) 
 
  
Kunso -0.594** 
(0.277) 
 
  
Badukrom -0.775*** 
(0.219) 
 
  
Awaropat -0.398 
(0.252) 
 
  
Fiaso -0.143 
(0.268) 
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Constant 
3.871*** 
(0.476) 
4.144*** 
(0.456) 
χ2 statistic on exogeneity 
of instrument [p-value] 
0.008 
[0.929] 
 
Observations 423 459 
Adjusted R2 0.196  
Note: *predicted value; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Starting with our main variables of interest, we do not find any noticeable effect of tenure 
arrangements on productivity. Security of tenure does not seem to influence the incentive of 
the farmer to make efforts (Place and Otsuka, 2002). In addition, it lends support to the notion 
exposed by Fenske (2010a) that unsecured tenure is not necessarily inefficient. This finding 
corresponds with several other empirical studies on different African countries, who have not 
found a significant positive relationship between security of tenure and productivity (Place and 
Hazell, 1993; Holden et al., 2001; Place and Otsuka 2002; Pender and Fafchamps, 2006; 
Fenske, 2010b). However, the result is contrary to findings by Deininger and Jin (2006), 
Goldstein and Udry (2008) and Abdulai et al. (2011), the latter two are studies on Ghana. 
However, Deininger and Jin (2006) take predicted values of investment instrumented by tenure 
and thus only allow for a positive effect on productivity through investment. Goldstein and Udry 
(2008) consider the effect of tenure on fallowing and, in turn, of fallowing on productivity. The 
effect of investment on productivity will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
Crop composition determines productivity and it corresponds with results reported by, for 
instance, Place and Otsuka (2002) and Abdulai et al. (2011). Plots planted with yams as the 
main crop indicate a significant and positive effect on productivity. Planting trees is neither 
negatively nor significantly associated with productivity on the plot within the pooled cross-
section analysis. Hence, the assumed effect of trees providing less output per acre has not 
been proven. 
Size of plot appears to be negative and significant and that is hardly surprising, given various 
empirical studies that have found the same effect (e.g. Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996; Place 
and Otsuka, 2002; Barrett et al., 2010). An increase in plot size by one percent decreases 
output per acre by 24%. Smaller sizes of plots require more investment in intensification in 
order to facilitate a living from agriculture (Holden et al., 2009) also leading to higher output on 
a smaller plot. The effect of loamy soil is positive albeit insignificant, suggesting that the 
advantage of good soil on the plot is not decisive for productivity. 
Individual and household characteristics matter partly. Having access to credit exerts a 
favorable —yet insignificant— effect on productivity, in opposition to findings by Abdulai et al. 
(2011). The missing significance might be due to the low share of farmers that have access to 
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credit. Necessary changes indicated by farmers in section 3.6.1 delineate the relevance of 
access to credit. The number of adults within the household per acre is positive and marginally 
significant. Hired labor though seems to be more important, since the family can be substituted 
by hired labor, and is consistent with results reported by Place and Otsuka (2002) for Uganda. 
Value of livestock is positive and significantly different from zero. An increase in value of 
livestock by one percent increases output by nearly 10%. Livestock might be linked to wealth 
and more possibilities to increase farm output. The result is supported by findings from Smith 
(2004) on Zambia.  
Being a member of an fbo and contact to an extension officer, positively associated with 
investment decisions, is no significant determinant of productivity on the plot. This result is to 
be compared to Deininger and Jin (2006), who similarly find that extension visits facilitate 
farmers’ investment but not productivity.  
The variable of having a mobile phone shows a highly significant positive sign. It underscores 
the statement by Powlson et al. (2011) that mobile phones can be beneficial in making 
progress in terms of development, enabling farmers to get information through mobile phones. 
The empirical findings by Jensen (2007) on Indian fishermen are also in line with our results.  
Plots located in Kintampo, appear to be negative and significantly different from zero, 
suggesting differences in climatic conditions which influence productivity. 
Household fixed effects  
In the household fixed effects estimation, only minor changes emerge with respect to the 
explanatory variables at plot-level. Even when removing the effect of unobservables at the 
household-level, tenure does not become a significant determinant of productivity. Trees exert 
a negative, albeit insignificant, effect on productivity, suggesting less output per acre. The 
effect of other variables is similar to the estimation results without household fixed effects. 
 
5.6 Summary and conclusions 
Investment is only a means to an end in order to raise productivity, that is why we analyze the 
influence of tenure arrangements on productivity. Plot-level productivity is determined by the 
use of an instrumental variable approach.  
We uncover no evidence that both tenure arrangements and social capital are significant 
determinants of productivity. Having a mobile phone increases productivity, which shows the 
relevance of communication in raising productivity. Hence, improvements and investments in 
communication technology in rural areas could foster success of the agricultural sector. 
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Individual and household characteristics only matter to a minor extent for productivity. Credit 
is not a significant determinant of productivity, maybe because of the low share of farmers 
having access to credit. A household fixed effects model has also been employed in order to 
control for unobservables at the household-level influencing productivity. However, tenure 
arrangements, again, do not significantly influence productivity. Management intensity seems 
to be equalized across diverse types of tenure.  
The results do not reveal the irrelevance of land reforms suggested in Chapter 3, but reveal 
possible other more binding constraints influencing productivity. In addition, the chain of 
interdependencies by means of analyzing the effect of investment that is done in the following 
chapter needs to be analyzed, not only the direct effect of tenure. 
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Annex 
 
 
Figure Appendix 2: Distribution residuals from productivity analysis 
The graph A2 reveals that the residuals are nearly normally distributed, and the assumption 
of normal distribution is given. 
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Table 5-1: Variance inflation factors productivity analysis 
Variable VIFa 
Credit 3.05 
HH-size per acre 2.46 
Owner 3.07 
Sharecrop 2.43 
Rent 3.34 
Maize 3.47 
Yams 3.32 
Cass 1.68 
Trees 1.48 
Pltsize 2.64 
Loam 1.40 
Age 1.15 
Lvstckvlue 1.17 
Hired labour days per acre 1.30 
Fbo 1.26 
Extens  1.53 
Mobile 1.20 
District 1.74 
Mean VIF 2.09 
 
aThe VIF is defined as: VIFj =
1
1-Rj
2 where Rj
2 is the R2 belonging to the regression of the jth explanatory 
variable on the remaining explanatory variables 
 
All individual VIF values and the mean VIF are far below 10, a value where one has to worry 
about multicollinearity. 
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6 Impact of investment in soil conservation on productivity 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the focus of the empirical analysis was on the direct effect of land 
tenure arrangements on productivity without considering the intermediate effect of investment 
decisions. This chapter accounts for the effect of productivity-enhancing and soil conservation 
measures on productivity, in order to acknowledge that investment decisions made by farmers 
under the influence tenure arrangements since, according to what has been analyzed in 
Chapter 3, investment decisions are likely to exert an influence on productivity. First, we 
present an extant empirical literature analyzing the effect of investment decisions on 
productivity, followed by the conceptual framework and the empirical specification. The 
descriptive and empirical results are discussed. 
6.2 Literature review 
Sustainability in agriculture implies increasing productivity in the long-run. For decision makers, 
it is crucial to know the effect of investment on productivity in order to foster the most beneficial 
investment options. Kato et al. (2011) investigate the influence of several soil and water 
conservation measures on crop yields in Ethiopia. Several measures appear to be greatly 
related to the mean value of yields, while considering their endogeneity by means of GMM and 
2SLS estimations. In particular, measures like waterways and trees are positively and 
significantly related to crop yields in both low and high rainfall areas. Di Falco et al. (2009), in 
their analysis on Ethiopia, also reveal a positive and significant effect of climate change 
adaptation measures, such as soil and water conservation measures, on yields and net 
revenue while controlling for possible endogeneity of these measures by IV estimation. 
However, one should not neglect the crucial effect of mineral fertilizer. Weligamage et al. 
(2014) analyze the influence of different allocation policies for distributing water on rice 
production in Sri Lanka. They find water in combination with application of mineral fertilizer to 
enhance productivity, especially in dry regions. 
Few empirical studies have attempted to investigate the impact of investments analyzed in 
relation to tenure arrangements on productivity. As indicated previously, Deininger and Jin 
(2006), in their analysis on Ethiopia, applied predicted values of investments, with security and 
transferability of tenure rights as instruments, confirming a positive effect of both tenure and 
investment on productivity. Chand and Yala (2009) determine, apart from land tenure effects, 
the influence of fertilizer use on productivity in Papua New Guinea and reveal a positive 
significant effect. Fenske (2010b) in Cote d’ Ivoire uses to determine productivity, apart from 
tenure variables, the variable investment fallowing. A positive and significant relationship 
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between fallowing and yields has been found. However, such analyses have one major 
shortcoming, since they ignore the fact that investment is not randomly assigned. Those 
investing and those not investing might be systematically different (Faltermeier and Abdulai, 
2009). When estimating the impact of investment on productivity, the question needs to be 
answered as to what degree of productivity would have been reached without investment 
(Kassie et al., 2010). In order to estimate the ‘direct productivity effects’ of investment, the 
effect needs to be isolated from other determinants of productivity. This refers to self-selection, 
since farmers self-select to invest, and this decision may be linked to the benefit derived from 
investment (Mendola, 2007).  
To overcome self-selection, the non-parametric method propensity score matching (PSM) can 
be applied (Mendola, 2007). The underlying basic idea of PSM with regard to investment is to 
compare observations with and without investment, according to the predicted propensity to 
invest. Comparisons are made between observations that have similar characteristics and that 
are relevant for the decision to invest (Kassie et al., 2008). Mendola (2007) examines the 
potential of new farming technologies on productive capacity of farmers in Bangladesh. The 
PSM results reveal that adoption of HYVs of rice positively and significantly influences farm 
income. Amare et al. (2012) also analyze the influence of improved farm technologies on 
household welfare such as income in Tanzania. Improved maize and pigeon pea varieties 
appear to be positively and significantly associated with income as well. 
Some empirical studies have employed PSM, in order to analyze the impact of conservation 
measures on productivity. For instance, Faltermeier and Abdulai (2009) examine the impact of 
water conservation and intensification technologies, such as the use of bunds and dibbling 
seeds on various outcomes like output and net returns in Ghana. They found positive impacts 
of the respective technologies on their outcome variables, but with varying degrees of 
importance. Kassie et al. (2010) determine the impact of minimum tillage and commercial 
fertilizer on net returns at plot-level in Ethiopia, with fertilizer having a positive and significant 
effect in a high-potential area and minimum tillage in a low-potential area. Kassie et al. (2008) 
also apply PSM for analyzing the impact of soil conservation, i.e. stone bunds, on the value of 
yields in Ethiopia. In order to assess unobservables that might confound the results, since PSM 
only controls for observables, the Mundlak’s approach is followed. Means of plot-varying 
covariates are included, being possible due to the panel nature of the data. The findings reveal, 
both with and without Mundlak’s approach, a positive and significant impact of soil conservation 
on productivity in a low-rainfall area, with unfavorable effects in a high rainfall area, suggesting 
the effects to be specific to agro-ecological conditions.  
PSM is a popular method to aim for creating a data set that might have resulted from a 
randomized experiment, by creating a comparison group like the treatment group based on 
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observable characteristics. PSM will be explained in the following chapter in detail, but the 
main assumption is the so-called unconfoundedness and implies that all covariates, which 
influence both treatment and outcome, are observed by the researcher. If the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA), holds, matching simulates an experiment and investment is 
random and uncorrelated with the outcome we want to measure. Thus, the CIA overcomes the 
issue of unobserved counterfactual observations, since it is assumed that the potential 
outcome of those who invest can be derived from the average actual outcome of those who 
do invest. Selection bias due to observables is removed, given the CIA holds, by matching on 
observables, i.e. conditioning on the propensity score (Imbens, 2004; Mendola, 2007; Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008).  
In case unconfoundedness does not hold, the problem of unobservables arises, i.e. factors 
that influence selection into treatment and outcome simultaneously that cannot be observed 
by the researcher such as ability or management capabilities. One possible solution is the 
Heckman selection method, accounting for possible unobservables, as it controls for possible 
sample selection bias by calculating the inverse Mills ratio λ from a first-stage estimation, in 
this case, investment in soil conservation measures. The second-stage estimation includes λ 
as an additional variable, and it analyzes possible unobservables (Moffitt, 2004; Greene, 2008: 
866). An extension to the Heckman selection method is the endogenous selection regression, 
where outcomes can be observed for the whole sample of those with and without treatment 
(Abdulai and Huffman, 2014). A further extension to this approach is multinomial endogenous 
switching regression. Similar to the endogenous switching regression, it allows both consistent 
and eﬃcient estimates for the treatment variable and accounts for possible selection bias 
influencing the outcome variable. The added benefit of multinomial endogenous switching 
regression is applicability when different treatments are not independent from each other. In 
the case of investments, this framework would analyze both individual and combined 
investments while capturing the interactions between investments (Kassie et al., 2014). Overall 
the main benefit of endogenous switching regression is to account for both, observable and 
unobservable factors superior to PSM only accounting for observable factors. As indicated 
above, PSM does hold in case one can assume there are no unobservable factors influencing 
treatment, in our case investment, and all observable factors are captured with the propensity 
score. In addition, those observations with no match, are discarded from the comparison.  
Another benefit of endogenous switching is that the first-stage estimations can be used to 
determine influencing factors on the treatment, i.e. investment; while estimates in the PSM are 
rather used to balance the covariates. Yet, in our case this is not the focus, since we already 
determined investment by means of a multivariate probit model and accounted for endogeneity 
of several concepts in chapter 03.  
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An alternative procedure to control for selection bias is the instrumental variable (IV) method, 
also used in this study. However, the IV method is in need of a variable to be used as an 
instrument for investment in specifying the outcome equation. The finding of instruments is a 
demanding task; an instrument needs to be relevant and exogenous, the problem of weak 
instruments arises. By the same token, OLS and IV approaches impose a linear functional 
form assumption, with this assumption being inherent that the effect of control variables is the 
same for those investing and those that do not. However, this is unlikely to be the case (Jalan 
and Ravallion, 2003; Mendola, 2007). In addition, Heckman selection and IV models both 
assume that the function of agricultural output would differ only by unobservable factors 
between those investing and those that do not. 
Propensity score matching is applied and, compared to the other parametric methods; it does 
not rely on any functional form assumption in determining the outcome (Owusu et al., 2011). 
6.3 Conceptual framework and empirical specification 
Propensity score matching 
The non-parametric propensity score matching (PSM) method presented, suggested by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985), is composed of the evaluation framework and 
implementation of propensity score. The latter is concerned with matching algorithms applied, 
assessing the matching quality and sensitivity analysis. 
Evaluation framework 
The aim is to estimate the effect of investment on plot-level productivity. From the first order 
conditions (3-8)-(3-12) in section 3.3, we have already explained in section 3.4 that the farmer 
invests in soil conservation measures if it leads to an increase in the expected farm net benefit 
aggregated over the planning horizon. As indicated earlier, expected farm net benefit is a latent 
variable that cannot be observed, merely the choice of investment. According to the 
maximization problem outlined in equation (3-6), the farmer invests in soil-improving and 
conservation measures, if expected farm net benefit is higher with investment Jjlm
*I  than without 
investment Jjlm
*N   (Jjlm
*I > Jjlm
*N ). Given farmers are risk-neutral, we assume that the farmer 
compares the expected farm net benefit with investment to the expected farm net benefit 
without investment. In case the expected farm net benefit is higher with investment, a positive 
investment decision is observed. Expected farm net benefit can be linked to a vector of 
explanatory variables (Z) and be presented by Djlm, the decision of the farmer l to invest or not 
in measure m (ditches, fertilizer, manure and multiple cropping) on plot j for which the following 
relation holds: 
Jjlm
* = γ'Zjlm + εjlm                                                                                                                 (6-1) 
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with Djlm = 1 if Jjlm
* > 0 
        Djlm = 0 if Jjlm
* ≤ 0 
where γ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and εjlm the error term with εjlm~N(0, σ). 
The probability to invest on plot j can be represented as:  
Pr (Djlm = 1)  = Pr (Jjlm
*I > Jjlm
*N ) = Pr (εjlm < -γ
'Zjlm)  = 1-F(-γ
'Zjlm)                                     (6-2) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function for εjlm.  
The relationship between investment and outcome, revenue per acre, can be analyzed by 
considering the following linear function (Owusu et al., 2011): 
Yjlm = αjlm +  β'Xjlm + δ'Djlm+μjlm                                                                                      (6-3)      
where Yjlm is the value of output per acre on plot, αjlm is a vector of unknown parameters, Xjlm 
is a vector of all other explanatory variables such as farm and household characteristics and 
μjlm is the error term with μjlm~N(0, σ).  
Equation (6-3) treats investment as an exogenous variable based on the premise that the 
farmer invests in soil conservation measures to increase productivity. However, it is not 
straightforward to estimate the effect of investment on revenue assuming investment is 
exogenous. The issue at stake is missing data. The question arises if revenue is higher due to 
investment alone or if farmers with higher revenue on plot are more likely to invest, as they 
have the means to do so (Mendola, 2007). Therefore, investment is not random and the group 
of those investing is likely to be systematically different (Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009). 
Selection bias occurs in case unobservable factors do influence both, the error term of the 
investment specification (εjlm) and the error term of the outcome specification (μjlm) resulting 
in a correlation between the two error terms defined by corr (εjlm,  μjlm) = θ. In case θ ≠ 0 OLS 
regression techniques produce biased results. We do not have data on the same farmer not 
having invested or otherwise an experimental setting with a control group not having invested. 
Hence, possible selection bias needs to be addressed differently. 
The standard approach in impact evaluation is the counterfactual framework that goes back to 
Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974), and it is based on the idea that for each individual there exists 
an observed outcome in case of treatment Y1 and a counterfactual unobserved outcome Y0. 
Thus, there exists an evaluation problem, since only one outcome can be observed for each 
individual. Individual treatment effects cannot be estimated and the analysis has to be subject 
to average treatment effects (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
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In case of treatment taking multiple values, multivalued treatment effects are used. A binary 
treatment effect model has the treatment options 0 and 1; a ﬁnite multivalued treatment effect 
model for example has treatment values along a positive integer. Comparing to a binary 
treatment effect, a multi-values treatment effect implies, that a control group is not always 
clearly deﬁned, new parameters of interest might be present linked to distinct phenomena like 
tipping points, and correct statistical inferences requires the joint estimation of all treatment 
effects (Cattaneo, 2010; 855-857). Since our main point of interest is the investment decision 
of farmers whether or not to invest in soil conservation measures, we do apply a binary 
treatment effect model that is using the average treatment effect. 
Generally, the interest is on the average treatment effect (ATE) that can be formulated the 
following (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983):  
τATE = E(D = 1)-E(D = 0)                                                                                                  (6-4) 
where Y1 is the outcome under investment (D = 1) and Y0 the outcome under no investment 
(D = 0). The ATE is the expected effect of investment (treatment) on an individual randomly 
drawn from the population (Wooldridge, 2010: 905). 
However, the ATE also includes those not intended to be subject to treatment. Since there is 
heterogeneity in the impact across individuals, the most common parameter is the average 
treatment effect of the treated (ATT) defined the following (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
τATT = E(Y1-Y0|D = 1)                                                                                                          (6-5) 
being the mean effect of those having invested (Wooldridge, 2010: 906). However, the 
counterfactual mean Y0 cannot be observed, and simply making use of those not having 
invested leads to selection bias as long as the distribution of covariates is not the same for 
both groups. Individuals do influence selection into treatment, i.e. they determine investment 
decisions and their decisions are related to expected outcome. The treatment effect being 
subject to selection bias can be formulated the following (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
E(D = 1)-E(D = 0) = τATT + E(D = 1)-E(Y1|D = 0).                                                            (6-6) 
Only in case E(D = 1)-E(D = 0) becomes zero that is in case Y0 is mean independent from 
investment D, the difference in means subject to treatment is an unbiased estimate and 
selection bias is zero. However, it is reasonable to assume that Y0 systematically differs 
between those having invested and those we observe that have not, since the outcome would 
also be different in case of no investment at all (Deheija and Wahba, 2002; Wooldridge, 2010: 
906 et seq.). In experimental settings, selection bias is approached using randomization, 
where control and treatment groups do not differ systematically (Imbens, 2010). Matching 
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overcomes the problem in non-experimental settings because selection bias is controlled for 
by building pairs of those with and without treatment with similar observable characteristics. 
The ATT is unbiased in case differences in any of the two pairs are assessed by the 
observables, while revenue is independent of assignment to investment conditional on 
covariates that are not influenced by investment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Deheija and 
Wahba, 2002).  
Propensity score matching (PSM) is an improvement of matching on covariates and has been 
proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985). Matching on covariates becomes 
cumbersome since a large range of variables included and finding exact matches a demanding 
task (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Propensity score is a balancing score reducing matching to 
a one-dimensional problem, where individuals are compared whether having the same 
probability to invest given the observable covariates (Heckman et al., 1997). The propensity 
score as the conditional probability to invest given the control variables Z is defined as follows 
(see Dehajia and Wahba, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
P(Z) = P(Z).                                                                                                                        (6-7) 
Two identifying assumptions for conducting PSM need to be met:  
First, the conditional independence assumption (CIA), implying that differences in outcome of 
those subjected to treatment and those that are not, are only due to treatment as for other 
observables that influence both investment and outcome is controlled for, is defined as follows: 
Y1, Y0 ∐  D|Z                                                                                                                         (6-8) 
where D denotes statistical independence and Z observable covariates that are not affected 
by treatment. The so-called unconfoundedness implies that all covariates, which influence both 
treatment and outcome, are observed by the researcher. If CIA holds, matching simulates an 
experiment and investment is random and uncorrelated with the outcome we want to measure. 
Differences in outcome are attributable to investment only. Thus, the CIA overcomes the issue 
of unobserved counterfactual observations, since it is assumed that the potential outcome of 
those who invest can be derived from the average actual outcome of those who do invest. 
Selection bias due to observables is removed, given the CIA holds, by conditioning on the 
propensity score (Imbens, 2004; Mendola, 2007; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Incorporating 
the CIA condition in (6-7) leads to (Imbens, 2004; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
Y(0)Y(1) ∐   |P(Z).                                                                                                             (6-9) 
Second, the overlap condition is defined the following (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
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0 < P(Z) < 1                                                                                                                      (6-10) 
where P indicates the probability of investment given covariates in that individuals with the 
same Z values have a positive probability of both investing and not. Heckman et al. (1997) note 
the comparison of individuals is restricted to those with common support, which proves that 
only similar individuals are compared, and reasonable comparisons are made. The justification 
of matching is only given over the common support. The condition implies that the propensity 
score is bounded away from 0 and 1 with exclusion of the tails of the distribution 
p(Z).  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) name both assumptions together “strong ignorability”. 
Provided the CIA holds and assuming that there is overlap between the group of those who 
have invested and those who have not, the ATT based on the propensity score can be 
estimated the following:  
τATT = E{[D = 1, P(Z)]-E[Y0|D = 0, P(Z)]}.                                                                        (6-11) 
The PSM estimator for ATT is therefore the average difference in outcomes over the common 
support weighted by the propensity score distribution of those having invested (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). Due to the propensity score, given the assumptions are fulfilled, there is no 
bias left in estimation of treatment effects due to unobserved heterogeneity (Jalan and 
Ravallion, 2003).  
Implementation of propensity score 
Any standard probability model is applicable to estimate the propensity score (Becker and 
Ichino, 2002). For the choice of variables, those included need to explain both investment and 
outcome at the same time. Yet, the variables are not allowed to be influenced by investment 
of the farmer, since they are the ones not changing over time or determined before investment. 
There is no mechanical algorithm that detects the set of variables being necessary to satisfy 
the CIA. One the one hand, a rich source of possible variables helps to satisfy the CIA. On the 
other hand, having too detailed information results in impossible matching, as those with 
specific characteristics do either always invest or not. Hence, missing data results in the 
problem of causal inference, but it is also required as variation is needed (Heckman et al., 
1998; Smith, 2000; Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
Matching Algorithms 
A matching algorithm is chosen after having estimated the propensity score, a way of 
comparing the outcome of one farmer having invested on plot with a farmer not having invested 
on plot. A broad range of matching algorithms is applicable. Said algorithms are diverse, 
subject to definition of the counterfactual observation, the neighbor, treatment of common 
support and assignment of weights to counterfactual outcomes, and they mostly involve a 
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trade-off between quality of matching and variance (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Especially 
in small samples, the decision of which algorithm to choose plays a role. However, with large 
sample sizes they become similar in their results, as they then compare exact matches 
(Heckman et al. 1997; Smith, 2000). The most common ones applied are nearest-neighbor 
matching, kernel-based matching, stratified matching, radius matching and Mahalanobis 
metric matching (Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009). A sound overview of algorithms can be found 
in both Smith and Todd (2005) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). In practice, one should try 
several matching algorithms and the decision of which to choose can be based on how the 
distribution of propensity scores in both groups looks (Bryson et al., 2002). 
We apply two matching algorithms, the nearest neighbor matching (NNM) and an extension of 
the one, the Mahalanobis metric matching (MMM). The nearest neighbor matching is the 
most intuitive one. Two observations that are closest in terms of propensity score are matched, 
one from the treatment and one from the control group (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This 
neighborhood can be formulated the following: 
C(i) = minj ||pi-pj||,   j ∈ E0                                                                                                  (6-12) 
where C(i) is the set of observations not investing (control observations) matched to the treated 
observation i with the propensity score pi and with pj being the closest propensity score of the 
non-treated observation j and E0 is the set of indices for control group observations (Heckman 
et al., 1997; Becker and Ichino, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005). The nearest neighbor estimator 
can be described the following (Heckman et al., 1997; Becker and Ichino, 2002): 
τNN =  
1
n1i
∑   i∈E1∩Sp (Y1i-
∑   j∈E0 wijY0j)                                                                                 (6-13) 
where n1i is the number of observations in the set E1∩Sp with  E1 being the set of indices of the 
treated observations and E0 the set of indices of the control group observations, Sp denotes 
the region of common support imposed and Y1i and Y0j are the outcomes in the two 
counterfactual situations of investment and no investment on plot. The weight wij attached to 
the control group observation in case of NNM is equal to one. 
Several variations of the NNM are available, it can be used without and with replacement, 
where in case of non-treated observations can be used more than once as a match. This 
variant implies a trade-off between bias and variance. The bias will reduce due to higher 
matching quality; however, by reducing the number of non-treated observations the variance 
of the estimator increases (Caliendo and Kopeinig, Smith and Todd, 2005). Another option is 
to make use of more than one neighbor to obtain counterfactuals, implying less variance due 
to more information used. However, also increased bias, due to average poorer matches 
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(Smith and Todd, 2005). One way of avoiding poor matches is to apply caliper matching, where 
a tolerance level is imposed on the maximum distance of propensity scores (Cochran and 
Rubin, 1973). An observation from the comparison group is selected as a match for a treated 
observation that is within the propensity range defined by the caliper and has the closest 
distance in terms of propensity score that is |pi-pj|  < ε, j ∈ E0 where ε is the pre-specified 
caliper. The quality of matching increases, however, the variance of the estimates also 
increases (Sianesi, 2001; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
The Mahalanobis metric matching (MMM) is an extension of NNM that is in contrast to the 
other matching algorithms, a multivariate covariate matching reducing bias. Apart from 
matching on the propensity score, other covariates are added, which may be strongly related 
to both outcome and investment. By this, emphasis can be placed upon the other investment 
decisions that are interrelated and are assumed to exert a strong influence on outcome as well 
(Lechner, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009). Generally, the 
application of too many covariates reduces the performance of the MMM and it is not advisable 
to use more than one continuous variable (Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Guo et al., 2006). 
According to the MMM algorithm, the observation j with no investment with the minimum 
distance d(i, j) is chosen as the match for the observation i with investment and both are 
removed from the matching process. This procedure continues until all treated observations 
are matched. In case of calipers applied, the nearest counterfactual observation is within the 
predetermined common support region defined by the caliper. The Mahalanobis distances are 
calculated as follows (Rubin, 1980; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985): 
d(i, j) = (u-v)TC-1(u-v)                                                                                                       (6-14) 
where u and v are the values of the matching variables (including the propensity score) for 
observation i with investment on plot and observation j with no investment on plot, and C is the 
sample covariance matrix of the matching variables from the full set of farmers not having 
invested. The combination of metric matching with propensity score is promising since 
propensity score matching reduces the discrepancy along the propensity score and MMM 
reduces the distance along individual coordinates of Z (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Sekhon, 
2008). Empirical results indicate that MMM is superior to other matching algorithms, in 
particular with calipers applied (Baser, 2006). 
Assessing the Matching Quality 
The main purpose of propensity score matching is not to predict why farmers invest, but to 
balance the distribution of observed covariates across groups of farmers having invested and 
groups of farmers not having invested on the plot. Matching quality is therefore determined by 
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the ability of matching to balance the relevant covariates that is dependent on the type and 
quality of control variables and matching procedure (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). A balancing test will provide information if reasonable counterfactual 
outcomes are constructed in that both groups are similar (Mendola, 2007; Lee, 2011).  
Various balancing tests are included in the literature. All of the approaches coincide the 
comparison before and after matching to see if there are differences left after conditioning on 
the propensity score (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The most widely used is the standardized 
mean difference between treatment and control sample suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985). This estimate compares the difference in means before and after matching for each 
variable and is defined the following (Lee, 2011): 
B(Z) = 100
ZT-ZC
√
VT(Z)+VC(Z)
2
                                                                                                          (6-15) 
where ZT and ZC are the sample means for the treatment and control groups and VT(Z) and 
VC(Z) are the corresponding sample variances. Total bias is calculated by an unweighted 
average across all covariates and the reduction in bias is computed the following:  
BR = 100(1-
Bafter
Bbefore
).                                                                                                            (6-16) 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), a standardized difference of 20% is considered 
to be large. 
Additionally, Sianesi (2004) proposed to estimate the propensity score on the matched sample 
only and carry out a comparison between the pseudo R2 before and after matching. After 
matching, the pseudo R2 shall be quite low indicating no systematic differences in the 
distribution of covariates between those who invest and those who do not and, above all, the 
joint significance of the included covariates shall be rejected. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Even after matching there still might be hidden bias, since variables unobserved by the 
researcher affect both investment and outcome, with estimators not being robust to hidden 
bias, leading to misleading policy implications. Then, observations with the same observed 
covariates have different probabilities of being assigned to treatment (Rosenbaum, 2002: 106). 
Selection bias cannot be tested directly in nonexperimental settings; however, it can be 
addressed by sensitivity analysis. The change in effects estimated under the assumption of 
unconfoundedness is assessed by violating unconfoundedness (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; 
Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). One option is the bounding approach suggested by 
Rosenbaum (2002), with the inherent question to what extent unobservables make an 
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influence on selection into treatment to alter inference about treatment effects, i.e. how 
unobservables do change effects of investment on revenue per acre on plot, for observations 
with the same observable characteristics but different unobservable characteristics 
(Rosenbaum, 2010: 367). In order to answer this question, the probability of being subject to 
treatment is expressed simplistically (Rosenbaum, 2002: 107; Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009): 
πi = Pr (zi)  = F(βzi + γui)                                                                                                  (6-17) 
where zi is a vector of all observed variables that explain investment and ui are the unobserved 
variables with γ denoting the effect on the investment decision estimated with F as a logistic 
distribution. In case of hidden bias γ is not zero, and two observations with the same observed 
covariates have different probabilities to invest. Rosenbaum (2002: 107) then considers the 
odds ratio to receive the treatment of two matched observations i and j:  
πi(1-πj)
πj(1-πi)
=
exp (βzj-γuj)
exp (βzi-γui)
= exp [γ(ui-uj)].                                                                                  (6-18) 
The formula shows that two observations with the same covariates differ in their odds ratio of 
decision to invest, by a factor that includes the parameter γ and the difference in the respective 
unobserved covariates u. Rosenbaum (2002: 108) proposes to restrict the unobserved 
covariate u to be a dummy variable. Then, the odds ratio can be rewritten the following: 
1
 
≤
πi(1-πj)
πj(1-πi)
≤                                                                                                                        (6-19) 
whereas = exp (γ). There does not exist any hidden bias if = 1, thus unconfoundedness is 
given. However, for ≠ 1 with even large values the association between investment and 
outcome is less restricted. The parameter describes the degree of departure from a study 
where no hidden bias is present at an outside estimate (Rosenbaum, 2010: 77). The sensitivity 
analysis considers several values of and the respective possible changes in inference. Values 
of being close to 1 already changing the inference to a great extent describes studies being 
sensitive to hidden bias. Bounds for significance levels and confidence intervals are derived 
by means of a Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test statistic (Aakvik, 2001; Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009) that is defined as follows (Rosenbaum, 2002: 110): 
T = t(D, r) = ∑  ss=1 ds ∑  
2
i=1 csiDsi                                                                                       (6-20) 
where D is treatment assignment and is a binary variable that equals 1 if the farmer invests in 
the respective measure on the plot and 0 otherwise, r is the outcome for each observation in 
the s pairs, and csi is binary (csi = 1 or csi = 0), both ds > 0 and csi are a function of r and, 
hence, they are fixed under the null hypothesis of no effect of investment.  
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Under the assumption that a confounding variable exists, the test statistic T = t(D, r) for each 
possible (γ, u) is the sum of S independent variables and the sth variable is equal to ds with a 
probability: 
ps =
cs1 exp (γus1) +cs2exp (γus2) 
exp (γus1) +exp (γus2) 
                                                                                               (6-21) 
and is equal to zero with probability 1-ps. With  ps
+ and ps
-  are defined as follows: 
ps
+ = and .                                                                 (6-22) 
Then, the unknown null distribution of T is bounded by two known distributions T+ and T-  
The expectation and variance of T+ are as follows:  
E(T+) = ∑  ss=1 dsps
+                                                                                                            (6-23) 
Var(T+) = ∑  ss=1 ds
2ps
+(1-ps).                                                                                               (6-24) 
The definitions for T- are similar apart from using ps
-  instead of ps
+ . The formulas are  
employed in order to test the null hypothesis of no effect of investment. The bounds of this 
significance level is calculated for any specific by: 
(T-E(T+))/√Var(T+) and 
(T-E(T-))/√Var(T-)                                                                                                            (6-25) 
where T is the Wilcoxon’s singed-rank statistic. In case of = 1 with no effect of unobservables 
on the assignment to treatment the bounds are equal to the estimated significance level of the 
matching estimator. However, an effect of unobservables is revealed by confidence intervals 
on the estimated effect getting wider, with also the significance levels of the test of no effect of 
investment on the outcome increasing (Rosenbaum, 2002: 105-112; DiPrete and Gangl, 
2004).  
6.4 Hypothesis 
We hypothesize that investment in productivity-enhancing and soil conservation measures 
influences productivity positively. Due to self-selection being assumed (see for example 
Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009), we will account for it within the empirical specification. 
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6.5 Results and discussion 
Variables included in the model 
Variables included to estimate the propensity score by means of probit models shall influence 
both investment and outcome, but not be affected by investment (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). For this reason, variables subject to endogeneity (see section 3.6.2) are not included in 
the matching process. We decided on a large range of regressors in order to reduce the 
possibility of unobservables influencing both investment and outcome. Yet, a ‘too good’ 
specification makes matching impossible (Deheija and Wahba, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). The main purpose of the propensity scores is not to determine investment, this has 
already been done (see section 3.6.2) to balance the covariates between those investing and 
those that do not (Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001). Interaction terms, like distance to the market 
and education, and higher-order terms, like plot size squared, are included in case differences 
in covariates between the two groups are still prevalent (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
The choice of variables is based on results determining investment decisions and productivity, 
and theory. Categories of variables are farm and household characteristics, plot-level 
characteristics, social capital and village dummies. The decision to invest in either of the 
investments is not independent of the other investment decisions as has been proven by the 
significance of the correlation coefficients in the multivariate probit model. Above all, those 
interrelated investment options are also likely to influence output. Thus, the remaining 
investment options are included as covariates within the matching process for each investment 
option. The definitions and sample characteristics of the variables used to estimate the 
propensity scores at plot-level are presented in table 6-1.  
Since MMM allows us to include, apart from the propensity score, other covariates where 
emphasis shall be placed, we add, for each specification to the propensity score, the other 
three respective investment options. Otherwise, observations would be matched based on 
similar propensity scores, yet with investment in diverse interrelated measures on the plot 
(Lechner, 2002; Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009). 
Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Variable definition Mean S.D. 
Outcome variable   
Yield Value of output per acre (GHS*0.1) 46.10 72.43 
Treatment variables   
Ditches 1 if farmer applies ditches on plot, 0 otherwise 0.42 0.49 
Fert 1 if farmer applies fertilizer on plot, 0 otherwise 0.33 0.47 
Manure 1 if farmer applies organic manure on plot, 0 otherwise 0.15 0.36 
Multcrop 1 if farmer applies multiple cropping on plot, 0 otherwise 0.59 0.49 
Independent variables   
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Trees 1 if trees have been planted on plot, 0 otherwise 0.36 0.48 
Pltsize Plot size in acres  4.66 5.37 
Pltsize2_100 Plot size in acres squared/100 0.51 2.01 
Soilfert 1 if plot is on fertile soil, 0 otherwise 0.88 0.33 
Slope 1 if slope on plot, 0 otherwise 0.35 0.48 
Pltforest 1 if vegetation on plot is forest, 0 savanna 0.43 0.50 
Age Age of farmer (years) 48.39 12.84 
Education 0=no education, 1= middle/JHS, 2=secondary/SHS 0.54 0.68 
HH-size Number of permanent household members  5.72 2.01 
Yrsr Years of residence in the village 20.73 15.62 
Friend 1 if farmer has friends, 0 otherwise 0.74 0.44 
Lvstckvlue Value of livestock wealth (GHS*0.01) 7.53 13.33 
TV 1 if farmer owns a TV, 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 
Bike 1 if farmer owns a bike, 0 otherwise 0.55 0.50 
Fridge 1 if farmer owns a fridge, 0 otherwise 0.15 0.36 
House 1 if farmer owns a house, 0 otherwise 0.52 0.50 
Fbo 1 if farmer is member of an fbo, 0 otherwise  0.31 0.46 
Nnoboa 1 if farmer is assisted by nnoboa, 0 otherwise 1.68 0.52 
Extens 1 if farmer received assistance by extension officer,  
0 otherwise 
0.38 0.49 
Moconstr Principal component ‚monetary constraint ‘a 0.092 1.08 
Prefft Principal component ‘constraint practical effort’a -0.025 1.31 
Distm Distance to the nearest market (km) 6.883 5.08 
Educ_distm Interaction education and distance to the market 4.012 7.33 
Safe 1 if farmer thinks community is safe to farm, 0 otherwise 0.902 0.30 
Kintampo 1 if farmer resides in Kintampo, 0 otherwise 0.265 0.44 
Kunso 1 if farmer resides in Kunso, 0 otherwise 0.163 0.37 
Badukrom 1 if farmer resides in Badukrom, 0 otherwise 0.197 0.40 
Awaropat 1 if farmer resides in Awaropat, 0 otherwise 0.274 0.44 
Twimea 1 if farmer resides in Twimea, 0 otherwise 0.059 0.24 
Fiaso 1 if farmer resides in Fiaso, 0 otherwise 0.041 0.20 
Observations   441   
Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). Exchange rate: €1 = ₵ 3,6 in 2014 
a Components are constructed by principal component analysis in chapter 4 
Source: Survey data 
Table 6-1 shows manure is the least applied soil conservation measure with only 15% followed 
by mineral fertilizer with 33%. Ditches and multiple cropping are applied to a larger extent on 
42% and 59% of plots respectively. 
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6.5.1 Descriptive Results 
Tables 6-2 and 6-3 present descriptive statistics of household and plot characteristics by 
investment status.  
Table 6-2: Household and plot characteristics of adopters and non-adopters summary 
statistics 
Characteristics 
 
Investment in ditches Investment in mineral fertilizer 
 Nonadopter Adopter Diff. Nonadopter Adopter Diff. 
Household characteristics      
HH-Size 6,13 5,45 -0,68*** 5,90 5,91 0,01 
Age 45,41 49,67 4,26*** 46,99 46,41 -0,58 
Education 0,47 0,56 0,09** 0,47 0,58 0,09 
Lvstckvlue 9,03 7,49 -1,54 8,19 9,33 1,14 
Yrsr 20,34 19,03 -1,31 20,99 17,65 -3,34*** 
Friends 0,68 0,83 0,14*** 0,69 0,80 0,11 
Extens 0,36 0,40 0,04 0,36 0,41 0,05 
Fbo 0,29 0,35 0,06* 0,30 0,34 0,04 
Nnboa 0,37 0,37 0,00 0,37 0,38 0,01 
TV 0,12 0,24 0,12*** 0,13 0,23 0,10*** 
Bike 0,39 0,55 0,16*** 0,42 0,49 0,07* 
Fridge 0,11 0,15 0,04* 0,10 0,18 0,08 
House 0,35 0,59 0,24*** 0,40 0,49 0,09 
Safe 0,83 0,95 0,12*** 0,87 0,86 -0,01 
Moconstr 0,01 0,22 0,21** 0,05 0,18 0,13 
Prefft -0,02 -0,12 -0,1 0,01 -0,20 -0,19* 
       
Plot characteristics      
Pltsize 4,88 3,79 -1,09*** 4,53 4,43 -0,10 
Soilfert 0,88 0,88 0,00 0,89 0,84 -0,05 
Slope 0,34 0,36 0,02 0,32 0,39 0,07 
Pltforest 0,40 0,39 -0,01 0,44 0,32 -0,12** 
Distm 6,63 6,36 -0,27 7,17 5,22 -1,95*** 
Trees 0,30 0,32 0,02 0,30 0,31 0,01 
Note: The difference in output measured is  
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡),  
with H0: diff = 0 and H1: diff ≠ 0; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Survey data 
Table 6-3: Household and plot characteristics of adopters and non-adopters summary 
statistics 
Characteristics 
 
Investment in manure Investment in multiple cropping 
 Nonadopter Adopter Diff. Nonadopter Adopter Diff. 
Household characteristics      
HH-Size 5,83 6,36 0,53** 5,80 6,02 0,22 
Age 46,88 46,42 0,46 47,09 46,49 -0,60 
Education 0,53 0,31 -0,22 0,56 0,44 -0,12** 
Lvstckvlue 8,41 9,27  0,86 6,97 9,96 2,99*** 
Yrsr 20,35 17,77 -2,58 21,16 18,75 -2,41** 
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Friends 0,73 0,72 -0,01 0,69 0,76 -0,07** 
Extens 0,37 0,39 0,02 0,36 0,39 0,03 
Fbo 0,30 0,36 0,06 0,31 0,32 0,01 
Nnboa 0,36 0,41 -0,05 0,35 0,40 0,05 
TV 0,17 0,11 -0,06* 0,13 0,19 0,06 
Bike 0,45 0,38 -0,07 0,46 0,43 -0,03 
Fridge 0,13 0,07 -0,06** 0,09 0,15 0,06*** 
House 0,45 0,28 -0,17*** 0,40 0,45 0,05 
Safe 0,87 0,87 0,00 0,86 0,88 0,02 
Moconstr 0,07 0,17 0,10 0,05 0,12 -0,07 
Prefft -0,10 0,23 0,33 -0,20 0,06 0,26** 
       
Plot characteristics      
Pltsize 4,44 4,83 0,39 3,99 4,92 -0,93 
Soilfert 0,87 0,90 0,03 0,86 0,89 0,03 
Slope 0,32 0,48 0,16*** 0,33 0,36 0,03 
Pltforest 0,41 0,33 -0,08* 0,42 0,38 -0,04 
Distm 6,83 4,88 -1,95*** 7,21 5,97 -1,24*** 
Trees 0,32 0,25 -0,07 0,28 0,33 0,05 
Note: The difference in output measured is  
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡),  
with H0: diff = 0 and H1: diff ≠ 0; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Survey data 
The t-statistics of the mean difference of household characteristics reveal that those farmers 
investing and those farmers that are not are partly different in their characteristics, supporting 
the notion that those farmers investing are systematically different and this relates to self-
selection of farmers into investment. In addition, some differences with regard to plot 
characteristics between plots with and without investment emerge. For example, among plots 
with investment in mineral fertilizer, manure, and multiple cropping the distance to the market 
is shorter than among plots without investment. So, the benefit of investment seems to be 
higher with a market nearby where outputs can be purchased. 
Table 6-4 reports descriptive statistics of differences in productivity by type of investment on 
the plot.  
Table 6-4: Difference in yields on plot between investment and no investment 
Investment 
option 
Output with investment 
(GHS*0.1/acre) 
Output without 
investment 
(GHS*0.1/acre) 
Difference 
(GHS*0.1/acre) 
Ditches 49.27 52.62 -3.35 
Fertilizer 63.61 44.96 18.65** 
Manure  52.66 51.18  1.48 
Multiple 
Cropping 
60.37 39.34 21.03** 
Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). Exchange rate: €1 = ₵3.6 in 2014 
Note: The difference in output measured is  
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡),  
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with H0: diff = 0 and H1: diff ≠ 0; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Survey data 
With regards to the outcome variable value of output per acre, there appear to be statistically 
significant differences between those observations with investment and those without. Output 
is significantly higher on plots where fertilizer and multiple cropping have been applied. 
However, the output on plots with investment in ditches is lower, albeit only to a small extent 
and significance. For investment in manure, we only observe a slightly higher output per acre 
of ₵14.8, which is not significant. Yet, a comparison of the means of output per acre by t-
statistics does not account for the effect of other factors such as farm, household and plot 
characteristics and, as such, may alter the impact of investment in soil conservation measures 
on revenues per acre with the influence of other factors (Owusu et al., 2011). In order to provide 
sound estimates of the impact of investment on revenues, we investigate the impact of the four 
investment options in the non-parametric framework propensity score matching accounting for 
selectivity bias. Hence, each investment is a treatment to be analyzed with respect to its impact 
on revenues per acre, the outcome variable. 
6.5.2 Empirical results 
Propensity scores are estimated for each investment option by means of a probit model. The 
results of the propensity score estimates are reported in tables A9-A12 from the Annex. An 
interpretation of the propensity score estimates is not undertaken here since the main goal of 
propensity score matching is to balance the distribution of covariates across groups of farmers 
investing and groups of farmers not investing on the plot (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008). 
The overlap assumption implies that matching can only be performed in the region of common 
support (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Common support is imposed by making use of caliper 
determining the maximum distance of p-scores between one treated and one untreated 
observation. The distribution of propensity scores and the regions of common support are 
presented in figures 6-1. The bottom half shows the propensity scores distribution of those 
having invested, and the upper half the propensity scores of those not having invested with the 
y-axis presenting the density of the scores. 
The graphs visualize the bias in the distribution of the propensity scores between groups with 
and without investment. They indicate the high relevance of proper matches and show that 
estimating the p-scores balance the untreated and treated groups very well.  
  
141 
 
  
  
Fertilizer-MMM 
 
  
 
 
 
 
      
   
  
    
  
 
  
 
 
 
0 .
2 
.
4 
.
6 
.
8 
1 
Propensity 
Score 
 
Untreated: Off 
support 
Untreated: On 
support Treated: On 
support 
Treated: Off 
support 
   
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
   
 
    
    
 
0 .
2 
.
4 
.
6 
.
8 Propensity 
Score 
 
Untreated: Off 
support 
Untreated: On 
support Treated: On 
support Treated: Off support 
   
 
 
  
 
 
         
 
        
 
 
0 .
2 
.
4 
.
6 
.
8 Propensity Score 
 
Unt
rea
 
Treated: On 
support 
Treated: Off 
support 
   
  
  
      
0 .
2 
.
4 
.
6 
.
8 
1 
Propensity Score 
 
Untreated: Off 
support 
Untreated: On 
support Treated: On 
support 
Treated: Off 
support 
   
 
 
 
  
      
0 .
2 
.
4 
.
6 
.
8 
1 
Propensity 
Score 
 
Untreated: Off 
support 
Untreated: On 
support Treated: On 
support 
Treated: Off support 
Ditches-NNM Ditches-MMM 
Fertilizer-NNM Fertilizer-MMM 
Manure-NNM Manure-MMM 
142 
 
  
Figure 6-1: Propensity score distribution and common support for propensity score estimation  
 
The results of the treatment effect ATT of each investment option on value of output per acre 
for both matching algorithms, NNM and MMM, with its respective caliper and number of treated 
and control observations on support used for matching, and the loss of observations due to 
common support condition are presented in table 6-5, while table 6-6 provides the indicators 
of matching quality. 
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Table 6-5: Average treatment effects of investment options and sensitivity analysis41 
Investment 
Matching 
Algorithm 
ATT2 Caliper 
Critical level of hidden 
bias Γ 
No. treated 
No. controls 
On support 
Loss of observations due 
to common support 
Ditches NNM 17.13** 0.01 1.3 
166 
219 
75 
 MMM1 24.45*** 0.01 1.4 
125 
269 
66 
Fertilizer NNM 21.43* 0.01 1.6 
141 
237 
74 
 MMM1 29.02*** 0.01 1.6 
119 
303 
30 
Manure NNM 12.31 0.1 - 
70 
313 
22 
 MMM1 11.44 0.08 - 
70 
279 
56 
Multiple Cropping NNM 23.03*** 0.01 1.4 
228 
182 
52 
 MMM1 27.00*** 0.08 1.7 
234 
188 
40 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Conditioning variables apart from propensity score are the other three investment options respectively 
2 Outcome is output per acre in GHS*0.1  
 
 
41 Units were randomly ordered before Matching algorithms are applied, in order to obtain consistent estimates, as otherwise, due to the matching algorithm a different order of data, 
leads to diverse results. In addition, given the relatively small sample size, matching is conducted with replacement (a given observation not having invested on the plot can get 
matched to more than one observation having invested on the plot). 
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Table 6-6: Indicators of covariate balancing, before and after matching 
Investment 
Matching 
Algorithm 
Mean absolute 
bias before 
matching % 
Mean absolute 
bias after 
matching % 
Total (%) bias 
reduction 
Pseudo R2 
(unmatched) 
Pseudo R2 
(matched) 
p-value of LR 
(unmatched) 
p-value of LR 
(matched) 
Ditches NNM 22.73 8.00 64.80 0.223 0.043 0.000 0.582 
 MMM 23.38 5.58 76.13 0.223 0.049 0.000 0.659 
Fertilizer NNM 22.82 8.47 62.88 0.174 0.058 0.000 0.202 
 MMM 20.72 8.31 59.89 0.177 0.058 0.000 0.577 
Manure NNM 20.53 9.39 54.26 0.249 0.057 0.000 0.960 
 MMM 21.28 9.63 54.75 0.248 0.078 0.000 0.771 
Multiple Cropping NNM 23.01 5.14 77.66 0.177 0.019 0.000 0.939 
 MMM 23.82 7.79 67.30 0.172 0.040 0.000 0.135 
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Overall, estimates show a positive impact of each investment option on the plot on the outcome 
variable. In terms of causal effects and significance, the results of the NNM appear to be similar 
to those of the MMM. Investment in ditches, fertilizer and multiple cropping exert a positive and 
significant impact on value of output per acre.  
In particular, plots with investment in ditches are characterized by a statistically higher output 
per acre of ₵171.3 in the case of NNM, and even a higher output when accounting for the other 
investment options by MMM of ₵244.5. Hindering soil erosion increases output significantly. 
The causal effect of investment in fertilizer is significant. It ranges between ₵214.3 (NNM) and 
₵290.2 (MMM) and exerts the greatest effect on output within the analysis by increasing soil 
fertility in the short-run. Multiple cropping significantly increases output per acre by ₵230.3 in 
case of NNM and by ₵270.0 in case of MMM through, among other effects, hindering soil 
erosion and augmenting soil capital in the long-run. The findings are supported by similar 
results reported for soil conservation measures (Kassie et al. 2008), for fertilizer specifically for 
Ethiopia (Kassie et al. 2010) and for intensification technologies for Ghana (Faltermeier and 
Abdulai, 2009). All three studies control for possible self-selection bias by means of propensity 
score matching. Balancing the distribution of covariates does not lead to a statistically 
significant difference in output per acre between farmers having invested in manure on the plot 
and those that have not, even if both NNM and MMM estimates show a positive treatment 
effect, ATT=₵123.1 and ATT=₵114.4 respectively. One explanation might be that nutrient 
compositions of manure do not necessarily meet nutrient needs of crops on the plot (Vanlauwe 
and Giller, 2006). 
Indicators of the matching quality are presented in table 6-6. The reduction in the mean 
absolute standardized bias is, in all cases, above 50% with a mean absolute bias after 
matching of always below 10, suggesting that the covariates are adequately balanced by 
propensity score estimation and each matching algorithm (Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009). 
Next to the standardized bias, the pseudo-R2 from the propensity score for each investment 
and the re-estimation of the propensity score after matching on the matched sample only as 
suggested by Sianesi (2004) is presented, together with the p-values of the likelihood ratio test 
of the joint significance of all the covariates in each probit model, before and after matching. 
In each model, the variance of the respective investment decision determined by the covariates 
declined substantially after matching. The joint significance of the covariates has to be rejected 
after matching in each case, whereas it is never rejected before matching. After matching, 
there is no systematic difference in the distribution of covariates between those farmers that 
have invested on plot and those that have not.  
Table 6-5 also shows the results of the sensitivity analysis with the critical level of Γ at which 
the causal inference of significant investment effects is questionable. Sensitivity analysis only 
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makes sense in case the ATT is significant (Hujer et al., 2004). The critical levels of gamma 
are obtained based on the assumption that the estimated effect of treatment overestimates the 
true effect since there might be positive unobserved selection that leads to an upward bias in 
the treatment effect that has been estimated (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). This confounding 
variable needs to have an equally strong effect on both selection into treatment and outcome 
(Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009). Gamma values for investment in ditches, fertilizer and 
multiple cropping range between a lowest critical value of Γ=1.3 for investment in ditches in 
case of NNM and a highest critical value of Γ=1.7 for investment in multiple cropping in case 
MMM is applied. These results are in the range of previous studies and imply to be relatively 
robust to hidden bias, that is unobserved heterogeneity with Γ=1.3 as the lowest value. A value 
of Γ=1.7, for example, indicates that in case observations that have the same Z vector differ in 
their odds of investment by a factor of 70%, then the confidence interval of the output effect 
would include a zero. In particular, it would require a hidden bias of Γ=1.7 to reduce the positive 
effect of multiple cropping. It needs to be stressed that Rosenbaum bounds are a worst-case 
scenario and do not indicate unobserved heterogeneity in the dataset or insignificance of 
treatment effects (DiPetre and Gangl, 2004; Hujer et al., 2004).   
6.6 Summary and conclusions 
The impact of investment on plot-level productivity is examined. The non-parametric approach 
propensity score matching was applied to account for selectivity bias, given the non-
experimental nature of the data. Results of the standardized bias method prove that the 
propensity score is able to balance the distribution of covariates between farmers having 
invested on the plot and farmers not having invested on the plot.  
Estimates reveal that investment in ditches, fertilizer and multiple cropping significantly 
increases value of output per acre on plot. The effect of investment in manure is positive, albeit 
insignificant. This might be due to manure not complying perfectly with nutrient requirements 
of crops.  
Two main policy implications can be derived from the analysis. First, these investments seem 
to be worthy of supporting and disseminating among farmers to raise their productivity. In 
addition, these results reinforce the implications drawn from the analysis in Chapter 3. Secure 
tenure rights do influence productivity by means of increased investment. Farmers with 
secured rights are more likely to invest in soil conservation measures as found in Chapter 3, 
which, increases productivity. Therefore, providing secure tenure rights influences agricultural 
productivity positively, emphasizing the importance of secured tenure. 
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Annex 
 
Estimation of propensity scores 
Table 6-1: Estimation of propensity score for investment in ditches 
Ditches Coefficient Std. Err. Z-Value Probability 
Fert -0.201 0.157 -1.28 0.201 
Manure 0.623 0.224 2.78 0.005 
Multcrop 0.206 0.150 1.37 0.170 
Trees -0.332 0.145 -2.29 0.022 
Pltsize -0.034 0.016 -2.18 0.029 
Age 0.015 0.006 2.76 0.006 
Education 0.022 0.109 0.21 0.838 
HH-size -0.083 0.035 -2.36 0.018 
TV 0.534 0.195 2.74 0.006 
Distm -0.036 0.019 -1.95 0.051 
Fbo 0.273 0.158 1.72 0.085 
Safe 0.379 0.280 1.35 0.176 
Moconstr -0.007 0.064 -0.11 0.909 
Lvstckvlue -0.011 0.005 -2.36 0.018 
Nnoboa -0.243 0.118 -2.06 0.039 
Kintampo 0.961 0.413 2.33 0.020 
Kunso 1.167 0.469 2.49 0.013 
Badukrom 1.540 0.405 3.81 0.000 
Awaropat 0.296 0.404 0.73 0.464 
Twimea -0.600 0.496 -1.21 0.228 
Constant -0.988 0.536 -1.84 0.065 
Observations 460    
Pseudo R2 0.223    
 
  
148 
 
Table 6-2: Estimation of propensity score for investment in fertilizer 
Fertilizer Coefficient Std. Err. Z-Value Probability 
Ditches -0.233 0.160 -1.46 0.145 
Manure -0.185 0.201 -0.92 0.357 
Multcrop 0.543 0.152 3.57 0.000 
Pltsize 0.001 0.013 0.11 0.915 
Soilfert -0.195 0.203 -0.96 0.337 
Age -0.007 0.006 -1.09 0.274 
HH-size 0.039 0.037 1.04 0.299 
Distm 0.007 0.021 0.32 0.750 
Fridge -0.103 0.208 -0.50 0.619 
House 0.156 0.163 0.96 0.337 
Extens 0.425 0.139 3.05 0.002 
Yrsr -0.010 0.005 -1.94 0.053 
Friend 0.271 0.166 1.64 0.102 
Lvstckvlue -0.004 0.005 -0.73 0.464 
Moconstr -0.040 0.067 -0.59 0.553 
Kintampo 0.735 0.359 2.05 0.040 
Kunso -0.684 0.440 -1.55 0.121 
Badukrom 0.072 0.379 0.19 0.848 
Awaropat -0.350 0.355 -0.99 0.324 
Twimea 0.066 0.410 0.16 0.873 
Constant -0.714 0.487 -1.47 0.143 
Observations 452    
Pseudo R2 0.177    
*For Mahalanobis matching the squared term of plot size is added  
  
149 
 
Table 6-3: Estimation of propensity score for investment in manure 
Manure Coefficient Std. Err. Z-Value Probability 
Ditches 0.530 0.226 2.35 0.019 
Fert -0.112 0.186 -0.60 0.549 
Multcrop -0.041 0.210 -0.20 0.843 
Trees 0.054 0.188 0.29 0.775 
Pltsize 0.206 0.099 2.08 0.037 
Pltsize2_100 -1.416 0.736 -1.92 0.055 
Soilfert 0.050 0.261 0.19 0.847 
Slope 0.284 0.179 1.59 0.112 
Pltforest 0.124 0.185 0.67 0.503 
Bike 0.342 0.198 1.72 0.085 
Education 0.032 0.155 0.21 0.835 
Age -0.016 0.043 -0.37 0.711 
Age2_100 0.019 0.041 0.46 0.644 
HH-size -0.006 0.046 -0.13 0.895 
Friend -0.379 0.193 -1.96 0.050 
Moconstr 0.473 0.132 3.58 0.000 
Prefft 0.514 0.116 4.44 0.000 
Kintampo -1.372 0.396 -3.46 0.001 
Badukrom -1.000 0.386 -2.59 0.009 
Awaropat -1.471 0.356 -4.14 0.000 
Twimea 0.281 0.359 0.78 0.433 
Constant -0.525 1.200 -0.44 0.662 
Observations 405    
Pseudo R2 0.249    
*Kunso predicts failure perfectly and it is dropped 
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Table 6-4: Estimation of propensity scores for investment in multiple cropping 
Multiple 
Cropping 
Coefficient Std. Err. Z-value Probability 
Ditches 0.303 0.149 2.03 0.043 
Fert 0.552 0.151 3.66 0.000 
Manure 0.413 0.214 1.93 0.054 
Pltsize 0.042 0.029 1.43 0.152 
Pltsize2_100 -0.026 0.075 -0.34 0.734 
Pltforest -0.035 0.136 -0.26 0.798 
Age -0.004 0.006 -0.81 0.415 
Education 0.109 0.169 0.64 0.519 
HH-size 0.021 0.035 0.61 0.545 
Bike -0.245 0.142 -1.72 0.085 
Fridge 0.397 0.214 1.86 0.063 
Distm 0.089 0.025 3.58 0.000 
Educ_Distm -0.057 0.021 -2.70 0.007 
Safe -0.112 0.231 -0.49 0.627 
Moconstr -0.049 0.062 -0.78 0.435 
Lvstckvlue 0.007 0.005 1.22 0.221 
Kintampo -0.061 0.362 -0.17 0.865 
Kunso -1.001 0.425 -2.36 0.019 
Badukrom -0.304 0.374 -0.81 0.416 
Awaropat -0.875 0.351 -2.49 0.013 
Twimea 0.464 0.438 1.06 0.289 
Constant -0.013 0.455 -0.03 0.978 
Observations 462    
Pseudo R2 0.177    
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7 Participation in off-farm activities 
7.1 Introduction 
Given the results of the investment specification in Chapter 3, indicating off-farm work and farm 
work to be interrelated and distinct by type of activity, it is imperative to gain deeper insight into 
these interrelationships similar to what has been done with social capital in Chapter 4, after 
having analyzed the interrelations to productivity in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. We determine 
participation in both wage and self-employment, contributing to scarce empirical literature 
differentiating between these two activities and, above all, increasing knowledge about the 
relationship between off-farm work and investment decisions. A better understanding of these 
interrelations is crucial for designing a policy that addresses welfare derived from both farm 
and off-farm activities for each individual. First, we present a review of extant empirical 
literature on the interrelations between participation in off-farm activities and investment on the 
farm and determinants of income diversification. Next, we provide a theoretical framework 
analyzing the decision of the farmer to participate in self-employment and/or wage 
employment. After having outlined the empirical specification, the next sections deal with 
descriptive and empirical results, analyzing the relationship between participation in off-farm 
work and investment and participation in self-employment and wage employment. 
7.2 Literature review 
7.2.1 Off-farm activities and investment in soil conservation measures 
Off-farm activities constitute an important aspect in the life of farmers, and omission of these 
when analyzing soil conservation measures could possibly lead to incorrect conclusions 
(Barrett et al., 2005).  
Progress in off-farm work ought to complement progress in agriculture as both are inter-related 
and inter-dependent (Owusu et al., 2011). Reardon et al. (1994) rightly note that income from 
off-farm activities can be used to either hire labor or purchase farm technology that, itself, is a 
substitute for labor. In addition, working off-farm can be positively associated with more access 
to information concerning investment options (Wollni et al., 2010). Agriculture, however, can 
only benefit from off-farm activities in cases where income obtained is actually used for 
investment in agriculture, and resources are not divided up at the expense of agriculture. 
Participation in off-farm activities also implies a withdrawal of family labor from the farm, and 
income might rather be used for consumption or investment in off-farm activities (Pfeiffer et al., 
2009). Hence, the influence of off-farm work on investment decisions cannot be stated a priori 
(Amsalu and Graaff, 2007). 
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Still, Taylor and Martin (2001) present the New Economics of Migration based on the 
assumption that off-farm decisions are made by families and not by individuals. Family 
members migrating provide liquidity and insurance overcoming lost labor on the farm. The 
latter can be tested by the effect of off-farm work on labor intensive investments, like building 
ditches. In contrast to this possible negative effect, income is received by migrants having 
better paid jobs. This effect cannot be measured by our data set, still, the higher income 
obtained might lead to an improved liquidity and reduced risk of investments. This can be 
tested empirically by the effect of off-farm work on cost-intensive investments like fertilizer. 
However, they argue that the positive effect of income from off-farm work largely depends on 
the type of investments and local circumstances; investments have to be profitable in order to 
pay-off.  
Some empirical findings concerning the effect of off-farm activities on investment behavior 
indicate a positive influence. An overview of studies having examined the effect of off-farm 
activities on farm activities is provided by Davis et al. (2009). They conclude that there is mostly 
a positive impact of income from off-farm activities on purchased inputs and capital 
investments. Bababunde and Qaim (2010), while focusing on the effect of off-farm income on 
food security and nutrition in Nigeria, provide a chain of possible determinants that explain the 
significant positive effects with a higher off-farm income leading to more investment in fertilizer, 
pesticides, and hiring of farm labor. Oseni and Winters (2009) find a similar effect in Nigeria. 
The amount of crop expenses in general and hiring of labor and purchase of fertilizer, in 
particular, are fostered by participation in off-farm activities. They also explain that making use 
of a dummy variable representing participation in off-farm activities is more suitable than 
applying off-farm income in terms of decisions on the farm since it is the ability of participation 
that allows households to earn income.  
Other empirical studies appear to be showing a negative influence of participation in off-farm 
work on investment on the farm. For instance, Kilic et al. (2009) in a study on Albania find a 
negative relationship. Income from off-farm activities is used as a substitute for farming and 
fewer resources are spent for input purchase and household farm labor. The study by Pfeiffer 
et al. (2009) on Mexico is partly in line with these results. They also reveal a negative effect on 
family labor resources, due to income obtained from off-farm employment. However, they 
observe a shift to input-intensive agricultural production, as more farm inputs are purchased 
by relaxed liquidity constraints. Huang et al. (2009) also observe a trade-off between allocation 
of labor to off-farm activities and agricultural production in China. The share of the household’s 
time allocated to off-farm employment in 2001 negatively influenced the area planted with fruits 
five years later. Moreover, no positive effect on capital and labor intensities could be revealed. 
Deininger and Olinto (2001) analyze the influence of specialization of both farm and off-farm 
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activities on returns to labor, with households being engaged in multiple income-generating 
strategies obtaining lower returns to labor. They identify specialization by interacting labor 
supply with a binary variable that is equal to one, in case the household specializes, and zero 
otherwise, while returns to labor are estimated by total household expenditure as a proxy for 
household income. 
Empirical analyses on the effect of off-farm activities on soil conservation measures are rare 
with ambiguous results concerning the influence of income diversification. The study by Holden 
et al. (2004) on Ethiopia, applies bio-economic modeling and analyzes conservation measures. 
They discovered that improved access to off-farm activities does reduce households’ 
incentives to invest in conservation measures, enhancing soil erosion and land degradation. 
Thus, improved access to off-farm activities reduces resources spent on investments that are 
sustainable. Amsalu and Graaff (2007) investigate the determinants of investment in stone 
terraces and their continued use in Ethiopia by means of a bivariate probit model. Participation 
in off-farm work appears to be negatively associated with both adoption and continued use, 
the latter being significant. They argue that short-term benefits derived from off-farm work 
seem to be more attractive than long-term benefits, due to investment in conservation 
measures. This type of argument is also enforced by study results of Tenge et al. (2004) on 
Tanzania. Participation in off-farm activities is negatively and significantly associated with 
investment in soil and water conservation measures. However, in the study by Jara-Rojas et 
al. (2013), participation in off-farm work is not significantly related to investment in soil and 
water conservation measures in Chile, estimated by a bivariate probit model. On the other 
hand, Marenya and Barrett (2007) in their study on Kenya, reveal off-farm income is positively 
associated with investment in several natural resource management measures, such as 
agroforestry and application of chemical fertilizer, determined by means of a multivariate probit 
model. They state cash income is crucial for hiring labor and purchase fertilizer, which is not 
given by farm income alone. 
A number of studies analyzing the relationship between off-farm activities and investment 
behavior on the farm applied instrumental variable approaches (see Kilic et al., 2009; Oseni 
and Winters, 2009; Pfeiffer et al., 2009). Participation in off-farm activities might be subject to 
endogeneity due to unobservable characteristics that influence both the decision to participate 
in off-farm work and the decision to invest. Possible unobservables might be ability or 
entrepreneurship (Kilic et al., 2009). Instruments that have been applied to control for possible 
endogeneity of off-farm activities are very specific to the study area, such as foreign language 
knowledge and migration networks (Oseni and Winters, 2009). Pfeiffer et al. (2009) use, apart 
from migration networks and distance to the U.S. border, the instrument ‘ratio of nonagricultural 
employment to economically active population’, in order to account for employment 
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possibilities at the municipality level in Mexico, which is closely related to nonagricultural wage 
income.  
7.2.2 Participation in off-farm activities 
Determinants of income diversification are generally differentiated into push and pull factors. 
Push factors are a result of missing income opportunities in agriculture since risk ought to 
spread by income diversification to compensate for income shocks ex post due to unforeseen 
failure and long-term constraints. Pull factors are also linked to some type of self-insurance, 
for risk is mitigated ex ante by deciding for an activity portfolio that is either low or negatively 
linked. Pull factors can be observed with a growing agricultural sector that provides beneficial 
linkages to the off-farm sector, such as provision of inputs and services for the farm sector 
(Ellis, 2000; Barrett et al., 2001; Haggblade et al., 2010). Thus, household’s labor allocation to 
off-farm activities is driven by either productivity of agriculture being insufficient or relative 
returns outside agriculture being higher (Reardon, 1997). 
Heterogeneous constraints and incentives have been considered in explaining the decision to 
participate in off-farm activities with household characteristics, such as availability of labor, 
money, and endowments, property rights in land and livestock and individual characteristics, 
like education (Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Barrett et al., 2005), as main determinants. 
Within off-farm activities, it is differentiated between high-return and low-return activities, where 
for the first access it is facilitated by monetary means (household income), access to markets 
and social interaction (Barrett et al., 2005). 
Size and structure of the household influences the ability to diversify income (Reardon, 1997). 
A larger household size, especially the number of adults, is positively related to participation in 
off-farm work. Having a larger family size implies more adults still stay at the farm to meet the 
respective labor demands or they are driven into off-farm activities due to land constraints 
(Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Lay et al., 2008). The number of children indicates the number 
of dependents that might influence participation in off-farm activities negatively, especially for 
women (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999). 
Endowments and access to monetary means are related to participation in off-farm work in 
diverse ways. Land owned is a common determinant used, accounting for labor abundance 
and wealth (Abdulai and CroleRees; 2001; Barrett et al., 2005). Off-farm activities linked to 
capital needed are more likely with households that have greater assets, such as land and 
livestock, whereas poorer households without noteworthy assets are more associated with 
lower-paid farm work (Reardon, 1997). Generally, those less favored in social and economic 
terms are less prone to high-return off-farm activities (Barrett et al., 2001). However, valuable 
assets can reduce the likelihood of participation in off-farm work, since these function as a 
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proper source of income (Verpoorten, 2009). Deininger and Olinto also reveal asset ownership, 
such as land and livestock as a promoter of specialization in either farm or off-farm work in 
Colombia by making use of a probit regression. Assets serve as a self-insurance reducing the 
need to diversify. Land size owned is also negatively associated with participation in local off-
farm activities in a cross-country analysis by Matusmoto et al. (2006) estimated by means of a 
multinominal probit model. Access to credit determines off-farm decisions differently. Lack of 
access to credit drives farmers into off-farm activities to obtain cash, as a substitute for credit, 
whereas access to credit can be a crucial factor in setting up a self-employed business 
(Reardon, 1997; Ellis, 2000; Escobal, 2001). 
Individual determinants are mainly human capital, age, and gender. Human capital is coined 
as one major predictor of participation in off-farm activities. Education raises the likelihood to 
participate, mostly in those with higher returns, and also the supply of labor to off-farm activities 
(Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Barrett et al., 2001; Escobal, 2001; Jolliffe, 2004). Jolliffe (2004) 
in her study on Ghana shows that the average level of education of the household strongly 
supports both off-farm labor supply and off-farm profit. Age determines income diversification 
in a complex way. According to Abdulai and CroleRees (2001), at younger ages an increase in 
age increases the probability to participate in off-farm work, albeit with a certain maximum. In 
addition, a difference in access to off-farm activities by gender, especially in those with high-
returns, has been outlined with women being disadvantaged. Women, mainly by being 
assigned duties at home, are restricted in their possibilities to participate in off-farm activities 
away from home. Social capital, as one attribute of the farmer, can also be beneficial in entering 
off-farm business (Ellis, 2000; Barrett et al., 2001). 
Other influential factors, which are neither controlled by the individual farmer nor are different 
across each individual farmer, have been outlined within the literature. Agroclimatic zones are 
perceived as important for explaining participation (see Reardon, 1997). Yet, according to the 
study by Yamono and Kijma (2010), soil fertility variables appear to be no significant 
determinants of off-farm income in Uganda. In addition, local conditions, such as infrastructure, 
population density and close distance to the market/city, are supposed to affect the capacity of 
farmers to shift from farm business to income diversification positively due to a reduction in 
various transaction costs (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Atamanov and van den Berg, 2012). 
For example, Matsumoto et al. (2006) reveal a larger distance to the market to be negatively 
associated with participation in local off-farm activities in Kenya, and link this result to the local 
labor market, which is thinner in remote areas. However, Yamono and Kijma (2010) do not find 
a meaningful relationship between market access and off-farm income in Uganda. They 
explain the insignificant effect in the tobit model by most local off-farm activities. 
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Having outlined main determinants of income diversification, we shed light on the fact that off-
farm activities are a heterogeneous concept; diverse types differ in their characteristics and 
determinants, especially self-employment and wage employment (Woldenhanna and Oskam, 
2001; Joliffe, 20144). Thus, by aggregating off-farm activities to one concept these differences 
are not observable (Barrett et al., 2001; Woldenhanna and Oskam, 2001). Aggregating self-
employment and wage employment comes at the cost of neglecting that self-employment is 
related to entrepreneurship and the latter not (Joliffe, 2004). Some empirical studies have 
disaggregated off-farm activities according to the type of activity, such as self-employment and 
wage employment. Those have determined participation in off-farm activities by binary choices, 
or the extent of activity by income or income shares (see e.g. Escobal, 2001; Ruben and van 
den Berg, 2001; Woldenhanna and Oskam, 2001; Isgut, 2004; Atamanov and van den Berg, 
2012). Atamanov and van den Berg (2012) apply a multivariate probit model for explaining 
participation in different off-farm activities in the Kyrgyz Republic, due to choices to participate 
being related. 
Extant empirical studies distinguishing among different types of off-farm activities, i.e. self-
employment and wage employment, differ in their views about the two activities. Woldenhanna 
and Oskam (2001), when applying a multinomial logit model, find that self-employment is 
preferred over wage employment in Ethiopia, as the latter is indicated to be an activity 
determined by push factors, while self-employment is an activity linked to high returns. This 
finding is consistent with the observation by Bundervoet (2010) on Burundi, where unskilled 
wage employment is characterized by certain, yet low, income, whereas self-employment 
implies higher income, although with higher capital investment needed. Cunguara et al. (2011) 
also point out entry barriers with respect to self-employment in Mozambique, based on a 
positive effect of livestock on income obtained from self-employment. However, in a study on 
Honduras, self-employment is also related to females irrespective of education, where 
education plays a role in wage employment (Ruben and van den Berg, 2001). Another study 
by Escobal (2001) on Peru reveals that education is positively associated with both self-
employment and wage employment, whereas the latter only holds on the premise of excluding 
working on another farm. With this category excluded, Isgut (2004) notes self-employment is 
less profitable than off-farm wage employment in Honduras. Lanjouw and Murgai (2009) find 
little evidence of a strong relationship between education and self-employment in India, by 
analyzing National Sample Survey data over time and using several multinomial logit models. 
The missing relationship is reasoned due to high heterogeneity of self-employment activities. 
Cunguara et al. (2011), additionally, differentiate between types of wage and self-employment 
when analyzing participation in off-farm work in Mozambique. They show a diverse effect of 
education by means of a multivariate sample selection model. Education is positively and 
significantly related to activities outside the farm sector, yet negatively and significantly with 
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participation in unskilled agricultural wage activities. According to these results, education also 
influences income obtained from skilled nonagricultural activities. A review of studies on Africa, 
by Reardon (1997), indicates a slightly higher share of income obtained by wage employment, 
compared to self-employment emphasizing the equal importance of wage employment. 
As outlined above, empirical literature suggests that self-employment and wage employment 
are two diverse types of activity (Jolliffe, 2004), and we also assume determinants of these 
activities to be diverse, shedding light on the distinct nature of these two activities. In particular, 
this is an extension to the study by Jolliffe (2004) on Ghana disaggregating self-employment 
and wage employment. 
7.3 Conceptual framework 
For analyzing the decision of the farmer to participate in off-farm activities, it is necessary to 
decide on either separability or nonseparability. The first concept implies that agricultural 
production of the household and consumption decisions are independent of each other (see 
Rosenzweig, 1980). The decision of the household concerning production and consumption 
can be analyzed in two stages. The farm household maximizes profits from agricultural 
production, subject to production constraints, and its full income constraint, with farm profits 
included, is part of its utility maximization from consumption. Market wages reflect the value of 
family labor exogenously. Family labor supply is only influenced by production decisions since 
changes in farm profits exert an income effect (Skoufias, 1994; Abdulai and Regmi, 2000). 
This assumption implies perfect labor markets, perfect substitutability of family and hired labor, 
no transaction costs and production decisions of the household, not being influenced by 
preferences (Bardhan and Udry, 1999: 7; Abdulai and Regmi, 2000).  
Nonseparability arises due to imperfect markets, since hiring labor on the farm and 
participation in off-farm activities is subject to constraints. Family and hired labor differ in their 
efficiency, and preferences of the farmer influence the decision to work on and off-farm (Lopez, 
1986; Singh et al., 1986; Deolalikar and Vijverberg, 1987; Benjamin, 1992). With market failure, 
labor is nontradable for some households, for the price is determined internally and not by the 
market (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995: 150). As a result, the decision to work off-farm and to what 
extent is not independent of labor requirements of the farm. Barrett et al. (2008) even indicate 
that in the face of various market failures the decision of households deviates from the 
respective equilibrium in a predictable manner due to risk, transaction costs, and preferences. 
The shadow wage, instead of the market wage, determines the respective decisions of the 
household that is the price that would equalize supply and demand of the farmer in case of 
market existence. The shadow wage is an endogenous function of characteristics and 
preferences of the household, production technology, fixed inputs and market prices (Singh et 
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al., 1986; Jacoby, 1993; Barrett et al., 2008). Nonseparability implies that exogenous factors 
influencing agricultural production choices also influence labor supply of the household. One 
can distinguish between direct effects that happen through changes in the households’ shadow 
profits, and indirect effects that happen through changes in the shadow wages of labor of the 
family. The latter effect only occurs in a nonseparable model (Skoufias, 1994; Abdulai and 
Regmi, 2000). 
A unitary household model is used. The household allocates time among leisure, farm work 
and off-farm work that is self-employment and wage employment42. The farm household is 
assumed to maximize utility (7-1) over consumption of goods and leisure: 
max U = U(C; Zu)                                                                                                                 (7-1) 
where U is the farm household’s utility function, the vector C summarizes manufactured goods 
and home-produced goods (Cc) and leisure (Cl)  and Zu are exogenous utility shifters 
(individual and household characteristics). We assume goods produced on the farm and goods 
that are purchased are perfect substitutes. The utility function of the household is assumed to 
be monotone, increasing and concave in each of its arguments, and twice differentiable.  
The technology of farm production is given by a twice differentiable, concave production 
function:  
Y = Y(X, R, Zy)                                                                                                                      (7-2) 
where Y is the output produced on the farm, the vector X consists of variable inputs Xv, family 
farm labor Xl
f and hired labor Xh, R is a vector of fixed factors such as capital and land, and Zy 
are exogenous production shifters (household characteristics). 
The farm household is subject to a time constraint:  
Tt = Xl
f + Xl
s + Xl
w + Cl                                                                                                         (7-3) 
where Tt is total time available, Xl
s is time allocated to self-employment in case the farmer is 
self-employed, and Xl
w is time allocated to wage employment in case the farmer participates 
in wage employment, Xl
f and Cl are defined as above. Since the farmer might not participate in 
self-employment and/or wage employment, but cannot work less than zero hours off-farm and 
also on the farm, we impose a nonnegativity constraint on Xl
f, Xl
s and Xl
w that is: 
 
42 Even if in the data set there is only a small number of farmers (5) that participates in self-employment and wage 
employment at the same time, farmers have the possibility to participate in both types. 
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Xl
f, Xl
s, Xl
w ≥ 0.                                                                                                                      (7-4) 
Next, the farmer is subject to a budget constraint, indicating that total expenditure of the farmer 
(left-hand side) must not exceed his total income (right-hand side): 
PcCc ≤ PyY(∙)-PvXv-WhXh + WsXl
s + WwXl
w + E                                                                     (7-5) 
where Pc is the price of consumption goods purchased in the market, Py is the farm output price 
and Pv is the price of variable inputs used for agricultural production. From agricultural income, 
in addition to variable input costs, hired labor costs, indicated by the amount of hired labor Xh 
and its respective wage rate Wh, are subtracted. The household’s income is accumulated by 
time allocated to self-employment multiplied by the wage Ws and time allocated to wage 
employment multiplied by the wage Ww. The vector E represents non-labor income such as 
transfers, land rent and assets not related to farming. Equation 7-6 indicates the sum of 
incomes with costs already subtracted,  IA is farm income, IW income from wage employment, 
IS income from self-employment and IO other income. 
Substituting (7-3) and (7-4) into (7-5) it follows: 
PcCc + WCl ≤ PyY(∙)-PvXv-WhXh + WTt + E.                                                                          (7-6) 
The so-called ‘full-income’ constraint states that the value of consumption of both goods and 
leisure must not exceed the value of household’s endowments with farm profits included 
(Bardhan and Udry, 1999: 9). 
The household’s decision problem can be formulated by making use of equation (7-1), (7-3) 
and (7-5): 
L(∙) = U(C; Zu) + λ(Tt-Xl
f-Xl
s-Xl
w-Cl) + μ(PyY(∙)-PvXv-WhXh + WsXl
s + WwXl
w + E-PcCc)                                                                                               
(7-7) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier linked to the inequality constraints on the work of each labor 
type and μ is the Lagrange multiplier linked to the income inequality constraint. We maximize 
this Lagrangian function L(∙) with respect to Xl
f, Xl
s, Xl
w, Xh and Xf and the multipliers λ and μ: 
δL
δXl
f = -λ + μPy(
δY
δXl
f) = 0                                                                                                          (7-8) 
δL
δXl
i = -λ + μWi = 0, i = s, w                                                                                                  (7-9) 
δL
δXh
= μPy(
 δY
δXh
)-μWh = 0                                                                                                       (7-10) 
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δL
δXv
= μPy(
 δY
δXv
)-μPv = 0                                                                                                       (7-11) 
δL
δλ
= Tt-Xl
f-Xl
s-Xl
w-Cl = 0                                                                                                       (7-12) 
δL
δμ
= PyY(∙)-PvXv-WhXh + WsXl
s + WwXl
w + E-PcCc = 0.                                                        (7-13) 
We can rewrite the first-order conditions (7-8), (7-9), (7-10) and (7-11) to: 
Py(
δY
δXl
f) = (
δU
δCl
)/μ = λ/ μ ≥ Wi,  i = s, w                                                                               (7-14) 
Py(
δY
δXh
) = Wh                                                                                                                        (7-15) 
Py(
 δY
δXv
) = Pv.                                                                                                                        (7-16) 
Equation (7-14) provides conditions for the optimal time allocation for farm work, off-farm work, 
and leisure. A farm household equates the marginal value of leisure with the marginal value of 
farm work and this equalization shall not be smaller than the off-farm wage. The term λ/ μ 
represents the shadow wage that is equal to the market wage in case of complete markets; 
optimal hours of self-employment and wage employment may be above zero (Huffman, 1991: 
96). 
Equation (7-15) suggests that the farm household will hire labor up to the point where the 
marginal product of hired labor is equal to the wage rate, and (7-16) implies that inputs will be 
used up to the point where the marginal product of inputs is equal to the price of inputs. 
The model above assumes complete markets. In addition, production and consumption 
decisions of the household are separable, and the value of marginal product of off-farm labor 
participation by type of off-farm activity is equal to an exogenously determined market wage 
(Singh et al., 1986). As indicated above under nonseparability, the decision to work off-farm 
and to what extent is not independent of labor requirements of the farm and the shadow wage, 
instead of the market wage, determines the labor decisions of the household (Singh et al., 
1986; Jacoby, 1993). Thus, we introduce market failure in the model as a market labor 
constraint: Xl
i ≤ M, where M is the maximum number of hours a farmer can work in the labor 
market. Given this assumption, it follows with i = s, w: 
∂U/∂Cl
∂U/∂Cc
= Wi
*
                                       (7-17) 
Wi >
∂Y
∂Xl
f =
∂Y
∂Xl
i = Wi
* if Xl
i = M                                                            (7-18) 
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Condition (7-17) indicates the equilibrium condition for the households’ utility maximization. 
Households will equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and 
the "shadow wage rate" . Equation (7-18) suggests that the shadow wage will be less than 
the off-farm wage, given labor market is incomplete and off-farm labor constraints are binding. 
Barrett et al. (2008) indicate that the difference between the market wage and the marginal 
revenue product of labor is predictable based on household characteristics and endowments 
that is allocative inefficiency. Therefore, there is a difference between the shadow wage and 
the marginal revenue product of labor being of relevance in the empirical specification. 
Applying nonseparability and making use of a shadow wage, the non-linear budget constraint 
can be replaced by an artificial linear constraint. The household maximization problem of 
equation (7-1) under the linear budget constraint can then be re-written as: 
max U = U(C; Zu)                                                                                     (7-19) 
Rewriting equation (7-6) subject to:  
PcCc + Wi
*Cl ≤ PyY(∙)-PvXv-WhXh + WiXl
i(Z) + E                                                          (7-20) 
where the value of the household’s total consumption of goods and leisure may not exceed 
the household’s total shadow income Y*.   
Structural demand functions for leisure and corresponding structural labor supply function are 
given as with i = s, w: 
Cl
* = Cl(Wi
*, Y*; Z)                                        (7-21) 
Tl
* = Tl(Wi
*, Y*; Z)                             (7-22) 
where Tl
* equals total hours of work of the household in farm and off-farm activities (wage 
and/or self-employment) 
Tl
* = Tt-Cl
* = Xl
f* + Xl
i*  if Xl
i* > 0                                      (7-23) 
Tl
* = Tt-Cl
* = Xl
f*           if  Xl
i* = 0                                                                 (7-24) 
Testing nonseparability 
We assess nonseparability by means of the well-known Benjamin (1992) test for differing 
efficiencies of family and hired labor. The underlying question of this test is whether the 
combination of hired and family labor affects total labor supply on the farm. 
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log L = βlog W* + γlogZ + (1-α)
LH
L
  + ε                                                                              (7-25) 
where L is total labor supply, W* is the shadow wage,  Z are household preferences, and 
LH
L
 is 
the fraction of hired labor on the farm. The objective of testing for differing efficiencies of family 
and hired labor is tested by (1-α) = 0. We account for possible endogeneity of shadow wage 
by applying 2SLS43. 
The test consists of 3 main steps. First, an agricultural production function (Cobb-Douglas) is 
estimated, second the shadow wage is derived (marginal product of labor), third separability is 
tested by estimating farm supply (Skoufias, 1994). We account for possible endogeneity of the 
shadow wage. 
The Cobb-Douglas production function can be found in table 7-1. 
Table 7-1: Cobb-Douglas production function  
  
Independent variables Log of farm output 
    
Log hired labour male hours 0.0663*** 
 (0.023) 
Log hired labour female hours 0.0134 
 (0.030) 
Log family labour male hours 0.042 
 (0.032) 
Log family labour female hours 0.046 
 (0.031) 
Log land size 0.888*** 
 (0.110) 
Log implements 0.188 
 (0.132) 
Livestock dummy 0.368** 
 (0.173) 
Age -0.001 
 (0.004) 
Male 0.239 
 (0.185) 
Education 0.089 
 (0.090) 
Fbo -0.394*** 
 (0.141) 
District -0.548*** 
 (0.154) 
Log Inputs amount* 0.045 
 (0.042) 
Log fertilizer amount* 0.055 
 (0.074) 
Log pesticides amount* 0.122** 
 
43 Information on estimation of shadow wage can be found in the Annex. 
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 (0.052) 
Constant 3.969*** 
 (0.458) 
χ2 -statistic for overidentification 
[p-values] 
 
0.484 
[0.922] 
Observations 375 
Adj. R2 0.398 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*Instrumented, Instruments used are village farm wage rates for male and females, share of land under ownership, 
share of children, share of elderly, distance to the market 
 
Estimation of shadow wage: W* =
∝Ŷ
F
,  
 
where Ŷ is predicted value of outcome and F are total hours of family labor. 
 
The wage might be subject to endogeneity and estimation can be found in the Appendix44.   
Table 7-2: Benjamin test 2SLS 
Independent variables Log Farm labor 
    
Log wage* -0.288*** 
 (0.093) 
Log fertilizer amount 0.272*** 
 (0.065) 
Log Fraction_hlabour -0.055 
 (0.082) 
Share_madults 0.033 
 (0.236) 
Share_fadults 0.111 
 (0.328) 
Share_elderly -0.653 
 (1.102) 
Log Inputs amount 0.039 
 (0.032) 
Log Pesticides amount -0.006 
 (0.065) 
Log Implements 0.154** 
 (0.075) 
Log Land area 0.037*** 
 (0.010) 
Age -0.002 
 (0.004) 
Education -0.106 
 (0.081) 
District 0.027 
 (0.127) 
Constant 4.724*** 
 (0.36) 
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Observations 238 
Adjusted R2 0.285 
Note:* predicted value, Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of the instrumental variable estimation reveal the effect of the fraction of hired labor 
to be insignificant. Therefore, the hypothesis of (1-α) = 0 cannot be rejected implying 
separability. In addition, the other two labor variables share of male adults on the farm and 
share of female adults on the farm are also not significant. The result is in line with the 
assumption of separability applied by Abdulai and Delgado (1999) on farmers in Northern 
Ghana, however, contradictory to the test of separability applied by Jolliffe (2004) on Ghanian 
farmers. Still, Jolliffe (2004) bases her decision on the joint significance of household 
characteristics, neglecting the effect of fraction of hired labor. 
Another test is the one proposed by Le (2010) representing a generalized test on separability 
combining both the Benjamin and Jacoby test (1993) that tests the equality of market wage 
and shadow wage. In this study we also apply the approach of Le’s generalized test in the 
context of Ghana: 
log(pQ/L)=−log(σ) + β log(w) + αZ + ξ                                                                                                                        (7-26) 
 
where (pQ/L)L is value of farm output per labour, w is the market wage and  Z are household 
preferences, The objective of testing for separability is tested by β=1 and α=0.  We account for 
possible endogeneity of market wage by 2SLS. 
Table 7-3: Le’s Generalized test 2SLS 
Independent Variables Log(Value of Output/Farm labour) 
    
Log Wage* 2.588** 
 (0.820) 
Share_elderly 3.556 
 (3.196) 
Share_fadults -0.688 
 (1.062) 
Share_madults 0.334 
 (0.782) 
 (1.580) 
Log Fert_amount -0.029 
 (0.174) 
Log Pest_amount 0.159 
 (0.125) 
Log Inputs_amount 0.044 
 (0.109) 
Log Implements -0.388 
 (0.230) 
Pltsize_all 0.064** 
 (0.027) 
District -0.632 
 (0.419) 
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Constant 0.971 
 (0.759) 
χ2 (4) -statistic [p-value] 4.08 [0.395] 
Observations 369 
Adjusted R2 0.890 
Note:* predicted value; instruments: education, population density poxied by two villages 
kintampo and awaropat (according to Le and Jacoby) ; Standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
The results of the instrumental variable estimation reveal the effect of wage is significantly 
different from 1 and the preference shifters are insignificant. The joint Wald test of β=1 and α=0   
can also not be rejected with the χ2 -statistic of 4.08 [0.395]. The test statistic is smaller than 
the upper critical value of 11.14 and larger than the lower critical value of 0.48. Separability 
requires that the coefficient on log wage is 1 and the coefficients on the preference shifters are 
0. Le’s test is a combination of two individual tests, where the first uses the relationship 
between production decisions and preferences and the second uses the relationship between 
shadow wages and market wages. Le’s test is based on a generalized specification of the 
shadow wage log(w∗) = β log(w) + αA, with w∗ = w under separability (Le, 2010). As indicated 
above in case of nonseparability, the decision to work off-farm and to what extent is not 
independent of labor requirements of the farm and the shadow wage.  
As already indicated, the results are contradictory to Joliffe (2004) in Northern Ghana, 
However, this test has not yet been applied in the respective study and only considers one part 
of separability. Both tests do not reject separability, indicating independence of production and 
consumption decision of rural households in Ghana. 
7.4 Empirical specification 
We want to estimate the decision of the farmer j to participate in self-employment, i = s, and/or 
wage employment, i = w. Following the theoretical model in section 7.3, in case the market 
wage (Wi
m, i = s, w) of a household’s off-farm time is greater than the respective shadow value 
(Wi
r, i = s, w) of time on the farm, we observe positive hours of self-employment (wage 
employment). We define the empirical reservation wage and off-farm wage equations the 
following (Huffman, 1991: 99; Abdulai and Delgado, 1999): 
Wij
r = β1Zrij + εrij , i = s, w                                                                                             (7-27a) 
Wij
m = β2Zmij + εmij , i = s, w                                                                                          (7-27b) 
where Zrij and Zmij  are exogenous explanatory variables (individual and household 
characteristics) that influence reservation and off-farm wages, and εrij   and εmij  are error 
terms. 
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We define an indicator Nij for the farmer j to participate in self-employment (wage 
employment): 
Nij
* = {
1 if Wij
m > Wij
r
0 otherwise
} , i = s, w                                                                                              (7-28) 
Due to εrij   and εmij  being random variables, the probability of participating in self-employment 
(wage employment) for farmer j can be written as: 
𝑝𝑟(𝑁𝑖𝑗
∗ = 1) = 𝑝𝑟(𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑚 > 𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑟) 
= 𝑝𝑟(𝜀𝑟𝑖𝑗  − 𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑗  < 𝛽2𝑍𝑚𝑖𝑗 − 𝛽1𝑍𝑟𝑖𝑗) 
= Fv(βZij)                                                                                                                          (7-29) 
where vij is the difference of  εrij  -εmij  , and βZij of β2Zmij-β1Zrij, and F(∙) is a cumulative 
distribution function for the random variable v. Variables that increase the reservation wage, 
reduce the probability to be engaged in off-farm activities, and variables that increase the off-
farm wage increase the probability to participate in off-farm activities (Huffman, 1991: 99). We 
estimate the probability to be self-employed and the probability to participate in wage 
employment jointly, since these decisions are likely to be interrelated (see Atamanov and van 
den Berg, 2012). For this reason, we account for correlation (ρ) in the unobservable variables 
across the two equations (Wooldridge, 2010: 442). Under the null hypothesis ρ is equal to zero 
and the model comprises independent probit specifications. Separate estimation of these 
equations is provided herein below. However, in case of significance of ρ a bivariate probit 
model shall be used (Greene, 2008: 820). 
7.5 Hypothesis  
Off-farm activities, i.e. self-employment and wage employment, are assumed to exert an 
influence on farmers’ decision to invest in soil conservation measures. These effects can be 
either positive or negative and can vary according to the type of investment (see Davis et al., 
2009). Due to differing natures of self-employment and wage employment (Woldenhanna and 
Oskam, 2001), diverse effects on investment behavior are likely.  
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7.6 Results and discussion  
7.6.1 Descriptive Results 
Table 7-4 presents descriptive statistics of off-farm activities of the farmer. 
Table 7-4: Off-farm activities 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Selfempl 1 if farmer is self-employed, 0 otherwise 0.26 0.42 
Wageempl 1 if farmer participates in wage employment, 0 
otherwise 
0.25 0.43 
Selfhrs Hours spent per day on self-employment 6.55 4.63 
Wagedays Number of days used for wage employment per month 18.03 11.34 
Income_selfempl Income from self-employment in 2009 (GHS) 359.62 855.33 
Income_wage Income from wage employment in 2009 (GHS) 902.77 1140.21 
Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). Exchange rate: €1 = ₵3.6 in 2014 
Source: Survey data 
Out of the 49% of farmers participating in off-farm activities, nearly equal shares are self-
employment and wage employment, with a low share of farmers (5) being engaged in both 
types of off-farm activities. Self-employment includes activities such as selling food, having a 
retail shop or charcoal production, whereas wage employment includes working for private 
employers or government, and working on another farm as hired help. Those who are self-
employed spend an average of nearly seven hours per day at work, indicating a large amount 
of this valuable resource —time— is spent there. Wage employment implies working, on 
average, 18 days per month. For those participating in off-farm activities, income from wage 
employment is highest with on average ₵900 per year, whereas self-employment only 
accounts for an average yearly income of ₵36045. However, for wage-employment we observe 
a high variance, with those working on another farm having the lowest income, and those 
working for the government having well-paid off-farm opportunities. 
In Chapter 3, we included off-farm activities in the investment specification. Now, we want to 
refer to the linkages between participation in off-farm activities and investment in soil 
conservation measures again by means of descriptive statistics and additionally with breaking 
down off-farm activities into self-employment and wage employment. 
 
 
45 Some even made no income, as the costs of the business where higher than income generated. Income 
referred to is net income. 
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Table 7-5: Cross-tabulation self-employment and incidence of investment 
 Ditches 
=0 
Ditches
=1 
Fertilizer
=0 
Fertilizer
=1 
Manure
=0 
Manure
=1 
Mult. Crop. 
=0 
Mult. Crop. 
=1 
Selfempl =0 
Frequency 
Expected 
Frequency 
 
387 
393 
 
192 
186 
 
405 
399 
 
174 
179 
 
494 
487 
 
85 
92 
 
273 
276 
 
308 
305 
Selfempl=1 
Frequency 
Expected 
Frequency 
 
128 
122 
 
51 
57 
 
117 
123 
 
61 
55 
 
143 
150 
 
35 
28 
 
87 
84 
 
91 
93 
 
Table 7-6: Cross-tabulation wage employment and incidence of investment 
 Ditches 
=0 
Ditches
=1 
Fertilizer
=0 
Fertilizer
=1 
Manure
=0 
Manure
=1 
Mult. Crop. 
=0 
Mult. Crop. 
=1 
Wagempl=0 
Frequency 
Expected 
Frequency 
 
401 
412 
 
205 
194 
 
429 
418 
 
177 
188 
 
516 
510 
 
90 
96 
 
290 
288 
 
318 
320 
Wagempl=1 
Frequency 
Expected 
Frequency 
 
114 
103 
 
38 
49 
 
93 
104 
 
58 
47 
 
121 
127 
 
30 
24 
 
70 
72 
 
81 
79 
 
In table 7-5 we observe that those being self-employed are expected to invest less in fertilizer 
and manure when comparing the expected frequencies with what they do underlining the 
positive results of off-farm activities on investment choices in the investment specification. 
Although, labor intensive conservation practices such as ditches and multiple cropping are less 
prevalent with self-employed farmers than expected. In table 7-6, being engaged in 
nonagricultural wage employment and at the same time investing in mineral fertilizer and 
multiple cropping is more often observed than expected. In the investment specification, we 
do find a strong relationship between off-farm activities and investment options. Money earned 
seems to be used for buying fertilizer and crops for multiple cropping. So, we partly reinforce 
the results obtained from the investment specification and shed some more light on the 
complexity of off-farm activities. 
Variables included in the model 
The decision of the farmer to participate in off-farm work is measured by two dummy variables 
that take the value 1 for working off-farm and zero otherwise. Variables included in the model 
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explaining participation in self-employment and wage employment, are based on previous 
research (see section 7.2) and are presented in table 7-5.  
Individual characteristics are included, such as age, years of formal education, and gender. 
Education represents human capital and can be beneficial for both, off-farm activities and farm 
business. Gender reveals differences between the two types of activity and indicates possible 
disadvantages for women (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Ellis, 2000; Ruben and van den Berg, 
2001). Social capital is represented by membership of an fbo. Given the positive effect of an 
fbo on investment behavior of the farmer, the effect on off-farm activities is examined, since 
social capital might enhance access to off-farm activities (Ellis, 2000). Number of people with 
money the farmer knows to get assistance from in cases of need is used to proxy for access 
to monetary means. 
Household characteristics included are size of land the farmer is cultivating, ownership of land, 
value of cattle the farmer owns and household composition. Land size is linked to labor 
abundance. Ownership of land and cattle represent wealth of the farmer, having been pointed 
out to be crucial for access to some types of off-farm activities. Household composition controls 
for the possible role the number of dependents and adults in the household play in decision 
making of the farmer (Reardon, 1997; Barrett et al., 2005; Lay et al., 2008). 
Variables related to location are distance to the market and district of the farmer. The first 
represents possible transaction costs of access to labor and the latter regional labor market 
conditions (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999). 
In the estimation, the problem of omitted variable bias might appear. Variables that are not 
included in the model but are correlated to independent variables produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates. Since we include variables based on previous research and cover a 
wide range of determinants, we can be confident in not being exposed to the problem of 
omitted variable bias. 
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Table 7-7: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Variable definition Mean S.D. 
Dependent variables     
Selfempl 1 if farmer is self-employed, 0 otherwise 0.27 0.44 
Wageempl 1 if farmer participates in wage employment, 0 otherwise 0.25 0.43 
    
Independent variables   
Age Age of farmer (years) 47.36 13.15 
Educyrs Years of formal education of farmer 3.84 4.89 
Male 1 if farmer is male, 0 otherwise 0.85 0.36 
Landsize Size of land farmer is cultivating (acres) 6.95 9.19 
Owner_land 1 if farmer owns (restricted and unrestricted ownership) land, 
0 otherwise 
0.51 0.50 
Children6 Number of children under 6 years old 0.60 0.77 
Children14 Number of children between 6 and 14 years old 2.02 1.50 
HH-size Number of household members above 14 years old 3.58 1.69 
Cattle Value of cattle (GHS*0.01) 2.88 12.74 
Fbo 1 if farmer is member of an fbo, 0 otherwise  0.30 0.46 
Monasall Number of individuals who would assist farmer with money if 
needed 1.22 2.18 
Distm Distance to the nearest market (km) 6.39 4.80 
District 1 if farmer resides in district Kintampo North, 0 Techiman 0.57 0.50 
Observations   326   
Ghanaian Cedis (GHS). Exchange rate: €1 = ₵3.6 in 2014 
Source: Survey data 
7.6.2 Empirical Results 
The results of the maximum likelihood bivariate probit model of the farmer’s decision to 
participate in self-employment and/or wage employment are presented in table 7-8. The 
marginal effects of the regressors on the probability to participate in each type of off-farm 
activity, calculated at the mean of the regressors, are also presented in the table46. We employ 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
The log-likelihood ratio statistic is 65.91 and is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the 
independent variables taken together influence the decision of the farmer to participate in off-
farm activities47. The cross-equation correlation coefficient is -0.628 and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This shows that it is more efficient to estimate the decision to 
participate in both types of off-farm activities jointly, since both decisions are not statistically 
independent. Unobservables that enhance participation in self-employment reduce the 
probability to participate in wage employment 
 
46 The delta method has again been applied to estimate the standard errors, due to nonlinearity of the model. The 
marginal effect is the marginal probability for each outcome only, and not conditional on the other outcome. 
47 We test multicollinearity of the explanatory variables (see table in the Annex), test statistics reveal no problem of 
highly correlated variables. 
171 
 
Table 7-8:  Bivariate probit estimates and marginal effects of decision to work off-farm 
Variables Selfempl Marginal effects Wageempl  Marginal effects 
Age -0.017*** -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Educyrs 0.028* 0.009 0.013 0.004 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) 
Male -0.727*** -0.259 0.822*** 0.189 
 (0.217) (0.078) (0.294) (0.044) 
Landsize -0.010 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) 
Owner_land 0.321* 0.100 -0.113 -0.034 
 (0.168) (0.051) (0.170) (0.050) 
Children6 0.228 0.072 -0.030 -0.009 
 (0.142) (0.045) (0.143) (0.042) 
Children14 -0.064 -0.020 0.030 0.009 
 (0.075) (0.024) (0.071) (0.022) 
HH-size 0.007 0.002 0.017 0.005 
 (0.051) (0.017) (0.052) (0.015) 
Cattle -0.003 -0.001 0.011* 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
Fbo -0.267 -0.080 0.391** 0.123 
 (0.184) (0.051) (0.177) (0.057) 
Monasall 0.081** 0.025 -0.085** -0.025 
 (0.035) (0.001) (0.0426) (0.012) 
Distm -0.001 -0.0004 -0.039** -0.012 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.0193) (0.066) 
District 0.074 0.023 -0.040 -0.012 
 (0.174) (0.053) (0.171) (0.050) 
Constant 0.469  -0.994**  
 (0.459)  (0.480)  
Cross-equation correlation    
ρSW  -0.628***   
Log-likelihood ratio statistica 65.91>χ0.01
2 [26] 
Observations 326  326  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a The log-likelihood ratio statistic is given by LR = 2(LΩ-Lω) where LΩ is the unrestricted maximum 
likelihood and Lω is the restricted maximum likelihood with an asymptotic χ
2(k) distribution where k is 
the number of restrictions. 
Individual characteristics influence the decision of the farmer to participate in off-farm activities. 
The variable age is negative for off-farm activities but only significant for self-employment48, 
according to findings by Ruben and van den Berg (2001) and Lay et al. (2008). Formal years 
 
48 We also test on a possible life cycle effect (see Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001). Since we do not find one, this was 
not included in the model. In addition, ethnicity has been mentioned as one factor explaining participation in non-
farm work (see Abdulai and Delgado, 1999). However, after including ethnic identity with this not significant variable, 
results deteriorated. 
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of education are positively associated with both off-farm activities but only significant for self-
employment, as it has been pointed out by other empirical studies (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; 
Escobal, 2001). Specifically, additional education increases the ‘wage’ for self-employment 
more than it increases the reservation wage for farm activities (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999). 
This is an important finding and reveals that the role of education needs to be analyzed in 
detail and cannot be considered for the aggregate off-farm work as has been done by Jolliffe 
(2004) in Ghana. However, Woldenhanna and Oskam (2001) did not find any significant 
positive effect of education on both types of off-farm activities for Nigeria. This might be due to 
policy and NGO interventions in the off-farm labor market (Berhanu et al., 2007). 
Self-employment is more likely among female farmers and wage employment among male 
farmers. The activities representing self-employment and wage employment seem to differ in 
their gender suitability, with no evidence of women being disadvantaged with respect to off-
farm activities. The findings are consistent with results reported by Ruben and van den Berg 
(2001) for Honduras. 
Assets determine the decision of the farmer to participate in off-farm activities. Ownership of 
land is positively and significantly associated with self-employment, possibly due to wealth that 
is necessary to set up a business. Off-farm activities that are capital intensive are mainly 
undertaken by wealthier households with a stock of assets (Reardon, 1997). The value of 
cattle, the highest value livestock, is positive and significant for wage employment. Wage 
employment covers a broad range of job options, some of them are linked to high income and 
certainly only accessible by wealthier households. The finding is in line with empirical results 
by Lay et al. (2008) in regard to participation in high-return activities in Kenya. However, 
findings by Ruben and van den Berg (2001) suggest livestock limits access to off-farm activities 
on account of the constant care needed. Membership of an fbo is a positive significant predictor 
of wage employment. The fbo might act as a broker in order to find wage employment 
possibilities, especially those working on another farm, enhancing access. 
Access to monetary assistance shows diverse results, as indicated in the literature with respect 
to access to credit (Reardon, 1997; Ellis, 2000). The variable number of people with money 
the farmer knows to get assistance from in case of need, also constituting a social network, 
appears to be positive and significantly different from zero for self-employment due to set-up 
costs. The result is to be compared to Escobal (2001), who similarly finds that access to credit 
facilitates access to self-employment. However, the variable is negative and significant for 
wage employment. Therefore, monetary constraints are overcome and monetary assistance 
is substituted by wage employment. These results underline the categorization of self-
employment and wage employment by Woldenhanna and Oskam (2001). The first is linked to 
high returns and pull factors, whereas the latter is linked to push factors. Yet, the asset cattle 
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that appears to be a positive and significant determinant of wage employment suggests this 
category to be a heterogeneous one. Farm wage employment is used by poor households to 
stabilize income, whereas off-farm wage employment is linked to households that diversify 
income. For that to be feasible, resources need to be available to compensate for the family 
member not working on the farm (Ruben and van den Berg, 2001) 49. 
Demographic variables of the household are not significant determinants of participation in off-
farm activities. Number of children with no negative effect suggests other family members look 
after their children in case the parents spend time off-farm (Matshe and Young, 2004). These 
results are consistent with findings from several other empirical studies (e.g. Abdulai and 
CroleRees, 2001; Lay et al., 2008). 
Location matters for wage employment, distance to the market is negatively and significantly 
associated with wage employment. In less remote areas, off-farm opportunities increase and 
participation is more likely, whereas remote areas increase costs of participation (Abdulai and 
CroleRees, 2001). However, being close to the market also enhances farm profitability, since 
agricultural products can be sold more easily (Lay et al., 2008). The positive significant effect 
on wage employment indicates that the latter effect does not override the first. For self-
employment, distance is not significant and suggests that remoteness is not hindering farmers 
from becoming self-employed, and it is more probable that regional infrastructure plays an 
important role (Canagarajah et al., 2001), due to data limitations not addressed here. The 
same diverse effect for closeness to urban areas on each type of off-farm activity has been 
found by Isgut (2004) for Honduras.  
7.7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter analyzes both the influence of participation in off-farm activities on investment 
behavior, and the determinants of participation in self-employment and wage employment. The 
first objective is analyzed by means of descriptive analysis. Participation in off-farm activities 
is analyzed under the assumption of separability after having tested for the separability 
hypothesis. Self-employment and wage employment are determined by a bivariate probit 
model differing in their determinants. 
The descriptive analysis underlines the results of the investment specification in Chapter 3. 
Self-employment is negatively related to some investment decisions, whereas wage 
employment is positively related to investment decisions. Results of the bivariate probit model 
indicate that younger, female and better educated farmers that own land and receive financial 
 
49 The differentiation between farm wage employment and non-farm wage employment is not feasible, since the 
share of those belonging to the first category is too small to draw inferences from. 
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assistance are more likely to be self-employed. Monetary assistance is negatively associated 
with wage employment, suggesting this activity is one of the means of overcoming cash 
constraints, whereas, in cases of self-employment, it might act as a precondition possibly due 
to start-up costs. However, ownership of cattle significantly increases the likelihood to 
participate in wage employment, which suggests wage employment is a heterogeneous 
concept.  
The empirical findings lend support to the notion that entry barriers exist for both types of off-
farm activities for households that have few, if any, other assets. Membership of an fbo makes 
participation in wage employment more likely, probably due to fbos acting as a broker in order 
to find employment possibilities. A smaller distance to the market has also been found to 
facilitate access to wage employment, which can be explained by more off-farm opportunities 
in less remote areas.  
Information of this chapter is essential for policy makers in order to foster both self-employment 
and wage employment by accounting for interrelations to investment on the farm.  
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Annex  
 
Table 7-1: First – stage estimation shadow wage in order to account for possible endogeneity 
 
Independent variables Shadow wage (predicted value) 
    
Wage_nonfarm_village* -0.660*** 
 (0.210) 
Log fertilizer amount 2.273*** 
 (0.440) 
Log Fraction_hlabour 2.430*** 
 (0.449) 
Share_madults -1.147 
 (2.053) 
Share_fadults -0.0910 
 (2.881) 
Share_elderly 4.953 
 (10.461) 
Log Inputs amount -0.565** 
 (0.277) 
Log Pesticides amount -3.128 
 (0.362) 
Log Implements 0.610 
 (0.642) 
Log Land area 0278** 
 (0.084) 
Age -0.062* 
 (0.036) 
Education -0.719 
 (0.722) 
District 0.325 
 (1.192) 
Constant 9.025*** 
 (02.702) 
  
Observations 238 
Adjusted R2 0.2302 
*average off-farm income on the village level; Benjamin uses population density that is not available 
in our data set, we used in line with Le (10) the commune wage rate. 
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Table 7-2: Variance inflation factors bivariate probit 
Variable VIFa 
Age 1.19 
Educyrs 1.17 
Male 1.06 
Landsize 1.11 
Ownership_land 1.15 
Children6 1.98 
Children14 1.87 
HH-size 1.23 
Cattle 1.05 
Fbo 1.11 
Monasall 1.05 
Distm 1.10 
District 1.21 
Mean VIF 1.25 
aThe VIF is defined as: VIFj =
1
1-Rj
2 where Rj
2 is the R2 belonging to the regression of the jth explanatory 
variable on the remaining explanatory variables 
 
All individual VIF values and the mean VIF are far below 10, a value where one has to worry 
about multicollinearity. 
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8 Conclusions from the study 
8.1 Summary of findings 
Tenure arrangements have gained attention as a way to understand investment in soil 
conservation measures. The presented study provides some important policy implications. We 
observe a negative effect of rentership on investment with positive long-term effects and 
positive effects attributed to the increase in length of time a farmer has been using a plot.  
Providing farmers with secured tenure arrangements and extending temporary rights would 
facilitate investment in soil conservation measures, in turn, increasing agricultural productivity. 
Investment in institutions, such as fbos and extension services, that enhance access to 
information and assistance, and communicate the positive effects of soil conservation 
measures on revenues, could be promising in light of the empirical results.  
The main goal of the study has been to gain insight into the impact of land tenure arrangements 
on farmers’ investment decisions in soil conservation measures. Results of the multivariate 
probit model which explain investment decisions at plot-level, while controlling for endogeneity 
of tenure arrangements, social capital, and off-farm activities, reveal that farmers who rent land 
are less likely to invest in manure, a soil improving investment option with positive long-term 
effects. Farmers on sharecropping contracts and under fixed-rentership are more likely to 
invest in fertilizer, a short-term investment option decreasing soil quality over time. The number 
of years the plot is under use by the cultivator is positively associated with all investment 
options, supporting the notion of tenure security as an important factor when investing in soil 
conservation measures.  
Investment is driven by social networks. Being part of information networks as well as networks 
related to other types of assistance is positively related to nearly all investment options. These 
results are consistent with the theoretical framework which suggests that the positive effect of 
social networks occurs through a reduction in transaction costs.  
Off-farm employment increases the likelihood of investment in fertilizer, manure and multiple 
cropping. Income obtained from off-farm activities might be used to overcome monetary and 
labor constraints, therefore enhancing investment.  
The crucial role of human capital for progress in the agricultural sector is indicated by education 
revealing a nonlinear pattern. 
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Generally, the results support the call for improved tenure security for farmers. This can be 
done in different ways, for example, by land registration programs or offering long-term 
contracts to tenants. Long-term contracts seem to be especially appealing based on our study 
results. The effects of social networks and off-farm work along with statements by farmers 
revealing access to credit and inputs as major obstacles of investment show that several 
factors influence investment. Solving the issue of tenure security alone is not enough. 
Investments in institutions which provide information and social interaction, like fbos or 
extension officers, and in institutions which provide access to credit and off-farm employment, 
need to be considered in order to enhance sustainability in agriculture.  
A descriptive analysis is used to further explore the relationship between social capital and 
investment decisions. Several different types of social capital appear to be positively 
associated with investment in soil conservation measures. Additionally, principal component 
analysis is applied in order to structure constraints on investment of the farmer, assessed by 
a Likert-Scale, and to complement the quantitative analyses. The five extracted components 
represent diverse aspects of the constraints: lack of expertise, liquidity, practical assistance, 
tenure security and profitability of investment. We compare these constraints by different levels 
of social capital and across different tenure arrangements. Social capital is positively linked to 
feeling less constrained. Having trust in the community and participation in several social 
networks is partly negatively associated to different types of constraints. The comparison of 
these components between tenure arrangements reveals differences in constraints. As 
expected, farmers on sharecropped and fixed-rented plots feel more tenure constrained 
compared to farmers on plots that are owner-cultivated. The same relation holds true for 
unprofitable options.  
Plot-level productivity is determined through an instrumental variable approach. We uncover 
no evidence that both tenure arrangements and social capital are significant determinants of 
productivity. Having a mobile phone increases productivity, which indicates the relevance of 
communication in raising productivity. Individual and household characteristics only matter to 
a minor extent for productivity. Credit is no significant determinant of productivity, which might 
be due to the low number of observations of farmers having access to credit. A household 
fixed effects model has also been applied, in order to control for unobservables at the 
household-level influencing productivity. However, tenure arrangements, again, do not 
significantly influence productivity. 
The impact of investment on plot-level productivity is examined by the non-parametric 
approach, propensity score matching, in order to account for selectivity bias. Estimates reveal 
that investment in ditches, fertilizer and multiple cropping, significantly increase revenues per 
acre on plot. The effect of investment in manure is positive, but insignificant. 
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The decision of the farmer to participate in self-employment and wage employment is 
determined by a bivariate probit model. Self-employment and wage employment differ in their 
determinants. Results indicate that younger, female and better educated farmers that own land 
and receive financial assistance are more likely to be self-employed. Monetary assistance is 
negatively associated with wage employment, suggesting this activity is one of the means of 
overcoming cash constraints. However, ownership of cattle significantly increases the 
likelihood to participate in wage employment, which indicates wage employment is a 
heterogeneous concept. These findings lend support to the notion that entry barriers exist for 
both types of off-farm activities for households that have few assets. Membership of an fbo 
makes participation in wage employment more likely, probably due to an fbo acting as a broker 
in order to find employment possibilities. A smaller distance to the market has also been found 
to facilitate access to wage employment, which can be explained by more off-farm 
opportunities in urban areas. 
8.2 Conclusions and policy implications 
Tenure arrangements are a significant driver of investment decisions and secured tenure 
arrangements would foster sustainable growth in agriculture. Extending temporary rights would 
facilitate investment, as the years the plot is under use by the cultivator increases likelihood to 
invest in soil conservation measures. 
Similarly, social capital is positively associated with investment. Hence, promoting soil 
conservation measures might provide a leverage point to policy makers. One option is 
investment in institutions facilitating information and assistance, for instance helping farmers 
building fbos. 
Off-farm activities do influence investment decisions positively, there is further need to analyze 
the effect of these activities in different parts of the population in order to build the right 
incentive structures. While education is only positive and significant above the average number 
of years of education, it still underpins the crucial role of human capital. Investment in education 
provides a payoff in the form of decision making on the farm. 
Taking into consideration the results of the impact analysis, those farmers investing on their 
plot and in measures with long-term effects do obtain higher revenues than those who do not 
invest. These results can be used as a powerful message to communicate to farmers. Given 
the positive influence of social capital, this could be achieved by means of social networks like 
fbos or also just within farmer communities. Social networks can facilitate spreading the 
positive effects of soil conservation measures. 
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The determinants of self-employment and wage employment show that human capital is also 
important for access to off-farm work, especially self-employment. Since for both types of off-
farm activities, the ownership of assets enhances participation, access to off-farm activities 
could be facilitated for those with few assets. One way could be improved education in order 
to compensate for limited capital ownership. Results clearly suggest that access to monetary 
means fosters self-employment participation, which brings the relevance of credit access to 
the fore. Qualitative analysis suggests a widespread lack of access to credit. Provision of 
monetary means on a small-scale, for example through microcredit, could be a way to stimulate 
both investment and productivity on the farm as well as participation in off-farm activities, given 
this makes sense from a macroeconomic perspective. 
8.3 Suggestion for future research 
 
Investment decisions should not only be viewed from the economic perspective. One fruitful 
collaboration would be a project with agricultural science to go into detail with respect to 
biophysical processes. Investment in soil conservation measures could be optimized by 
viewing it from different relevant perspectives and with different expertise. 
Tenure arrangements should be analyzed over a period of time. The theoretical framework for 
investment is based on a dynamic perspective, yet cross-sectional data is used due to time 
and resource constraints. In order to assess the effects of tenure over time, panel data would 
be best.  
Future research should focus on the amount of investment in determining the effect of land 
tenure arrangements. It is crucial to understand the effect of tenure, not only on the decision 
to invest, but to also whether the investment was optimal. The theoretical framework captures 
the amount of investment, yet in the empirical analysis only binary data is used.  
Social capital linked to access to information turned out to be crucial for investment. Further 
research is needed to analyze the economic impacts of social learning and how to leverage it 
best. Detailed information on flows of information and social interaction connected to it would 
be beneficial in setting-up the right social structures for social learning. 
With respect to determinants of off-farm activities, infrastructure and location have been proven 
to be important. However, data about infrastructure and location was limited within the data set 
since this was not the main focus of the study. Concentrating on off-farm activities, additional 
locational information would probably assist in explaining the decision of the farmer to be 
engaged in off-farm activities. 
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Macroeconomic research is needed to understand the implications of, on the one hand 
increasing off-farm activities off-farm activities growing, and on the other hand the need for 
sustainable growth in agriculture. Research needs to focus on understanding how to 
incentivize different parts of the population in different ways to sustainably grow agriculture 
while growing the overall economy at the same time. 
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Annex 
 Field Questionnaire 
 
Section 1 Personal History 
 
1.1. Personal characteristics 
1 Serial number of household head Male  Female 
 
 
  
2 Position in household (A)   
3 What ethnic group do you belong? (B)   
4 Religion   
5 Hometown   
6 District of hometown   
7 Place of residence (village)   
8 District of residence   
9 Years of residence in the village   
10 Distance to the nearest market   
11 Age (yrs)   
12 Where born (C)   
13 Education level (D)   
* Interview both husband and wife if needs be.                                     
 
1.2. Household characteristics  
1 Number of household members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2 List and indicate position of all 
permanent household members 
residing with you now (E) 
        
3 Age (yrs)         
4 Education level (Same as D)         
5 What job is he/she engaged in 
now?(F) 
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Section 2. Plot-level Characteristics 
2.1. Current plot characteristics 
1 Plot number P01 P02 P03 P04 P05 P0
6 
2 Vegetation (01=forest, 
02=savanna) 
      
3 What is the size of plot (acres)       
4 Distance of  plot from home (km)*         
5 What is the means of transportation 
to plot (01=walk, 02=bicycle, 
03=motor bike,04= car)? 
      
6 Type of slope (G)       
7 Indicate the expected soil quality 
by ranking  them (H) 
      
8 What is the nature of soil on your 
plot? 
(01= sand, 02=clay, 03=loam, 04= 
sandy loam, 05=other (specify)? 
      
* For both tenant and landlord. 
2.2. Tenure arrangements and duration on plot   
1 Plot number P01 P02 P03 P04 P0
5 
P0
6 
 Are you a tenant or an owner? (1= 
tenant, 2 =owner) 
      
 If owner, how many plots do you 
own?  
      
 How did you become the owner? (I)       
 How many plots have you released 
to tenants? 
      
 How many plots are you cultivating 
this year? 
      
 Who inherits the plot (s) when you 
pass away? (J) 
      
2 What tenure contract exists 
between you and your 
landowner/tenant? (K) 
      
 Is it a paper contract? (1=yes, 
2=no) 
      
3 If share 
cropping, 
indicate 
following 
detailed 
agreements 
How long have you 
cultivated this plot?  
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What is the contract 
duration on plot if 
any (years)? 
      
 
 
Have you 
renewed 
the 
contract 
on plot 
before? 
1=yes, 
2=no 
      
 
 
 
If yes, 
how 
many 
times 
have 
you 
renewe
d the 
contract 
on plot? 
      
 
 
How are costs of 
inputs (seeds, 
fertilizer) shared 
between you and 
your 
landowner/tenant? 
(L) 
      
 
 
Do you 
prevent 
your tenant 
(Are you 
prevented 
by your 
landowner) 
from 
planting 
any 
particular 
tree or crop 
on plot?   
1=yes, 
2=no 
      
 
 
 
If yes, 
why 
the 
restrict
ions? 
 
4 If rented 
(hired) land, 
indicate the 
following  
detailed 
agreements 
Duration of tenure 
on plot (years) 
      
 
 
How long have you 
cultivated this plot? 
      
 
 
Amount 
paid/collected 
(GH¢). 
      
209 
 
 
 
Are you 
restricted 
from 
planting 
any 
particular 
tree or 
crop on 
plot? 
1=yes, 
2=no 
      
 
 
 
If yes, 
why the 
restricti
ons? 
 
5 If taungya, 
indicate the 
following  
detailed 
agreements 
Duration of tenure 
on plot (years) 
      
 
 
How long have you 
cultivated this plot? 
      
NB: Please ask questions on tenants and owners differently. 
 
2.3. Previous plot characteristics 
1 Plot number P01 P02 P03 P04 P0
5 
P06 
2 What was the nature of vegetation 
before you started farming on the 
land?  (1=forest, 2=savanna) 
      
3 How long have you cultivated the 
plot since acquisition? 
      
4 Was the 
plot under 
fallow 
before you 
started 
using it? 
 
 
 
 
1=yes, 2=no       
 
 
If yes, how long was 
the plot put to fallow 
before you started 
cultivating it?   
      
 If no, how long has the 
plot been put to use 
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 before you started 
cultivating it? 
 
 
Crops grown on plot 
before you started 
using it? (M) 
      
5 Were there 
trees on the 
plot when 
you started 
using it? 
1=yes, 2=no       
 
 
If yes, what type of 
trees? (N) 
      
6 Have you 
cut some 
trees since 
you started 
farming on 
the plot?    
1=yes, 2=no       
 
 
If yes, approximately 
how many trees have 
you removed from 
the plot? 
      
 
2.4. Investments on Plots 
1 Plot number P01 P02 P03 P04 P05 P06 
2 Are you aware of any soil 
conservation method? 
(1=yes, 2=no) 
      
(i) What method do you use in 
controlling soil erosion on 
your plot? (O)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 How long have you 
practiced this erosion 
control method? 
      
 What quantity of 
investments have you 
undertaken on plot  
(in GH¢)? 
      
(ii) What agronomic method 
do you use on your plot? 
(P)  
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 How long have you 
practiced this agronomic 
method? 
      
 What quantity of 
investments have you 
undertaken on plot 
(in GH¢)? 
      
(iii) What soil management 
practice do you use on your 
plots? (Q)   
      
 How long have you 
practiced this soil 
management method? 
      
 What quantity of 
investments have you 
undertaken on plot  
(in GH¢)? 
      
(iv) What cultivation method 
do you practice on your 
plot? (R)  
      
 How long have you practiced 
this cultivation method? 
      
 What quantity of 
investments have you 
undertaken on plot  
(in GH¢)? 
      
3  Have you planted trees on            
your plot (s)? (1= yes, 2= no) 
     
 Area (acres) planted with 
trees? 
      
  What types of trees have 
you planted? (Same as N)  
      
  What year did you plant the 
trees? 
      
  What are the most important 
reasons for planting the tree 
(S) 
      
  How were seedlings 
obtained? (T) 
      
  How do you maintain the 
trees? (U) 
      
 
2.5. Future investments on plot (in five years time)   
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plot 
No. 
No. of 
years 
you 
intend 
using 
plot 
What land 
preparation 
techniques would 
you adopt when 
the tenure on plot 
is renewed? 
What crops are you 
going to cultivate in 
case you decide to 
renew your tenure on 
plot? 
How are you 
going to restore 
fertility on plot 
when you decide 
to renew your 
tenure? 
P01     
P02     
P03     
P04     
P05     
P06     
 
2.6. Land Preparation 
plot 
No. 
Do you 
practice slash 
and burn?  
(1=yes,2=no) 
Mention any other 
land preparation 
method you use 
on your plots? 
Do you intercrop 
or rotate your 
crops with 
legumes?  
(1=yes, 2=no) 
Mention other 
farming systems 
you have been 
using on plot. 
P01     
P02     
P03     
P04     
P05     
P06     
 
 
 
2.7. Input Use 
plot 
No. 
Major rainy season (2009) Minor rainy season (2009) 
Input   
(V) 
Quantity 
(units) 
Amount 
paid (GH¢) 
Type of 
input  (V) 
Quantity 
(units) 
Amount 
paid (GH¢) 
213 
 
P01       
P02       
P03       
P04       
P05       
P06       
 
2.8.1 Hired Labor Input (Adult male)  
Major rainy season (March-July, 2009) 
plot 
No. 
Land 
Preparation 
Sowing Weed Control Harvesting  
No   Days Wage  No    Days Wage  No    Days Wage  No   Days Wage  
P01             
P02             
P03             
P04             
P05             
P06             
Minor rainy season (September-November, 2009) 
plot 
No. 
Land 
Preparation 
Sowing Weed Control Harvesting  
No   Days Wage  No    Days Wage  No    Days Wage  No   Days Wage  
P01             
P02             
P03             
P04             
P05             
P06             
Note: Wages in GH¢ 
 
2.8.2 Hired Labor Input (Adult female) 
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Major rainy season (March-July, 2009) 
plot 
No. 
Land 
Preparation 
Sowing Weed Control Harvesting  
No   Days Wage  No    Days Wage  No    Days Wage  No   Days Wage  
P01             
P02             
P03             
P04             
P05             
P06             
Minor rainy season (September-November, 2009) 
plot 
No. 
Land 
Preparation 
Sowing Weed Control Harvesting  
No   Days Wage  No    Days Wage  No    Days Wage  No   Days Wage  
P01             
P02             
P03             
P04             
P05             
P06             
 
2.8.3. Family Labor Input (Adult male) 
Major rainy season (March-July, 2009) 
plot 
No. 
Land 
Preparation 
Sowing Weed Control Harvesting  
No Days No Days No Days No Days 
P01         
P02         
P03         
P04         
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P05         
P06         
Minor rainy season (September-November, 2009) 
plot 
No. 
Land 
Preparation 
Sowing Weed Control Harvesting  
No Days No Days No Days No Days 
P01         
P02         
P03         
P04         
P05         
P06         
 
2.8.4. Family Labor Input (Adult female) 
Major rainy season (March-July, 2009) 
plot 
No. 
Land 
Preparation 
Sowing Weed Control Harvesting  
No Days No Days No Days No Days 
P01         
P02         
P03         
P04         
P05         
P06         
Minor rainy season (September-November, 2009) 
plot 
No. 
Land 
Preparation 
Sowing Weed Control Harvesting  
No Days No Days No Days No Days 
P01         
P02         
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P03         
P04         
P05         
P06         
 
2.9. Crop cultivation        
1 Plot number P01 P02 P03 P0
4 
P0
5 
P0
6 
2 Crops grown  
(Same as M) 
Major rainy season 
(2009) 
crop 1       
 
 
 
crop 2       
 
 
 
crop 3       
 
 
Minor rainy season 
(2009) 
crop 1       
 
 
 
crop 2       
 
 
 
crop 3       
3 Area of crop 
cultivated 
(acres) 
Major rainy season 
(2009) 
crop 1       
 
 
 
crop 2       
 
 
 
crop 3       
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Minor rainy season 
(2009) 
crop 1       
 
 
 
crop 2       
 
 
 
crop 3       
4 Have you observed any decline in crop 
yields?(1= yes, 2= no) 
      
If yes, what do you think are the causes 
of this problem? 
 
 
 
5 Are there 
any 
differences 
between 
crops you 
grow and 
that of the 
landowner/ 
tenant? 
1=yes, 2=no  
 
 
If yes, mention some of 
the differences in 
farming systems. 
 
6 Did you 
receive any 
technical 
assistance 
from an 
extension 
officer in 
2009?  
1=yes, 2=no  
 
 
If yes, how many times 
in 2009? 
 
 
Section 3. Household Income and Assets (Wealth) 
3.1. Household ownership of implements/tools/assets  
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1 Implements/tools/assets 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 
 
What types of 
implements/tools do you use 
in your farm? (W) 
      
How many of those 
implements do you have? 
      
How did you acquire them? 
(X) 
      
What year did you acquire 
them? 
      
What is the unit cost of the 
implement (in GH¢)?  
      
3 Which of the following assets 
do you have? (Y) 
      
How did you acquire them? 
 (Same as (X) 
      
 
3.2. Income from crop/tree/fruit sales  
1 Serial number of 
head 
 
2 Type of crop/ 
trees/ 
fruits 
Maize 
(bags) 
Yam 
(100 
averag
e 
tubers) 
Cassa
va 
(bags/ 
taxi  
boot) 
Plantain 
(bunches
) 
Groun
dnut/ 
Beans 
(bags) 
Vegeta 
ble* 
(box/ 
 crates) 
Trees/ 
Fruits 
(logs/q
ty) 
3 What 
quantity 
of 
crop/tre
e/ fruit 
was 
harvest
ed in 
2009? 
 P01        
 
 
 
P02        
 
 
 
P03        
 P04        
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P05        
 
 
 
P06        
 
 
 P01        
 
 
 
P02        
 
 
 
P03        
 
 
 
P04        
 
 
 
P05        
 
 
 
P06        
4 What 
quantity 
of the 
crop/ 
tree/ 
P01        
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fruit was 
sold in 
2009? 
 
 
P02        
 
 
P03        
 
 
P04        
 
 
P05        
 
 
P06        
What is the unit 
price (GH¢) of 
crop/tree/fruit 
sold in 2009?  
       
5 What 
quantity 
of the 
crop 
was 
stored 
in 
2009? 
Major 
rainy 
season 
       
 
 
Minor 
rainy 
season 
       
6 What quantity of 
crop did the 
household 
consume in 2009? 
       
 
3.2. Income from crop/tree/fruit sales (continued) 
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Type of 
crop/ 
trees/ 
fruits 
 Maize 
(bags) 
Yam 
(100 
avera
ge 
tuber
s) 
Cassa
va 
(bags/ 
taxi  
boot) 
Plantai
n 
(bunch
es) 
Ground 
nut/ 
Beans 
(bags) 
Vegeta 
ble* 
(box/ 
crates) 
Trees/ 
Fruits 
(logs/qty) 
7 How do 
you sell 
your 
farm 
produce
? (market 
channels) 
(Z) 
P01        
 
 
P02        
 
 
P03        
 
 
P04        
 
 
P05        
 
 
P06        
8 What 
type of 
marketi
ng costs 
do you 
incur? 
(AA) 
P01        
 
 
P02        
 
 
P03        
 
 
P04        
 
 
P05        
 
 
P06        
9 What is 
the 
value of 
the 
marketi
ng costs 
(GH¢)? 
P01        
 
 
P02        
 
 
P03        
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P04        
 
 
P05        
 
 
P06        
1
0 
What 
are the 
main 
problem
s with 
marketi
ng of 
the farm 
produce
? 
   
P01
  
       
 
 P02 
       
 
 
P03 
       
 
 
P04 
       
 
 
P05 
       
 
 
P06 
       
 
3.3. Livestock ownership   
1 Serial no. of head  
2 What types of animals 
do you own? (tick)  
Cattle she
ep 
goat pigs chicken guinea 
fowls 
 
 
      
3 What quantity did you 
have at the beginning 
of 2009? 
      
4 What quantity did you 
have at the end of 
2009? 
      
5 What is the unit price 
(GH¢) of animal in 
2009? 
      
 Did a veterinary 
officer attend to your 
animals in 2009? 
(1=yes, 2=no) 
      
 
3.4. Non-farm Business Activities 
1 Serial number of household head*  Male Female 
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2 Self-
employment 
Type of business? (AB)   
 
 
How much time (in hours) is spent on the 
work each day? 
  
 
 
How was capital obtained for the business?  
(Same as X) 
  
 
 
What were the costs (GH¢) of this business 
in 2009? 
  
 
 
What was the total income (GH¢) in 2009?   
3 Non-agricultural 
wage 
employment 
(e.g. drivers, 
truck pushers, 
watchman, etc.) 
Actual job (AC)   
 
 
Number of days used for this work per 
month 
  
 
 
Monthly wage (GH¢)   
 
 
How was payment made? (AD)   
 
 
Value of payment  in kind (GH¢)   
 
 
Value of payment  in cash (GH¢)   
4 Off-farm 
agricultural 
employment 
(e.g. hired labor 
etc.) 
Actual job (Same as AC)   
 Daily wage (GH¢)   
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Number of days used for this work per 
month 
  
 
 
How was payment made? (Same as AD)   
 
 
Value of payment in kind (GH¢)   
 
 
Value of payment in cash (GH¢)   
* Interview both male and female                                              
Section 4. Social Capital, Networks and Cooperation 
4.1 Social networks 
1 Informal social networks Male Female 
 Do you have friends apart from your relatives? 
(1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 How often do you visit your friends per week?   
 How many farmers live in a radius of five kilometers 
around your home? 
  
 How often do you talk to them per week?   
2 Networks for specific purposes   
 Do you have someone who assists you practically 
in your farming activities (through nnoboa)?  
(1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 If yes, how many do help you?    
 Do you know someone who assists you with money 
in case of need? (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 If yes, how many individuals would assist you? 
Differentiate between 1= family, 2= friends, 
neighbors, 3= traders, 4=other (specify) (Use the 
numbers and state number of individuals for each!) 
  
 Does someone assist you with trading? (1=yes, 
2=no) 
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 If yes, who does help you?   
 Mention the form of assistance   
3 Information networks   
 How many neighbors do use soil conservation 
methods and soil-improving practices? 
  
 If more than none, do you discuss the methods with 
some of them? (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 What is the main experience of those who use soil 
conservation methods and soil-improving 
practices?  
(1=very bad, 2=bad, 3=don’t know, 4=good, 5=very 
good)  
  
 How many individuals you know do use soil 
conservation methods and soil-improving 
practices? 
1=family, 2=friends, 3=religious networks (Indicate 
the number of individuals for each) 
  
 If more than none, do you discuss the methods with 
some of them? (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 What is the main experience of those who use soil 
conservation methods and soil-improving 
practices? (1=very bad, 2=bad, 3=don’t know, 
4=good, 5=very good) 
  
 Are you getting advice about your farming 
business?  
● family (1=yes, 2=no) 
● friends (1=yes, 2=no) 
● neighbors (1=yes, 2=no) 
● others (specify) (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 If yes, mention the type of advice   
 Do you have a mobile phone? (1=yes, 2=no)   
 If yes, (and if applicable) how does it help you in 
your farming business? 
  
 
4.2. Social capital from participation in social activities 
 
1 
 
Participation in religious activities 
Male  Female 
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 Do you belong to any religious organization?  
(1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 If yes, what group?    
 What informed you to join the group?   
 Do you hold any position in the group? (1=yes, 
2=no) 
  
 Does joining this group assist you in your farming 
activities?  
  
 If yes, mention this form of assistance!   
2 Participation in farmer based organizations 
(FBO) activities 
  
 Are you a member of any FBO? (1=yes, 2=no)   
 If yes, how many organizations are you a member 
of? 
  
 How many ethnic groups are present in your 
organization(s)? If more than one organization, 
indicate for each! 
  
 Does joining the organization (s) assist you in 
your farming business? 
  
 If yes, mention the form of assistance!   
 Do you hold any position in any of the 
organizations? ( 1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 Have the members of the organization (s) 
received some training towards improving your 
farming activities? (1=yes,2=no) 
  
 If yes, what kind of training have you received?   
 
 
 
 
4.3. Social capital at the village level 
  
Serial number of household head  
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Male Female 
1 Do you think the community in which you farm is safe 
for you to undertake your farming activities? (1=yes, 
2=no) 
  
2 Generally, do you think the people in the village or 
community where you farm can be trusted? (1=yes, 
2=no) 
  
3 Generally, how do you rank the cooperative behavior 
in the community? (4=very good, 3=good , 2=average, 
1=poor)   
  
4 How do you rank the educational systems in the 
community where you farm? (4=very good, 3=good , 
2=average, 1=poor)   
  
5 Do you think being a member of the community offer 
you opportunity to access credit from the community 
credit lenders? 
(1=yes, 2=no)  
  
6 Do you vote for local politics? (1=yes, 2=no)   
*Interview both male and female 
4.4.Trust and cooperation in tenancy arrangements and assistance 
  
Serial number of household head  
 
 
 
Male Female 
1 How often do you meet your landowner/tenant in a 
year? 
  
2 For sharecroppers, do you trust your owner/tenant to 
accept/pay his/her share of output? (4=very high 
3=high, 2=average, 1=poor) 
  
3 For fixed-rent tenants;  
Do you trust your owner to allow you to vacate the 
rented plot promptly? (4=very high, 3=high, 
2=average, 1=poor) 
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Do you trust your owner to extend the tenure duration, 
if you want to? (4=very high, 3=high, 2=average, 
1=poor) 
For owners of fixed plots;  
Do you trust your tenant to vacate the rented plot 
promptly? (4=very high, 3=high, 2=average, 1=poor) 
  
4 Have your owner/tenant assisted you with a loan for 
your farming activities before? (1=yes, 2=no)  
  
5 If yes, have you defaulted in the repayment of the 
loan agreement before? (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
6 How do you rank the assistance extension agents 
give to you in improving your cultivation techniques? 
(4=very high, 3=high, 2=average, 1=poor) 
  
7 How do you rank the assistance extension agents 
give to you in improving the investments you 
undertake on your plot(s)? (4=very high, 3=high, 
2=average, 1=poor) 
  
*Interview both male and female 
Section 5. Perceived Needs  
5.1. Constraints on investment 
Which of the following issues hinder you from investing in soil conservation methods and 
soil-improving practices? Determine the extent of constraint! 
1 
Socio- economic issues 
Very 
High 
High Low Very 
Low 
None 
 
 
     
 Lack of access to inputs      
 High prices of inputs      
 Lack of access to credit      
 Lack of land      
 Insecurity in extension of 
tenure duration 
     
 High effort of applying 
practices 
     
 Lack of practical help      
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 Lack of implements and/ or 
tools to apply practices 
     
 Lack of remunerative 
options to gain benefits from 
investment 
     
 Insecurity in reaping benefits 
of investment 
     
 Lack of good experiences 
from others 
     
 High social pressure        
 High complexity of applying 
combination of practices 
     
 Lack of support from 
family/friends to invest 
     
 Low increase in (short-term) 
productivity in comparison to 
cost increase of production 
due to investment 
     
2 Structural issues      
 Lack of information on 
possible practices 
     
 Lack of knowledge on how 
to apply practices 
     
 
 
Lack of advice/ guidance on 
how to apply practices 
     
3 Other (Specify) 
 
     
 
5.2. Necessary Changes 
What have to be changed for you to invest in soil conservation methods and soil-improving 
practices? Please name three and start with the most crucial in order to indicate the order of 
importance 
1)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………     
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
2)………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
230 
 
3)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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CODES 
Section 1: Personal History 
A (Position)  B (Ethnic group)  
01=husband  01=Frafra 
02=wife     02=Kusasi 
03=brother                                                       03=Busanga 
04=sister   04=Kasena Nankani 
05=son  05=Builsa (Kangyaga) 
06=daughter  06=Gurunshie (Kasena) 
07=other (specify)  07=Asante 
                                                                    08=Brong 
                                                                      09=other (specify) 
C (Where born)  D (Education Level)   
01=this village                                                 01=none 
02=out of this district                                       02=primary 
03=my hometown                                           03=middle/JHS 
04=foreign country                                           04=secondary/college/SHS 
05=other (specify)                                            05=other (specify) 
E (Position)                                                   F (Job) 
01=husband  01=student/pupil 
02=wife  02=looking after the family farm 
03=son  03= non-agricultural wage employment  
04=daughter  04=agricultural wage employment  
05=brother  05=self-employed   
06=sister  06=unemployed  
07=nephew  07=other (specify) 
08=other (specify)  
Section 2: Plot-level Characteristics 
G (Type of slope)                  H (Expected fertility) 
01=flat  01=very fertile  
02=mild slope  02=fertile  
03=severe slope  03=not fertile  
04=other (specify)  04=other (specify)   
 
I (Plot ownership)    J (Inheritance of plot) 
01=inherited maternal family             01=children 
02=inherited paternal family   02=brother/sister 
03=husband family land                03=uncle/aunt  
04=hired/rented land     04=husband/wife 
05=sharecropping     05=others (specify) 
06=free/gift 
07=stool land (lease/grant from chief) 
08=personally owned land (purchased) 
K (Tenure arrangement)  L (Share of costs of inputs) 
01=sharecropping (abunu)               01=migrant tenant bear all the cost 
02=sharecropping (abusa)  02=landowner bear all the cost 
03=hired (rented)  03=cost is shared equally 
04=purchased (owned)  04=migrant tenant pays two-thirds  
05=free (gift)  05=landowner pays two thirds  
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06=lease (grant) from chief   06=other (specify) 
07=taungya 
08=other (specify) 
 
M (Crops grown)   
01=maize  08=tomato    
02=sorghum  09=okro   
03=millet  10=garden eggs    
04=yams  11=cowpea    
05=cassava  12=groundnuts   
06=cocoyam  13=plantain  
07=pepper               14=other (specify) 
N (Type of trees)   
01=teak  05=orange 
02=cashew                                        06=mango 
03=oil palm                                        07=other (specify) 
04=mahogany (“odum”)                    
0 (Erosion control)  P (Agronomic practices)  
01=terraces  01=multiple cropping 
02=ditches                                       02=mulching 
03=wind breaks                                        03=crop rotation 
04=earth dams                    04=cover crops 
05= other (specify)                                        05=others (specify) 
Q (Soil management practices)  R (Cultivation practices)  
01=deep ploughing  01=minimum tillage 
02=compost                                       02=zero tillage 
03=farm manure                                        03=ridging across slope 
04=green manure                    04=ridging along slope  
05= other (specify)                                        05=others (specify) 
S (Reasons for planting trees)  
01=to check soil erosion                                  04=to earn income 
02=to prevent declines in yields of crops        05=to have secure tenure of plot 
03=part of tenure agreement                            06=other (specify) 
T (Source of seeds)                                         U (Maintenance of trees) 
01=purchased                                         01=manual weeding 
02=own grown seedlings                       02=pruning 
03=community tree nursery                   03=use of weedicides 
04=other (specify)                                   04=establishing fire lines 
V (Type of Inputs)   
01=fertiliser (NPK 15-15-15)   05=herbicides/weedicides  
02=fertiliser (NP 20-20)   06=planting material  
03=urea (sulphate of ammonia)    07=improved seeds  
04=pesticides/fungicides   08=other (specify)  
Section 3: Household Income and Assets (Wealth) 
W (Implements)  X (Source of funds)  
01=cutlass    01=loan from the bank  
02=hoe    02=loan from credit union 
233 
 
03=ax                                      03=loan from ‘susu’ collectors 
  
04=mattock                       04=loan from traders  
05=head pan                     05=loan from money lenders  
06=tractor          06=income from crop sales 
07=basket                                                            07=income from non-farm 
08=sacks                                                              08=income from livestock sales 
09=other (specify)                                                09=other (specify) 
Y (Ownership of assets)    
01=cart      06= refrigerator 
02=car      07=television 
03=motor bicycle    08=house 
04=bicycle     09=others (specify) 
05=tractor 
Z (Marketing channels)   AA (Type of marketing costs) 
01=farm 01=transport cost 
02=market 02=on-loading cost 
03=home 03=off-loading cost 
04=market, home                 04=market tolls 
05=cocoa buying centres          05=transport, on-loading 
06=others (specify)     06=transport, market tolls 
                                                                   07=selling cost 
                                                                  08=others (specify) 
AB (Type of self-employment)  AC (Type of wage employment) 
01=pito brewing  01=employee working for rural private employer 
02=handicrafts   02=employee working for government 
03=selling of cooked food  03=hired farm labourer 
04=shoe shine/repairing  04=exchange work in relative’s farm 
05=charcoal production                                       05=exchange work in friend’s farm 
  
06=gari processing    06=exchange work in local transport owner’s farm 
07=table top/market stall    07=other (specify) 
08=general retail shop    
09=tailoring/seamstress    
10=other (specify)    
AD (Payment of wages)   
01=cash     
02=payment in kind    
03=use of plough    
04=free transportation to/from farm  
05=other (specify). 
 
